Beyond the Roll-Call Arena: The Determinants of Position Taking in Congress

• Published date: 01 June 2005
• DOI: 10.1177/106591290505800210
• Author: Benjamin Highton,Michael S. Rocca
• Date: 01 June 2005
• Subject Matter: Articles

In his seminal work on legislative behavior in the U.S.

Congress Mayhew (1974: 49) defined position taking as

“the public enunciation of a judgmental statement on

anything likely to be of interest to political actors.” The sig-

nificance of position taking derives in large part from the

observation that “politicians often get rewarded for taking

positions rather than achieving effects” (Mayhew 2001: 51).

Of course the primary rewards most politicians seek are elec-

tion and reelection. Therefore, attention is naturally drawn to

the relationship between the positions members of Congress

take and the preferences of their constituents. Understand-

ing the nature of this dyadic relationship is also important

because it bears directly on questions of representation,

which are of longstanding concern to democratic theorists.

To date, most empirical analyses of position taking in

Congress focus on roll-call voting, where members of Con-

gress (MCs) regularly cast votes, thereby regularly taking

positions. Beginning with Miller and Stokes (1963), a large

literature has developed to understand the nature of the

connection between legislators’ roll-call votes and the opin-

ions and preferences of their constituencies.1Left largely

unstudied has been position taking outside the domain of

roll-call voting. And, to the extent that this has been stud-

ied, the emphasis has generally been on non-electoral fac-

tors. In this article, we suggest that although non-roll-call

position taking is difficult to analyze systematically, shifting

from an exclusive roll-call focus is important because a

large amount of MC position taking does not occur through

roll-call votes.

The purpose of this study is twofold. First, we analyze

the conditions under which members take non-roll-call

positions. The motivation for this analysis is the observation

that some members of Congress take positions on particular

issues while others do not. We argue and provide evidence

that whether a legislator takes a position depends in impor-

tant ways on the nature of constituency opinion, specifically

its heterogeneity, extremity, and alignment with a member’s

own preferences.

Second, we examine the positions that MCs take and

suggest that because non-roll-call position taking is not

directly linked to policy effects, parties are less interested in

exerting influence over it. This comparatively weaker party

link represents another important difference between roll-

call and non-roll-call position taking behavior. Our results

support this notion, indicating that party differences are less

pronounced and smaller in comparison to constituency

influences outside the roll-call arena.

In the following sections, we formulate and test a series

of hypotheses derived from theory and previous research.

We focus on position taking regarding abortion policy in the

101st Congress. This decision was guided by theoretical and

empirical considerations, which we explain below. The arti-

cle proceeds by reviewing previous research and developing

the hypotheses. Then we describe the data and estimation

strategy. Finally, we present and discuss the results.

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

Members of Congress regularly have the opportunity to

take positions in a variety of formal and informal ways. For

instance, members can take positions by giving one-minute

speeches on the House floor; they can stake out positions

through bill sponsorship and cosponsorship; media inter-

views are a vehicle for position taking; and so on.2Indeed,

303

Beyond the Roll-Call Arena:

The Determinants of Position Taking in Congress

BENJAMIN HIGHTON AND MICHAEL S. ROCCA, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS

Most analyses of position taking in Congress focus on roll-call voting, where members of Congress (MCs) reg-

ularly cast votes, thereby regularly taking positions. Left largely unstudied has been position taking beyond the

domain of rollcall voting. However, analyzing non-roll-call position taking raises interesting theoretical ques-

tions. Whereas most members cannot avoid taking positions (casting votes) on roll calls, outside the roll-call

arena MCs have more discretion; they must decide whether or not to take a position at all. And, while roll-call

voting is directly tied to policy consequences, the connection is weaker in non-roll-call position taking. These

two distinguishing features of non-roll-call position taking motivate a variety of hypotheses about who takes

positions and what positions they take. Our results reveal strong constituency links to both phenomena. The

results also imply that party influence is greater on roll-call position taking. We interpret these findings in the

context of leading theories of congressional behavior.

1See, for example, Fiorina (1974); Achen (1977, 1978); Erikson (1978,

1981); Jackson and King (1989); Bartels (1991); and Ansolabehere,

Snyder, and Stewart (2001).

NOTE: We appreciate the advice, criticism, and assistance from Ryan

Claassen, Robert W. Jackman, Kathryn Pearson, Brian Sala, Walter

J. Stone, and Raymond E. Wolfinger.

Political Research Quarterly,Vol. 58, No. 2 (June2005) pp. 303-316

2As Mayhew (1974: 63) put it: “The ways in which positions can be reg-

istered are numerous and often imaginative. There are floor addresses