Big splash, no waves? Cognitive mechanisms driving incumbent firms’ responses to low‐price market entry strategies

AuthorJukka Luoma,Tomas Falk,Henrikki Tikkanen,Alexander Mrozek,Dirk Totzek
Date01 May 2018
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2763
Published date01 May 2018
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Big splash, no waves? Cognitive mechanisms
driving incumbent firmsresponses to low-price
market entry strategies
Jukka Luoma
1
| Tomas Falk
1
| Dirk Totzek
2
| Henrikki Tikkanen
1
|
Alexander Mrozek
3
1
Department of Marketing, Aalto University
School of Business, Aalto, Finland
2
School of Business, Economics and Information
Systems, University of Passau, Passau, Germany
3
Google Germany, Berlin, Germany
Correspondence
Jukka Luoma, Department of Marketing, Aalto
University School of Business, P.O. Box 21230,
FI-00076 Aalto, Finland.
Email: jukka.luoma@aalto.fi
Research Summary: Low-price market entries, aiming for
rapid sales growth, tend to prompt strong competitive
reactions. This research explores whether and how firms
using low-price entry strategies can mitigate retaliatory
incumbent reactions. An experiment with 656 managers
shows that entrants can attenuate the strength of incum-
bentsresponses by fostering perceptions of high aggres-
siveness or low commitment. Entrants may be able to
accomplish this by adjusting their entry strategy to embed
(subtle) cues of aggressiveness and (lack of) commitment.
A replication experiment with university students rein-
forces our overall theoretical argument. However, the
results also indicate that the interpretation of cues embed-
ded in the entry strategy may be affected by the experience
of incumbent firm managers. Overall, these results clarify
the cognitive foundations of competitive responses to mar-
ket entry.
Managerial Summary: What drives incumbents to
respond strongly to market entries, and what can the
entrant, if anything, do to mitigate those responses? This
research offers empirical evidence and theoretical insights
for managers faced with these questions by shedding light
on the thinking processes preceding competitive
responses. The study shows that while managers are moti-
vated to respond strongly to market entries that appear to
be highly consequential to their business, these responses
may be mitigated if the entrant manages to foster percep-
tions of high aggressiveness or low commitment to the
market. Managers form these perceptions in part on the
basis of the entrants behavior, creating an opportunity for
Received: 27 September 2015 Revised: 6 October 2017 Accepted: 23 October 2017 Published on: 30 January 2018
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2763
1388 Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/smj Strat Mgmt J. 2018;39:13881410.
entrants to adjust their entry strategies in a manner that
demotivates strong competitive responses.
KEYWORDS
behavioral strategy, competitive dynamics, experimental
study, market entry, pricing
1|INTRODUCTION
Entering an existing market involves balancing two goals. On the one hand, it is desirable to enter a
market with a big splash,that is, to grow market share quickly and enjoy the associated positive
feedback effects, such as learning by doing, scale economies, network effects, information conta-
gion, and the accumulation of complementary assets(Sterman et al., 2007, p. 684). On the other
hand, entrants would like to avoid the wavesassociated with a big splash, that is, the strong, pos-
sibly devastating competitive reactions by incumbents. These goals are often seen as contradictory;
entrants must choose between making a high-impact entry and minimizing the likelihood of a coun-
terattack (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992; Chen, Su, & Tsai, 2007).
This study explores the possibility that this trade-off may not be that clear-cut. Indeed, prior the-
oretical arguments suggest that highly impactful market entry strategies may sometimes deter
incumbent firm counterattacks (e.g., Fan, 2010; McGrath, Chen, & MacMillan, 1998; Wang &
Shaver, 2014). Consequently, we ask if and how a firm might be able to dampen the waves associ-
ated with a big splash market entry. And, if they can, what are the cognitive mechanisms underlying
a weakened competitive response of the incumbent?
We explore these issues in the context of entry pricing, focusing on what determines incumbent
responses to a new competitors low-price market entry strategy (LPMES). Entering a market with a
below-market price is appealing, as a low price offers a clear signal of economic advantage over the
incumbentsofferings, thus inducing customer switching and fueling rapid sales and market share
growth (e.g., Spann, Fischer, & Tellis, 2015). However, incumbents can easily spot the low price
and are likely to perceive it as threatening. As retaliatory price cuts are easy to implement, incum-
bents tend to rapidly cut prices in response to low-price market entries (Debruyne, Moenaertb, &
Griffinc, 2002; Kuester, Homburg, & Robertson, 1999), thus countering the intended positive effects
of an LPMES (McCann & Vroom, 2010; Simon, 2005).
Apart from that, managersassessments of the entrants longer-term behavioral intentions might
also affect the incumbents competitive responses. In particular, we predict that managers are likely
to be less motivated to attack entrants who are expected to act aggressively in the market (e.g., Fan,
2010), due to a fear of triggering a destructive race to the bottom.Conversely, managers are more
prone to attack entrants perceived as committed to the market (e.g., Heil & Walters, 1993), due to
the belief that such entrants present a long-term competitive threat unless dealt with immediately.
Thus, the incumbents response may be mitigated if the entrant succeeds to foster perceptions high
aggressiveness or low commitment. An experiment with 656 managers supports these predictions. A
replication study with 1,070 university students reveals a qualitatively similar pattern of results.
Our study also illuminates how the entrant might be able to influence the incumbents percep-
tions of aggressiveness and commitment. Building on the cue approach (e.g., Chen & MacMillan,
LUOMA ET AL.1389

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT