Beyond the "embryonic stage": Younger v. Harris and "proceedings of substance on the merits" in the context of preliminary injunctive relief.

AuthorSchaeffer, Jarrod L.
  1. INTRODUCTION II. OVERVIEW OF THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE III. YOUNGER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF A. The "Procedural" View B. The "Substantive" View IV. TOWARD A UNIFORM APPLICATION OF YOUNGER A. Procedural Similarity B. Federal Equity Power, Federalism, and Comity C. Equitable Concerns V. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION

    Federal courts historically have been dubbed "the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States," yet a party bringing an action in federal court must first surmount numerous jurisdictional obstacles. (1) Having invested a significant amount of time, money, and other resources in preparing a claim for federal review, putative plaintiffs may be surprised when a court ultimately abstains from deciding a case under one of several judicially-crafted doctrines. (2) largely predicated on notions of federalism and comity, these principles may ring hollow for those seeking emergency relief from a constitutional deprivation. (3) For these and other reasons, federal courts generally do not refuse to exercise jurisdiction and abstention supposedly serves as "an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it." (4) Despite this "virtually unflagging obligation," however, the scope of abstention doctrines has expanded significantly in recent years. (5)

    Though courts may abstain from exercising jurisdiction for a number of reasons, this article focuses exclusively on abstention under Younger v. Harris (6) In Younger, the Supreme Court held that federal courts generally must abstain from enjoining state criminal proceedings or otherwise interfering with state criminal prosecutions. (7) Since then Younger has evolved; the doctrine has been steadily enlarged to include quasi-criminal proceedings, state administrative proceedings, and even some civil actions. (8) Concerns about federalism and comity, rather than the original equitable justifications, now predominate and courts usually justify abstention by invoking the talisman of "Our Federalism" and voicing a desire for harmonious relations between federal and state judiciaries. (9) Much has been written about the development and wisdom (or lack thereof) of these developments. (10) This article charts a more pragmatic course, exploring the intersection of Younger and preliminary injunctive relief to resolve a split among the lower federal courts concerning the significance of temporary restraining orders. (11)

    The Supreme Court has yet to articulate a comprehensive standard for the application of Younger in this context. In particular, though one treatise has reasonably and confidently asserted that abstention is warranted after "[a] denial of a temporary restraining order" by a federal district court but not after "the issuance of a temporary restraining order," the federal courts are actually split on how they view these two occurrences and the case law hardly reflects this neat generalization. (12) The most that can be said definitively is that the "[d]enial of a temporary restraining order and issuance of such an order might well be viewed differently" by the Supreme Court. (13)

    No court or commentator has outlined a coherent framework for abstention following proceedings concerning preliminary injunctive relief. A uniform standard governing the application of Younger following these proceedings is desirable, however, because a consistent approach would better observe the federalism and comity concerns that motivate abstention, balance the interests of litigants, and provide guidance in abstention cases. (14) This article offers a way to resolve the split among the lower courts as to when abstention is required after the issuance of a temporary restraining order. (15) Specifically, it argues that viewing the issuance of such an order in the same manner as the issuance of a preliminary injunction is the most logical and doctrinally consistent approach.

  2. OVERVIEW OF THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE

    The modern Younger doctrine is best described as an exception to a federal court's duty to exercise jurisdiction where federal adjudication would disrupt an ongoing state enforcement proceeding. (16) The doctrine embodies the judicial determination that, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts should not interfere with actions pending before state judiciaries. (17) "Our Federalism," as the Supreme Court explained, requires that "the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." (18) "Perhaps the strongest justification for Younger deference is the recognized need to avoid disrupting the state judicial process.... [and t]his principle has long served as an essential element of federalism." (19)

    Pursuant to Younger, a federal court generally must abstain from interfering in state proceedings when certain circumstances are present, even if it properly has jurisdiction over a claim. Younger does not compel abstention, however, where extraordinary circumstances indicate that a party will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of federal intervention, where a state prosecution is brought in bad faith, where a state statute is patently unconstitutional, where a state proceeding does not provide an adequate forum for a party's claims, where a state submits to federal jurisdiction, or where a party waives the abstention argument by failing to raise it. (20) Outside these exceptions, the federal courts generally must stay their hand if an ongoing state proceeding implicates important state interests and the state tribunal is competent to hear federal constitutional claims. Moreover, the Supreme Court "ha[s] since recognized that [its] concern for comity and federalism is equally applicable to certain other pending state proceedings," gradually extending Youngerin ways both topical and temporal. (21)

    As to the former, Younger has grown beyond state criminal proceedings and now applies to almost any ongoing state proceeding that implicates important state interests. (22)

    The temporal evolution--relating to when Younger is relevant in the course of litigation--is the main focus of this article. Originally, Younger abstention was appropriate only if state judicial proceedings were pending or about to be pending before a federal action was commenced. (23) In the absence of a pending state proceeding, the Younger Court opined that "considerations of equity, comity, and federalism have little vitality." (24) The Court extended the doctrine significantly, however, when it held in Hicks v. Miranda (25) that Younger applies to state proceedings initiated "against [] federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court." (26) Shortly afterward, in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. (27) the Court added that a "prayer for injunction is squarely governed by Younger" where the "federal litigation was in an embryonic stage and no contested matter had been decided." (28) To say that the Court's reasoning in these cases was unclear would be an understatement. (29) Today, the upshot of Hicks and Doran is still complicated by the murky question of what constitutes a "proceeding of substance on the merits" or the "embryonic stage" and it thus remains unclear when a subsequently filed state proceeding can displace actions already taken in federal court. (30) This lack of clear guidance has left the matter to be fleshed out by the lower courts. (31)

    Wrestling with this question, courts have reached some consensus on how to define "proceedings of substance on the merits" and the "embryonic stage." In Tucker v. Ann Klein Forensic Center, (32) for example, the plaintiff filed a federal complaint thirteen months before he eventually filed an analogous state complaint. (33) During that time, the district court examined and dismissed several of the plaintiff's claims. (34) Ruling that the district court was not required to abstain, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that, when the plaintiff "filed his complaint in the Superior Court [of New Jersey], his federal action had been pending for more than one year, both the District Court and this Court had addressed and resolved the merits of several of [the plaintiff]'s claims, and there had been one appeal to this Court." (35) Those circumstances clearly indicated to the court that the "federal action had progressed beyond the point at which Younger abstention could properly be invoked." (36) Not all cases, however, present so clear a case and the abstention question is routinely closer where federal "proceedings" are not so obviously extensive.

    Typically, courts do not view mere filings--e.g., of pleadings or an application for a temporary restraining order--or the scheduling of a hearing on a preliminary injunction as progressing beyond the "embryonic stage." (37) Since a "proceeding of substance" must be "on the merits," courts also require consideration of an important controversy germane to the issues presented in the case. (38) Questions related solely to abstention or jurisdiction are usually insufficient. (39) It remains unclear, however, how broadly courts should define the "merits" of a proceeding. (40) Federal courts have also declined to abstain in cases where "state law expressly indicates that the [state] proceeding is not a judicial proceeding or part of one," the proceeding "lack[ed] trial-like trappings," or the specific constitutional claim at issue could not obviously be adjudicated. (41)

    This article focuses on the interpretation of "proceedings of substance on the merits" and the "embryonic stage" in the context of preliminary injunctive relief, i.e. a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order...

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