Ben-Meir / A nuclear Iran is not an option: a new negotiating strategy.

• Author: Ben-Meir, Alon
• Position: Report

Editor's Note: Of all the global challenges facing the Obama administration, many believe the most serious and pressing is the looming prospect that Iran will develop nuclear weapons. This essay provides thorough analysis of the complicated negotiating background and suggests a detailed strategy that might produce a peaceful solution.--Ed.

Summary

The negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (1) over Tehran's nuclear enrichment activities have not only failed to reach an agreement but have brought Iran much closer to the threshold of mastering the technology to produce nuclear weapons. There are many factors that precipitated this breakdown, including the West's inability to understand and deal with the Iranian psychological disposition, the failure to present to Iran the severity of the punitive measures that could be inflicted as a consequence of its defiance, and the U.S. administration's misleading policy that gave Iran the room to maneuver. There is an urgent need to adopt a distinctively new strategy toward Iran consisting of three tracks of separate but interconnected negotiations: The first should focus on the current negotiations on Iran's enrichment program and the economic incentive package; the second should concentrate on regional security and the consequences of continued Iranian defiance; and the third track should address Iran's and the United States' grievances against each other. The United States must initiate all three tracks, without which future talks will be as elusive as the previous negotiations, except this time the West and Israel will be facing the unsettling prospect of a nuclear Iran.

The Nature of U.S.-Iran Relations

The relationship between the United States and Iran has increasingly been deteriorating, especially since Tehran began to flex its muscles following the Iraq war in 2003 and continuing with its insistence on maintaining its uranium enrichment program. Both sides have grievances against each other that date back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and beyond. The American lack of understanding of the Iranian national psyche, history, religion, culture, and strategic interests and Iran's display of the same attitude toward the United States has compounded the problems and hampered any tangible progress. The Bush administration's refusal to negotiate directly with Tehran and its preoccupation in Iraq has played to the advantage of the clergy, allowing them time for nuclear advancement with impunity.

From the Iranian perspective, decades of being abused by Western powers--especially the United States--came to an end with the Islamic revolution. Ironically, the Bush administration's decision to topple Saddam Hussein has, in effect, ended America's dual containment policy of Iraq and Iran, leaving Tehran to claim the spoils of the Iraq war. Iranians moved swiftly to take advantage of the chaotic war conditions, exploiting their close ties to the Iraqi leaders, entrenching themselves in most of Iraq's social, economic, and political arena. Although many Iranians feel stifled and isolated by their government, they still view the Islamic revolution as something that has freed them from Western bondage and set them on a historical journey to greatness. The Iranian leaders are determined to assert themselves regionally, especially now that their country has become a substantial player in the oil market. The pursuit of a nuclear program is a symbol of the government's newly found power and a means by which it can enhance its regional leadership role, if not the country's hegemony. The government feels confident it can continue to do so in defiance of the international community without paying an unacceptable price.

As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (2), Iran has the right to enrich uranium to generate energy for peaceful purposes under strict guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran, however, has failed to fully comply with the NPT provisions and has been unwilling to agree with efforts to settle the impasse over its nuclear program. (3) Iran has for more than 18 years concealed its nuclear program, expanded its nuclear facilities--some of which remain unknown to the IAEA--and resisted unannounced inspections. Iran also appears to be seeking industrial enrichment of higher-grade uranium, has failed to answer many questions regarding its ongoing nuclear activity, and continues to threaten Israel existentially. Iran's behavior in this regard has eroded its international credibility and raised serious questions about its ultimate intentions.

This is the Iran that the Obama administration will face, proud and resolute, with some self-conceit, willing to take risks, albeit carefully calibrated. Iran's confidence in itself, however exaggerated, is due in part to the West, especially American policy makers--aided by many political intellectuals who have postulated that the global economy cannot do without Iranian oil. The West's concerns over any interruption in the delivery of oil (25% of global oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz (4)) resulting from the destruction of Iran's nuclear facilities has, for all intents and purposes, removed that option from the table. As a result, the Iranians demonstrate a lack of appreciation about the consequences of their defiance, although they remain terrified of American naval and air force presence in the neighborhood. In addition, as the Iranian leaders have managed to play successfully for time, they feel that they may be able to stall long enough to produce nuclear weapon technology before the next American administration gets its bearing.

There are three critical requisites the Obama administration must carefully consider in order to pave the way for effective negotiations that could lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict:

The first requisite is according Iran the respects it seeks.

Iran is a proud nation with a rich heritage and continuous civilization that extends over four millennia; for many Iranians their country is the center of the world and must be respected and treated with due esteem. Iran is not an amalgamation of ethnic groups put together by colonial power, and thus the Iranians take national pride very seriously and demand to be accorded some deference, especially in public discourse. They see themselves as the Middle East's legitimate regional hegemon and attach national pride directly to having and operating an independent nuclear program. Moreover, the Iranian clergy view their revolution as the expression of Islamic power not limited to Shiites, which gives them credibility of leadership for the entire Islamic world. The Bush administration's propensity to use a public forum to denounce the Iranian republic has been counterproductive at best because it alienated even the Iranian moderate forces, including many of the followers of former Iranian President Khatami and current speaker of the Parliament Laranjani, who sought a dialogue with the United States.

From the time the Bush administration designated Iran as a member of the axis of evil in 2002 along with Iraq and North Korea (5), all civil discourse between the two nations was effectively ended. Instead of building on the thaw that came about immediately after September 11 and the war in Afghanistan, and creating a favorable atmosphere for negotiations, the U.S. government's public denunciations of the Iranian leadership were seen as a strategy to prepare the American public opinion for much harsher measures including the use of military force. The next administration must open a new chapter with Iran and show some strategic sensitivity by first recognizing Iran's historical riches and geopolitical importance. If the United States wishes to achieve an agreement with Iran on the nuclear issue, it must first improve the public atmosphere. This includes an end to public verbal onslaughts, which only legitimize Iran's counter belligerency toward the United States.

The second requisite is ending the threats against the regime.

The protection and the preservation of the regime is seen by the Iranian clergy as the singular most critical element that must be defended at any and all cost. Threats against the regime are viewed not only as threats against the government as an institution but against the Islamic revolution itself. As a result, such threats provoke disproportionate aggressiveness toward the source of the threat. In this regard the Bush administration played into the hands of the Iranian clergy by threatening a regime change and openly allocating more than $75 million for operations inside and outside Iran to undermine the regime. For example, in May 2007, ABC reported that the CIA had hired Jundallah, a Pakistan-backed Baluchi group, to carry out sabotage operations inside Iran along with other CIA covert programs against the regime authorized by the president. (6)

The next administration must make it clear from day one that it has no intention of interfering with Iran's domestic affairs. If the objective of the negotiations...