Barring "analogous" state law claims is no excuse: Haywood v. Drown and states' obligation to enforce section 1983.

• Author: McMillan, David

Introduction I. Haywood v. Drown A. The Facts B. Majority vs. Dissent II. Defining "Analogous" State Law Claims III. States' Obligation to Enforce Section 1983 A. What Triggers the Obligation? 1. The Broad Scope of the Antidiscrimination Rule 2. The Rule: Triggered by Jurisdictional Grant Over Generic Tort Suits a. States' Discretion to Create State Forums b. Adequate Forum Creation B. What is the Nature of the Obligation? 1. The "Valid Excuse" Balancing 2. Haywood Applied 3. The "Valid Excuse" Balancing Should Permit Selective Exclusion, so Long as an Alternative State Forum is Provided Conclusion: A Framework for Evaluating States' Obligation to Enforce Section 1983 INTRODUCTION

In our system of federalism, two judiciaries--state and federal--operate side by side. Congress, through powers conferred by Article III of the United States Constitution, (1) controls the character of the federal judiciary, while state legislatures control the judiciaries in their respective states. (2)

Although state courts derive their authority from state law, the Supremacy Clause (3) and its underlying policies require that state courts share some responsibility for adjudicating federal claims. (4) When Congress passes an Act, for example, it is not only expected but desirable that state courts should aid in its enforcement. The framers, by including a mandate that state judges are bound by federal law, contemplated that state courts would have jurisdiction over federal claims. (5) In fact, the Supreme Court has made concurrent jurisdiction the general rule rather than the exception. (6) Moreover, sound policy suggests that by entertaining federal claims, state courts can help Congress promote the substantive policies underlying federal law (7) while relieving the federal judiciary of the burden of adjudicating all federal claims. (8)

States, on the other hand, retain considerable discretion to delineate the boundaries of their own courts' jurisdiction, (9) and Congress generally cannot affix an obligation to entertain federal claims on state courts whose jurisdiction is inadequate to the occasion. (10) What's more, states have powerful incentives to keep federal claims out of their court systems. States may, for example, either as a matter of sheer judicial economy (11) or as a way to relieve state court judges from the task of dealing with unfamiliar or complex federal laws, (12) seek to limit the number of federal claims occupying state court dockets. Alternatively, a state may simply disagree with an act's underlying policy and refuse to enforce it in its courts. (13)

Determining exactly when states' interests in keeping federal claims out of their courts should outweigh the policy that states enforce federal law has become a matter of contention. In 2007, New York State's highest court, the New York Court of Appeals, held that the state's trial courts of general jurisdiction, the New York Supreme Court, could decline to entertain a very specific subcategory of claim under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983, (14) the federal civil rights statute. (15) The plaintiff was a prisoner in a New York correctional facility who sued employees of the State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") in New York Supreme Court over various alleged civil rights infractions. The State argued that the plaintiff's claim was barred based on a New York statute, Correction Law [section] 24, (16) which removed the court's subject matter jurisdiction over any civil action for damages against DOCS personnel for torts committed within the scope of their employment. The statute required, instead, that such claims be brought against the state in the New York Court of Claims. (17) The undisputed purpose of the statute was to transfer liability away from individual DOCS employees and onto the State in order to facilitate the performance of the employees' legitimate prison duties. (18) Nevertheless, since the Court of Claims cannot entertain [section] 1983 suits, (19) the effect of Correction Law [section] 24 is to completely extinguish one fact-specific category of [section] 1983 claims (i.e., damages suits against DOCS employees). This is despite the New York Supreme Court's routine practice of adjudicating both [section] 1983 suits against other state employees and state tort claims against private defendants. (20)

