F. J. Beckwith, Of Souls, Selves, and Cerebrums: A Reply to Himma.

• Author: Beckwith, F.J.
• Position: Abstracts

F. J. Beckwith, Of Souls, Selves, and Cerebrums: A Reply to Himma, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 56 (2005).

Himma's article [abstracted above] depends on a Cartesian understanding of the self that locates the soul or self in mental activity or consciousness. Himma, for instance, uses the terms "soul" and "mind" interchangeably, as if the absence of mental function or the cerebral architecture that makes mental functions possible signals the absence of the soul. Himma assumes that what is valuable about a human being is consciousness, a psychological self, which he argues correlates with an intact brain that has the present capacity to allow the self to manifest certain functions--for example, self consciousness, self awareness, thought, etc. This account seems to beg an important question: why should the psychological self--the mental activities of a mature being--be judged as the locus of...