Beyond Institutional Collective Action: Why and When Do Metropolitan Governments Collaborate?

• Date: 01 September 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0160323X19884618
• Published date: 01 September 2019
• Author: Manlio F. Castillo
• Subject Matter: Reviews & Essays

Reviews & Essays
State and Local Government Review
2019, Vol. 51(3) 197-209
Beyond Institutional Collective
ª The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
Action: Why and When Do
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DOI: 10.1177/0160323X19884618
Metropolitan Governments
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Collaborate?
Manlio F. Castillo1
Abstract
The essay explores why and when metropolitan governments collaborate beyond the assumptions
of the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework. It claims that metropolitan governments not
only create collaborative arrangements after comparing their costs and benefits, or when sponta-
neously their agendas get aligned. This article argues that the success of metropolitan interlocal
collaboration also rests on the proclivity to collaboration of independent local governments’
institutional structures, which, in turn, depends on how local governments and their management
capabilities have been shaped and evolved, both individually and comparatively with neighboring
governments. Additionally, the article classifies and explains four basic models of metropolitan
collaborative arrangements.
Keywords
institutional collective action, decision-making institutions, metropolitan areas, interlocal collabora-
tion, collaborative arrangements
The best way to govern metropolitan areas
pursuing agreements between agents involved
composed of many smaller jurisdictions is col-
in urban governance. It identifies factors that
laborative governance. Many scholars agree
reduce transaction costs and incentivizes the
that while an administratively fragmented city
creation of interlocal arrangements.
can choose to govern and manage its parts indi-
vidually, collaborative connections lead to bet-
ter outcomes. Research has documented these
advantages of cooperation and coordination
1 Department of Public Administration, Center for
(e.g., Feiock, Tao, and Johnson 2004; Morgan
Research
and
Teaching
in
Economics
(Centro
de
Investigaci ´on y Docencia Econ ´omicas [CIDE]), Mexico
and Mareschal 1999; Sharp 2004).
City, Mexico
The Institutional Collective Action (ICA)
theoretical framework (Feiock 2007, 2009) has
Corresponding Author:
become a useful approach for explaining the
Manlio F. Castillo, Department of Public Administration,
reasons why local metropolitan governments
Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (Centro
de Investigaci ´on y Docencia Econ ´omicas [CIDE]), Carre-
establish collaborative arrangements. Through
tera M´exico-Toluca 3655, Lomas de Santa Fe, 01210,
the assumptions of rational choice, ICA views
A
´ lvaro Obreg´on, Mexico City, Mexico.
urban areas as places for negotiating and
Email: manlio.castillo@cide.edu