Recognizing that Correction Law [section] 24's exclusion of a specific category of [section] 1983 claim from the New York Supreme Court was questionable under the Supremacy Clause, the Court of Appeals nonetheless held that the statute was a "valid excuse" to decline to hear the suit. (21) In the court's view, neither the Supremacy Clause nor its underlying policies were sufficiently pressing to override the State's discretion to establish the jurisdiction of its courts. (22) It held that states are not required to create courts amenable to ali types of [section] 1983 claims, and that if a state decides not to extend jurisdiction over a fact-specific category of state-law claims, it is free to bar enforcement of the federal law analogue. (23) In this case, since Correction Law [section] 24 applied neutrally to any civil action--state or federal--it did not offend the Supremacy Clause's bar prohibiting discrimination against federal law. (24)

This Note casts doubt on the doctrinal underpinnings of the majority opinion in Haywood v. Drown (25) and attempts to offer an affirmative characterization of states' obligation to hear [section] 1983 claims. Part I summarizes the events of Haywood and the positions espoused by the majority and dissenting opinions. Part II briefly describes the antidiscrimination principle-which requires a state court to entertain a federal claim so long as the court would enforce an "analogous" state claim--and offers competing views on how to define the term "analogous" state law claim. Part III then utilizes Supreme Court cases to expose the doctrinal inaccuracies in the New York Court of Appeals' majority opinion in Haywood. Part III.A argues that the antidiscrimination principle imposes a far broader obligation on state courts to hear federal claims than the Haywood majority believed. It further argues that the court misapplied the principle by concluding that the state court had no obligation to hear the plaintiff's [section] 1983 suit, despite its authority to hear generic state law tort suits. Part III.B examines the "valid excuse" doctrine and its apparent dual purpose--to preserve states' jurisdiction-setting discretion without undermining the supremacy of federal law--and argues that the Haywood court's version of the "analogous" state law claim excuse fails to fulfill this purpose. The excuse, however, could theoretically exist provided it comported with both the doctrine's implicit balancing and with Felder v. Casey. This Note concludes by suggesting a framework for evaluating the legitimacy of a state court's refusal to enforce [section] 1983 claims, under which a reviewing court should examine both the availability and adequacy of an alternative state forum to hear the [section] 1983 suit and the state's interest in removing jurisdiction over such suits.

1. HAYWOOD II. DROWN

   1. The Facts

      In 2007, plaintiff Keith Haywood, an inmate at a New York Corrections facility, brought a [section] 1983 action in New York Supreme Court against DOCS employees alleging various civil rights infractions. (26) Apparently DOCS officers had engaged in several conspiratorial acts--including fabricating the facts of a misbehavior report of which Haywood was the subject and falsifying the results of a urinalysis test--which were designed to thwart the exercise of the plaintiff's due process rights. (27) The State, acting on behalf of the DOCS defendants, (28) moved to dismiss based on New York Correction Law [section] 24, (29) which states:

      1. No civil action shall be brought in any court of the state, except by the attorney general on behalf of the state, against any officer or employee of the department, in his personal capacity, for damages arising out of any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties by such officer or employee.

      2. Any claim for damages arising out of any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties of any officer or employee of the department shall be brought and maintained in the court of claims as a claim against the state.

      Thus, the State argued, Correction Law [section] 24 vests the New York Court of Claims with exclusive jurisdiction over all damages suits against DOCS employees, (30) and therefore, plaintiff's Supreme Court suit was improper. Moreover, the statute prohibits plaintiff from suing the individual DOCS employees directly; he must instead sue the State in the Court of Claims.

      The trial court dismissed Haywood's claim and New York's Appellate Division affirmed. (31) On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the plaintiff argued that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution prohibited [section] 24's application in barring his federal [section] 1983 suit. He asserted that Congress, by enacting [section] 1983, set "policy for all," (32) and that [section] 24 obstructs that policy by precluding a fact-specific [section] 1983 suit, namely, damages suits against individual DOCS employees acting within the scope of their employment. Additionally, [section] 24 discriminated against [section] 1983 causes of action by barring DOCS-defendant claims only, leaving the New York Supreme Court free to adjudicate [section] 1983 claims against other state actors and generic state tort suits against private defendants. The State, on the other hand, countered that [section] 24 was a neutral and valid exercise of the State's prerogative to determine its courts' jurisdictional contours. (33) It contended that [section] 24 reflects the State's...