Beyond the NRA doctrine.

• Author: Ferguson, Charles D.

THE LACK of a transatlantic policy to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is perplexing. The United States has declared that the "proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our national security", and that "there are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD." The EU equally proclaims: "WMD and missile proliferation puts at risk the security of our states, our peoples and our interests around the world. Meeting this challenge must be a central element in the EU's external action."

So what would be more commonsensical than tackling this existential threat jointly?

The reality is, however, that the existing U.S.-EU policy framework hardly goes beyond a polite exchange of views during bi-annual summits. The lofty U.S.-EU communiques hide the fact that there is simply no transatlantic WMD proliferation policy to speak of. The status quo is untenable, and the United States and EU should work urgently to make amends.

Halting WMD proliferation tops strategic agendas on both sides of the Atlantic, but this is where the parallel ends. President Bush opens the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy with the ominous words "My fellow Americans, America is at war", whereas the EU's Security Strategy of 2003 begins with the blue-eyed statement that "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free." The contrast could not be starker: the United States feels beleaguered, pressured to take rapid and proactive measures aimed at immediate success. In contrast, the EU sees security threats as management challenges, with time not running out, but often working in Europe's favor.

This disparity could have made for a well-functioning, complementary partnership, with the United States more gung-ho and Europe a bit more contemplative. Instead, it has resulted in a major strategic disconnect.

The most notable shift is that the Bush Administration no longer calls upon all states to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Instead, the 2003 State of the Union address argued that the "gravest danger facing America and the world is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical and biological weapons." Washington's strategic worldview accepts that its allies (the "good guys") may possess WMD (like Israel and, after 9/11, Pakistan and India as well), whereas its enemies (the "bad guys") must be disarmed or, preferably, replaced. The United States no longer puts pressures on India or Pakistan to abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), even though both countries have nuclear weapons and have more than once been at the brink of nuclear war with each other. Moreover, although Pakistan has helped develop the nuclear programs of Iran, North Korea and Libya, Washington seems to place more value on Islamabad's assistance in fighting Al-Qaeda.

To Europeans, this U.S. shift is disconcerting since it further erodes the basic rules of existing non-proliferation treaties and regimes. Moreover, while Angela Merkel's "New Germany" has earned brownie points with the White House by taking a tough stance vis-a-vis Iran (not only due to Tehran's nuclear cheating but also because President Ahmadinejad's open denial of the Holocaust has set German politicians' teeth on edge), there is still hardly a European policymaker--or even a political analyst of some credibility and name--who prefers war to a nuclear Iran.

As the saying goes, when all you have is a hammer, all problems look like a nail. Lacking a hammer, Europe tends to wield a diplomatic pen, and in the process hopes to translate policy solutions into treaties. This approach explains why the EU remains as strongly committed to the NPT as before--probably even more so. At the transatlantic summit of June 2005 in Washington, the EU and the United States affirmed "that the NPT is central to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons." But this statement sounded rather hollow and obligatory since the United States faced severe European criticism for the failure of the NPT Review Conference of May 2005 in New York. At this NPT Conference, the U.S. delegation blocked any discussion on nuclear disarmament, but wanted to shift the debate to rogue states like Iran and...