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198
State and Local Government Review 51(3)
However, it can be difficult to develop col-
literature examines the reasons why local gov-
laboration mechanisms between local govern-
ernments are led to develop collaboration
ments even when the right conditions and
agreements to provide public services or to
incentives exist. For example, the 1999 reforms
adopt broader metropolitan policies (see, for
to Mexico’s municipal system eliminated all
instance, Feiock 2007; Andrew and Hawkins
the significant obstacles to collaboration
2012; Gerber and Gibson 2005; Bickers and
among urban municipalities. However, more
Stein 2004; Carr, LeRoux, and Shrestha 2009;
than a decade after the reforms, Cabrero and
Brown and Potoski 2003; Bae and Feiock
Arellano (2011) document that a lack of coordi-
2012; Gerber, Henry, and Lubell 2013).
nation mechanisms for metropolitan and
Andrew (2009) described three approaches
municipal partnerships and an aversion to col-
used to study the adoption of interjurisdictional
laboration remain. This reality extends beyond
agreements among metropolitan local govern-
Mexican cities. Other metropolitan areas in the
ments. First, the rational choice approach seeks
United States and Latin America with colla-
to explain the motivations of local officials in
boration incentives also experience a lack of
establishing agreements and contracts with
cooperation and coordination (e.g., see Crava-
each other. The second approach uses network
cuore and Clemente 2006; LeRoux and Carr
analysis to examine how the relationships
2007).
formed by local actors enable agreements lead-
The objective of this essay is to reduce gaps
ing to collaboration. Lastly, the case study
in the literature by discussing why local gov-
approach aims to gain a detailed understanding
ernments in metropolitan areas do or do not col-
of each collaborative arrangement among met-
laborate, given the assumptions of the ICA. To
ropolitan local governments (Andrew 2009).
do so, this essay develops a series of hypotheses
The rational choice analytical approach is the
to explore the lack of collaboration. Building
most prevalent among the three not only
on these hypotheses, a classification of local
because of its firm roots in economic theory but
government collaborative arrangements is
also because the other two approaches can
introduced that considers their creation and
complement it.
durability. Before turning to the hypotheses,
The ICA theoretical framework was devel-
this essay discusses the main features and prin-
oped to explain how interlocal collaboration
cipal critiques of the ICA approach and ana-
agreements are reached. The ICA perspective
lyzes metropolitan local governments as
considers cities as an arena of constant interac-
decision-making institutions.
tion between diverse institutional actors lead-
ing to the development of agreements and
The ICA Framework and
contracts between them. ICA’s main argument
is that interlocal collaboration arrangements
Metropolitan Collaboration
occur if the transaction costs of these agree-
Scholars suggest that the vertical relationships
ments are lower than the potential benefits
between state governments and their municipa-
(Feiock 2007, 2009). As such, research based
lities and the horizontal relationships between
on the ICA framework has focused on identi-
local governments shape regional governance
fying factors reducing transaction costs,
(Miller and Lee 2009). The concept of colla-
thereby increasing the likelihood of collabora-
boration refers to the development of these con-
tive arrangements between nongovernmental
nections between governments and other actors
agents and governments in the same metropol-
such as employers, civic organizations, interna-
itan area.
tional organizations, and workers. In this set of
relationships, collaboration between local gov-
Assumptions of ICA
ernments within the same urban area is espe-
cially relevant due to their vital role in the
ICA appears to be based on three basic
governance of cities. A significant body of
assumptions. The first is that metropolitan local

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Castillo
199
governments always have an underlying willing-
LeRoux and Carr (2007) found favorable con-
ness to collaborate with their counterparts to pro-
ditions in the state of Michigan for interurban
vide public services or to develop and
collaboration (such as economies of scale,
implement urban policies through individual or
start-up costs, and asset specificity) that would
systematic activities over short or long periods.
enable local governments to collaborate in the
However, this willingness is not acted upon until
provision of basic public services. However,
two things happen. First, the priorities and interests
these collaborations never occurred, even
of the local governments involved are aligned
though doing so was a shared priority. A sim-
regarding the public issue that will be addressed
ilar story could be told about Mexico. Legisla-
through the collaborative arrangement. Second,
tion that supported the establishment of
the transaction costs are lower than the benefits
intermunicipal collaboration mechanisms did
of the collaboration.
not lead Mexican municipalities to pursue
ICA also assumes an alignment of priorities
collaboration.
defined as the concurrence in local government
The ICA approach accepts that the high
agendas.
The
alignment
of
priorities
degree of heterogeneity of urban jurisdictions
encourages local governments to enter into
can make intraurban collaborative arrange-
effective (i.e., real) management and negotia-
ments impossible as each component of the
tion processes to establish a collaborative
metropolitan area may have conflicting priori-
arrangement and to verify that the transaction
ties with either each other or the city’s objec-
costs are lower than the benefits. Finally, ICA
tives (Feiock 2013). However, the ICA
assumes that local governments have appropri-
analytical framework requires that the differ-
ate administrative and management capabil-
ences in the municipalities comprising the
ities to launch and operate the collaborative
urban area be evaluated as part of the transac-
arrangement for as long as necessary. Each
tion costs, which prevents us to delve into
government entity is assumed to have the
the problem. The following sections present
resources, personnel, relationships, and exper-
some ideas to improve our understanding of
tise necessary to carry out the collaboration.
collaboration.
In summary, ICA claims that, given the will-
ingness of local metropolitan governments to
collaborate and an adequate management capa-
An Alternative Explanation:
bility to do so, collaborative arrangements
Organizations as Decision-making
result when the priorities of government enti-
Institutions
ties align over time and when the...