Bidding Farewell to the Ball and Chain: the United States Supreme Court Unconvincingly Prohibits Shackling in the Penalty Phase in Deck v. Missouri

• Publication year: 2022

39 Creighton L. Rev. 741. BIDDING FAREWELL TO THE BALL AND CHAIN: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT UNCONVINCINGLY PROHIBITS SHACKLING IN THE PENALTY PHASE IN DECK V. MISSOURI

Creighton Law Review

Vol. 39

INTRODUCTION

Several courts have ruled, as a matter of either state or federal constitutional law, an accused has a right to appear at trial free of visible shackles or other physical restraints.(fn1) Courts and commentators typically frame their criticism of shackling at the guilt phase of a criminal trial as an affront to the presumption of innocence inherent in due process, since shackling is likely to have an effect on juror perceptions and prejudices.(fn2) Courts that support a prohibition on guilt phase shackling also point to shackling's interference with a defendant's ability to aid in his own defense, as well as its negative effect on the dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings.(fn3) Until Deck v. Missouri,(fn4) few courts and commentators had discussed shackling's effect on due process in the sentencing or "penalty phase" of a criminal trial, when the presumption of innocence no longer applies.(fn5)

In Deck, Carman L. Deck ("Deck") appealed his death sentence, arguing his constitutional rights were violated when he appeared before the jury at the retrial of his penalty phase handcuffed to a belly chain.(fn6) Prior to Deck, the closest the United States Supreme Court came to addressing the issue of shackling was to speak briefly of the practice in the dicta of three of its previous rulings.(fn7) The Court in Deck relied in great part on this dicta as a basis for announcing a constitutional prohibition on the routine use of shackles in both the guilt and penalty phases of criminal proceedings.(fn8) The Court held that the Constitution prohibits visible shackling during both the guilt and penalty phases, unless there is an essential state interest specific to the defendant that would warrant such measures.(fn9) The Court explained the prohibition on shackling was deeply rooted in the law and this "ancient English rule" found support in some of the Court's modern decisions.(fn10) Quoting to dictum from its opinion in Illinois v. Allen,(fn11) the Court indicated the prohibition against shackling made up part of the constitutional due process guarantee under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.(fn12) The Court then relied on additional dicta from its opinions in Holbrook v. Flynn(fn13) and Estelle v. Williams(fn14) for the proposition that shackling was inherently prejudicial.(fn15)

The Court in Deck noted that lower courts have relied on language from these three opinions to establish a constitutional prohibition against shackling, although lower courts have disagreed about the procedure to be implemented.(fn16) Thus, the Court formally announced a constitutional prohibition on shackling during the guilt phase.(fn17) The Court determined the same principles that militate against shackling in the guilt phase apply with equal force to prohibit penalty phase shackling.(fn18) According to the Court, these "three fundamental legal principles" are (1) the presumption of innocence, (2) the right to counsel, and (3) maintaining the dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings.(fn19) With respect to the first principle, the Court explained that although the presumption of innocence is no longer a concern in post-conviction penalty proceedings, shackling infringes upon related concerns.(fn20)

This Note will discuss the facts and holding of Deck, which announced a constitutional prohibition against the routine use of shack-ling at all stages of a criminal proceeding.(fn21) This Note will then explore several of the Court's prior decisions, upon which the Court in Deck relied to support its indication that the due process guarantee of the Constitution supported a prohibition on guilt phase and penalty phase shackling.(fn22) Next, this Note will determine the Court improperly relied on its prior rulings to constitutionally prohibit shackling of criminal defendants in the guilt phase.(fn23) This Note will then show the Court in Deck utilized unconvincing reasoning and unpersuasive dicta when it determined the principles that underlie the prohibition on guilt phase shackling apply with equal force to bar penalty phase shackling.(fn24) Finally, this Note will conclude by discussing some procedural implications of the Court's decision in Deck.(fn25)

