Batson Revisited

• Author: Nancy S. Marder
• Position: Professor of Law & Director of the Jury Center, Chicago-Kent College of Law
• Pages: 1585-1612

1585

Batson Revisited

Nancy S. Marder

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1586

I. EXAMINING BATSON’S INEFFECTIVENESS .............................................. 1588

A. GIVING REASONS ............................................................................ 1589

B. BEING DEFERENTIAL ....................................................................... 1592

C. EVISCERATING BATSON .................................................................. 1593

II. REASSESSING THE AMERICAN THEORY OF JUROR BIAS ......................... 1595

III. EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF JUROR BIAS .......................... 1600

A. THE ENGLISH THEORY ................................................................... 1600

B. THE PROCESS THEORY ................................................................... 1601

IV. DESIGNING JURY SELECTION ACCORDING TO THE PROCESS THEORY

OF JUROR BIAS ...................................................................................... 1606

A. ELIMINATING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ....................................... 1607

B. PRESERVING FOR-CAUSE CHALLENGES ............................................. 1610

C. MAINTAINING VOIR DIRE ................................................................ 1610

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1611

 Professor of Law & Director of the Jury Center, Chicago-Kent Colle ge of Law. I thank

James Tomkovicz for organizing this conference and the Iowa Law Review for publishing the

papers from this conference. My thanks, as always, to Jeremy Eden for reading early drafts and

giving me helpful suggestions.

1586 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1585

INTRODUCTION

The twenty-fifth anniversary of Batson v. Kentucky1 provides an important

moment to reflect on Batson and to consider how this seminal case and its

progeny2 have affected the use and abuse of peremptory challenges. I had

initially welcomed the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to peremptory

challenges in Batson back in 1986. Although Batson was a compromise3—

preserving peremptories while seeking to address discriminatory

peremptories—it had the noble goal of trying to eliminate discrimination

during jury selection. I also embraced its expansion over the years. The logic

of Batson was inexorable: just as prosecutors should not be permitted to use

peremptories to eliminate African Americans as jurors, so too, defense

attorneys4 and civil parties5 should be similarly constrained. Just as African

Americans should not be subjected to discriminatory peremptories, so too,

members of any race,6 ethnicity,7 or gender8 should not be subjected to

discriminatory peremptories. However, over time I developed serious doubts

that Batson and its progeny could achieve their central goal of eliminating

discrimination during jury selection.9 Now, with twenty-five years of

experience, we can look back and see just how ineffective Batson has been.

This anniversary is an appropriate juncture to renew the call for the

elimination of the peremptory challenge, echoing Justice Thurgood

Marshall’s recommendation in his Batson concurrence twenty-five years

ago.10

1. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor’s use of a

peremptory challenge based on race violates the Equal Protection Claus e of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).

2. See infra notes 4–6, 8, 16 (describing the cases that expanded the reach of Batson).

3. Batson, 476 U.S. at 126–27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (describing Batson as a “curious

hybrid”).

4. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson to defense

attorneys).

5. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (extending Batson

to civil parties).

6. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that a Batson challenge can be

made by a defendant of any race whenever the prosecutor exercises a peremptory based on

race).

7. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (noting that a Batson challenge

can be made on the basis of ethnicity, but finding that in this case the prosecutor’s reasons for

exercising peremptories against two Latino prospective jurors were race neutral).

8. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that gender-based

peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fou rteenth Amendment).

9. See Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX.

L. REV. 1041 (1995) [hereinafter Marder, Beyond Gender]; Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the

Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683 (2006) [hereinafter Marder, The

Peremptory Challenge].

10. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring).