Between Two Fires: The Institutional and Public Constraints to Unilateral Policy Change

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211069579
• Published date: 01 March 2023
• Date: 01 March 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Political Research Quarterly

2023, Vol. 76(1) 14–28

© The Author(s) 2022

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/10659129211069579

journals.sagepub.com/home/prq

Between Two Fires: The Institutional and

Public Constraints to Unilateral Policy

Change

Sharece Thrower

Abstract

Though the US presidency literature widely examines how Congress limits executive power, recent discourse argues the

public is the more effective restraint. This paper develops a theory explaining when inter -institutional relations and public

constraints inf‌luence the alteration of unilateral directives. Both are important for curbi ng substantial policy changes that

likely provoke congressional and public response. Using data on when executive orders are amended and revoked

between 1955 and 2013 to measure policy shifts, I f‌ind orders are less likely to be altered under presidents facing

oppositional or cohesive congresses and high public disapproval. Both types of constraints are strongest for large policy

changes, that is, revocations or targeting ideologically distant orders. This study advances the unilateralism literatur e by

examining interactions between multiple constraints and degrees of policy change, while also contributing to studies of

policy duration.

Keywords

executive power, policymaking, separation of powers, public approval, unilateral action

The excess of presidential power is one of the most

pervasive fears in public and political spheres. Expansive

executive authority is not merely an artifact of recent

presidents, but ref‌lects a growing trend toward what some

scholars call the imperial presidency (Rudalevige 2005).

As one reporter insightfully noted, “Trump per se isn’t the

power. Power is the problem, and years and the chickens

we have so carefully raised by weakening constraints on

the executive branch are f‌inally coming home to roost.”

1

Many attribute the rise of executive power to the abate-

ment of institutional checks, particularly from Congress.

Senator Mike Lee announced “executive overreach is an

enormous problem…largely of Congress’s own mak-

ing.”

2

Professor Neal Devins called checks and balances

“an abject failure”because Congress “lacks both the will

and the way to check the presidency.”

3

Posner and Vermeule (2010) agree that institutional

restraints on the president “have eroded considerably over

the last two hundred years,”while arguing the public can

f‌ill this void: “the major constraints on the executive…do

not arise from law or from the separation-of-powers frame-

work…but from politics and public opinion.”Scholars and

political observers often believe both Congress, riddled with

gridlock and informational disadvantages, and the courts,

deferential and fearful of non-enforcement, are ineffective at

curbing executive power (Moe and Howell 1999). The public,

on the other hand, might be a more credible threat to elec-

torally motivated presidents whose popularity determines their

legislative and judicial successes (e.g., Rivers and Rose 1985;

Yates 2002). Accordingly, recent scholarship f‌inds public

opinion constrains unilateral actions (Christenson and Kriner

2019;Reeves and Rogowski 2016), a tool affording presi-

dents the greatest opportunity to act independently from the

other branches of government.

The preponderance of the unilateralism literature,

however, centers on legislative constraints, often re-

vealing presidents issue fewer directives when facing an

oppositional or internally cohesive Congress (e.g., Howell

2003). Some scholars highlight statutory and non-

statutory tools (Chiou and Rothenberg 2017)or

Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN,

USA

Corresponding Author:

Sharece Thrower, Political Science, Vanderbilt University, 325

Commons Center, Nashville, TN 37203, USA.

Email: sharece.d.thrower@vanderbilt.edu