FACTS AND HOLDING

On the evening of July 8, 1996, Deck drove to Jefferson County, Missouri with his sister, Tonia Cummings ("Cummings"), to rob the home of James and Zelma Long.(fn26) At around nine o'clock that evening, Deck and Cummings knocked on the Longs' door.(fn27) When Mrs. Long answered, Deck asked for directions, at which point Mrs. Long invited Deck and Cummings into her house.(fn28) As Mrs. Long was explaining directions, and while Mr. Long wrote them down for Deck and Cummings, Deck moved to the front door, pulled a gun from his waistband, and instructed the Longs to lie on their bed.(fn29) Mrs. Long opened the safe at Deck's behest, gave Deck the contents, and voluntarily gave Deck two hundred dollars from her purse.(fn30) Upon Mrs. Long's return to the bedroom, Mr. Long offered Deck a canister of money.(fn31) Deck then ordered the Longs to again lie face down on their bed, after which he stood at the foot of the bed for ten minutes contemplating whether to kill them.(fn32)

Deck eventually fired two shots into each of the Longs' heads, killing them.(fn33) Deck then took the Longs' money and fled the house.(fn34) On the basis of a tip from an informant, the local police dispatched an officer to Deck's apartment complex.(fn35) Upon arrival at Deck's apartment complex, the officer confronted Deck after witnessing him drive his car with the headlights off into the apartment parking lot.(fn36) The officer discovered Deck's .22 caliber pistol concealed under Deck's car seat and subsequently arrested him.(fn37) Deck later gave a full oral, written, and audio-taped confession of the murders.(fn38)

The Circuit Court of Jefferson County convicted Deck of two counts of first-degree murder and related offenses.(fn39) Justice Gary P. Kramer sentenced Deck to death for each murder count.(fn40) Deck's sentences and convictions were upheld on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri.(fn41) Deck then petitioned the Supreme Court of Missouri for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.(fn42) The Supreme Court of Missouri remanded for a new penalty phase, finding ineffective assistance of counsel when Deck's counsel failed to recommend proper mitigation instructions to the court.(fn43) At Deck's retrial of his penalty phase, the court entered two death sentences consistent with the jury's recommendations.(fn44)

Deck appealed his re-sentencing judgment to the Supreme Court of Missouri, asserting nine points of error.(fn45) Among these points of error, Deck argued the court abused its discretion when it allowed him to appear before the jury handcuffed to a belly chain.(fn46) Deck argued that by allowing him to appear in such restraints, the trial court vio-lated his rights to a fair and reliable sentencing, to due process, to confrontation of evidence, to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and to equal protection.(fn47)

In determining that the trial court was justified in allowing Deck to be restrained throughout trial, the Supreme Court of Missouri began its analysis by noting a Missouri trial court has authority to use restraints to ensure order and safety in the courtroom.(fn48) The court then stated that an abuse of discretion will be found when a trial court's ruling is clearly illogical under the circumstances and was so unreasonable that it shocked the sense of justice so as to indicate a lack of consideration.(fn49) The court noted the following three facts to support its determination that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing Deck to appear in restraints during the retrial of his penalty phase: (1) No record was made to show the extent of jurors' awareness of Deck's restraints during his penalty phase, (2) Deck made no claim that the restraints hindered him from taking part in the proceedings, and (3) the court perceived Deck as a flight risk in that Deck was a repeat offender and the guilt phase produced evidence that his victims were killed to prevent his recapture by authorities.(fn50) The court added that even if the trial court abused its discretion, Deck did not demonstrate any resulting prejudice that affected the outcome of his trial.(fn51) Finally, the court noted when the venire panel was questioned about whether Deck's restraints would influence their decision, no juror answered in the affirmative.(fn52) On this basis, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined the trial court was within its discretion by allowing Deck to appear shackled and restrained at the retrial of his penalty phase.(fn53)

On July 15, 2004, Deck filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.(fn54) The Court granted certiorari to consider whether it was constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution for a trial court to allow a capital defendant to appear in front of a jury during the penalty phase visibly handcuffed to a belly chain.(fn55) Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for the majority, held...