A behavioral economic approach to nuclear disarmament advocacy.

• Author: Rinn, Alexander S.

ABSTRACT

Nuclear disarmament advocates have provided a strong moral voice for the total disarmament of nuclear weapons, but if they are to remain credible participants in the disarmament process, they must redouble their efforts to assist in the difficult technical and political obstacles that stand in the way of a world without nuclear weapons. This Note first outlines impediments to disarmament towards which advocates could helpfully direct their attention, such as: conventional force imbalances; developing "proliferation-safe" civil nuclear technologies; enforcing nonproliferation obligations; and verifying nuclear disarmament. Second, it explains how tools from behavioral economics and negotiation theory could inform a more influential disarmament advocacy. Among other things, it suggests an iterative approach to disarmament to combat loss aversion and reference dependence. To fight time discounting, this Note urges support for ex ante agreement on UN Security Council action in response to violations of the nonproliferation regime. Finally, it recommends using a fairness norm based on process rather than distribution in formal disarmament negotiations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PRIVATE ADVOCACY III. BEYOND MORAL ARGUMENTS: PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT A. Security Concerns Related to Nuclear-Weapon States B. Security Concerns Related to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States C. Verification of Nuclear Disarmament IV. How BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS COULD INFORM A NEW DISARMAMENT ADVOCACY A. Tools from Behavioral Economics B. Applying Theory to Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy V. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION

Today there is increasing agreement, especially among leaders of the West, that nuclear disarmament must be a political priority, and nongovernmental disarmament advocates can claim some credit for this state of affairs. However, if these advocates are to remain relevant, they must move beyond their traditional moral arguments for the abolition of nuclear weapons toward an advocacy that helps states solve the real and difficult problems that stand in the way of a world free of these weapons of mass destruction. The will to pursue disarmament is stronger than ever, but the way remains challenging.

President Barack Obama declared in a 2009 Prague speech that the United States is committed "to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons." (1) When the Nobel Committee awarded President Obama the Nobel Prize, it stated that special attention was given to the President's commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. (2) Before the President gave his Prague speech, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn in 2007 wrote an opinion piece arguing for a nuclear-weapon-free world, and listed a series of steps that could be taken toward that end. (3) In 2008, UK Defense Minister Des Browne told the Conference on Disarmament that his country was dedicated to a world free of nuclear weapons and introduced a new process to study the difficult challenge of disarmament verification. (4) President Nicolas Sarkozy of France delivered a speech in 2008 that was more ambivalent on complete nuclear disarmament than the speeches by the leaders of the United Kingdom and the United States, but which nonetheless was remarkable in that a French President was willing to address the topic at all in such detail. (5)

A community of nongovernmental advocates (NGAs), composed of private individuals and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focused particularly on nuclear disarmament advocacy, deserves some credit for elevating the issue of nuclear disarmament to such heights. Ever since the end of World War II, there have been influential members of civil society giving a voice to common citizens and advocating for the abolition of nuclear weapons. With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970 and the accompanying periodic cycle of international meetings to review its operation, these advocates were presented a more formal venue within which to conduct their disarmament advocacy. In recent years, NGAs have increased their presence in the NPT review process and kept the fire to the feet of world leaders. They carried a simple message: the average citizen of the world does not want nuclear weapons to exist. The fact that world leaders such as President Obama have recently given prominent speeches on nuclear disarmament suggests that the message has been received.

Today, however, is a dangerous time for nongovernmental disarmament advocacy. The moral arguments for nuclear disarmament have been made and understood. There is diminishing doubt around the world that complete nuclear disarmament should be pursued. The question now is how. These advocates today risk their relevance if they do not evolve along with the changing nuclear disarmament landscape. They must turn their attention to helping states solve the most difficult challenges standing in the way of further nuclear reductions and eventual total disarmament. It is no longer enough to tell states what they should do in broad strokes to achieve nuclear disarmament; now is the time for diligence, to delve into the minute details that states are forced to confront when implementing their disarmament visions. The summit has been identified, now is the time to help states prepare an expedition.

This Note is organized into five parts. After this introduction, Part II provides a summary of the NPT, focusing on its disarmament provision, and recounts the development of NGA involvement in the NPT review process. Part III describes some of the difficult obstacles that states must overcome to make significant progress toward nuclear disarmament, and on which disarmament advocates might helpfully involve themselves. These obstacles include: the impact of disarmament on perceptions of security and political influence in nuclear-weapon states, nuclear-related security concerns in non-nuclear-weapon states, and the verification of nuclear disarmament. Part IV outlines an approach based on behavioral economics that advocates could employ to help states solve these problems and take significant steps toward nuclear disarmament. This approach suggests reframing the issue and developing specific advocacy strategies for nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Part V summarizes the results and offers a conclusion.

2. THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PRIVATE ADVOCACY

   The NPT, which was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, has the titular purpose of curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (6) The NPT has been ratified by 190 states, making it the most adhered-to arms-control treaty in history. (7) It recognizes five nuclear-weapon states, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and classifies all other states as non-nuclear-weapon states for the purposes of the treaty. (8) Only four states are not party to the NPT: India, Israel, and Pakistan, which never adhered to it, and North Korea, which most states recognize as having withdrawn in 2003. (9)

   The precise hierarchy of NPT obligations is often debated, but it is safe to say that three of the treaty's primary purposes are (1) to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, (2) to declare that the responsible use of nuclear energy is permitted, and (3) to commit to a goal of nuclear disarmament. (10) The nonproliferation obligations of the NPT are specified in Articles I and II and require that weapon states shall not transfer or provide any assistance in the development of nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear-weapon state, and non-nuclear-weapon states shall not receive any such weapons or seek development assistance. (11) Next, Article III requires that all parties accept appropriate safeguards negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the fulfillment of obligations under the treaty. (12) Article IV affirms that all parties have an "inalienable right" to peaceful nuclear energy, in conformity with the nonproliferation obligations of the treaty. (13) Article VI is the disarmament provision, which reads: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." (14)

   There has been a lot of debate about what Article VI actually requires of nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. The plain language suggests that only good-faith negotiations are required, but some, including the International Court of Justice (ICJ), have argued that the NPT requires actual nuclear disarmament or at least tangible steps in that direction. (15) Though some disarmament advocates promote the ICJ's advisory opinion as the definitive word on what Article VI requires of parties, the ICJ's opinion that the NPT requires actual nuclear disarmament is increasingly seen as conclusory and stretching the plain meaning of the treaty. (16) The center of the debate today is focused on what "good faith" actually requires, recognizing that actual nuclear disarmament probably stretches the meaning of the NPT too far.

   Every five years since 1975, parties to the NPT have convened to "review the operation of [the] Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized." (17) Since 1995, private disarmament advocates and NGOs have spoken with an increasingly forceful voice at these conferences. Review conferences typically last four weeks and involve debate on what can be done to promote the NPT's purposes for nonproliferation, peaceful nuclear energy, disarmament, and other issues, such as how to respond to...