Barbed Wire Command: The Lepal Satlire of the Command Responsibilities of the Seniav Prisoner in a Prisoner of War Camp

• Author: Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Manes, Jr
• Pages: 01

1. INTRODUCTION

   "Foe 13 me!

   To none else o m they I&? it,

   This gu!lt, but to me7"***

   Two thousand seven hundred and thirty Americans died ar prisoners of war of the Communist forces during the Korean Conflict. This astonishing death toll w.8 thirty-eight per cent of the total captured.' Was thia just another unavoidable tragedy of war, or is there a lesson to be learned? To answer this requires a search--a careful look-for the causes of these deaths. First to provoke suspicion are enemy atrocities. Though it is true that miserable hardship prevailed and true also that many prisonem died victims of savage atrocities in Korea, the experiences related by the survivors raise some doubt that atrocities and murders alone, even substantially, account for this death rate. For example. three-fourths of the repatriated prisoners from North Korea re-ported that they personnally were not individually "mistreated," and ninety-four per cent experienced no incidents considered b>- 'This artlole was sdaDted from 8 thesis wesenred to The Judre ldroeate General's Sohml. US. Aimr. ChBrlotteslille,~V!rgi~i~,while the aithor -88 a member o! the Elghth Adraneed Class. Ths o~lnion~and eonelu8lona preienled herein are !how of the author and do not neoe~~a1~1vleuresent the \.iewa of

   **OLUCe of The Judge Advocate General. US. APmy, Waihington 25, D C member of the Colorado State Bar: graduate of the L'nirersify of Denver Lar Schod

   ***Sophacles, Antlzone, l e t IJ' (Circa 400 B C 1'DOD Pam 1-18, The U.S. Blzhtmg Man's Code 62 I15551 [her8umlf81 cited DOD Pam 1-16], PIUgh, The Cone of Coidwt for fhe limed Forces, 56 Colum L. Rev. 678. 681 I15561

   NILITARY LAW REVIEW

   them to be war crimes orceive that all evidence of an atrocious massacre of almost half of the prisoners could be concealed from three-fourths of the surviving half. The Communiat captors carefully spread rumors or atrocities for the purpose of instilling fear for their own political purposes.8 But, manifestly, fear in itself is not fatal.'

   Those political designs of the Communists did not go fully unrealized as was painfully evident throughout the 1953 repatriation process of United Nations prisoners of war at Panmunjon when dismal reflection of disloyalty were cast generally upan the re-patriates.j But, you well might ask: "We~ethese defections of such a scale so as to give rise to an association between the loyalty of the prisoners in general and the sobering casualty ratel" Apparently not, for a special committee of the Secretary of Defense wae later to report that only 192 of the 4,428 repatriated prisoner. (1 in 23) were found to be chargeable with serious misconduct. To demonstrate that the scale of disaffections had been distorted. the committee compared this actionable misconduct rate with the one in fifteen of Americans i\-ho, according to Federal Bureau of Investigation reports, have records of alleged misconduct of

   It would be quixotic :o con

   ...

   "Segal, Foetor8 Related to the Collab~ialian and Resistorice Bohabior 01 L.P Army PIi8Omr9 01 War In Korea, Tech. Rep. h'o. 88, Human RBBenrCes Researoh Omcs 84 IO. W.

   Umv. 1956). DurlnB the early stBges of the WnUet. p11m to the OVelt entry of Red Chinese tmOP$ Into Korea, North Korean treatment of DrllOnera could be Oharletelized a8 iadiatlc and unoirillred brutallty Hundreds Dellshed and many weie deliberately nlaln durlng savagely enloreed "dslth marahss" to the rear toward the Yalu. But after the Chloese Reds took control of the OPeratlms in Octobei 1950. dellberate restialnt was exercised ~nthe tleatment Of Drlemars, and V~CIOYIIbrUtalltg w&$ generally PeplPced withB POllOJ O! PBlltlmI indoctrlnatlon Implemented wlth the p~ycholog10sl tech n1qU.e as eontrrsted to Dhisleal abuse. Even under Lhs Chlnese. however. the Prlsonenl were On meager diet and lived under mlaerkble olroumstanoea. DA

   Pilsoneis of War 15 May 56, DD 16-20

   Pam. 30-101, Commuilst Interrogation, Indmtrinarlan and E X D I O ~ ~ ~ ~ I O ~ of

   .DOD Psm. 1-16. 34.

   'Though when leal COILtnbULes Io rhe Drlsaner ol ai dlseare iomrfimei called "Barbed Wlre Sindmme,' it may indlrently threaten rile health even fha Hfa. of the p'laoner "Barbed Wlre Syndrome' 13 dmcuased ~n Oh 11mtro

   'Cornordim tn Kore~,

   Time, 2 Sou. 1953. D 31 Hoio 0 P Pi isonera Bioi* Dnder Red ''BTBfn%%8hCg.I'

   Look, 2 June 1953. DD. 80-83: Fay, if'^ EQ~Y fo

   BlUU AmBTiDGnni), COlllelB, 16 May 1963. p. 20: Note, Xlsconduct s?& the Pizron COmP, 58 C a l m L. Rar. 709 (19561, Germ Warlore. The Lie That Wan Fortune, No". 1953, D 48.

   ili" I, 808

   ~.

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   BARBED WIRE COMMAND

   sufficient gravity to hare occasioned fingerprinting.6 Was there then a distinction in the experiences among the several services which would provide a clue? The Army was the only service to bring alleged offenders to trial by court-martial, which, on its face, seema to be a source of some satisfaction to the other services. But any indulgence in such satisfaction would fail to appreciate the Army's singularly dominant burden of combat in Korea. Illustrative of the comparative roles of the various services, and directly related to the problem at hand, is the simple mathematical fact that, of the 4,428 prisoners repatriated at Panmunjon, only five per cent were Air Force, four per cent were Marine Corps, and one per cent were Navy, but ninety per cent were Army.i Manifestly, it would be idle to attempt to make any valid service comparisons based upon such unrepresentative samples of the other services. Were there national differences that might suggest a solution? Much has been said and written of the commendable manner in which the Turks acquitted themselves in the North Korean prisoner of war camps, although these commentators are prone to overlook the fact that one member of a particularly objectionable group, generally recognized as the very core of prisoner collaborationist propaganda activities, was a Turk.B But, and here the critic may find some light, quite apart from the political aspects, the Korean experience established the Turks capacity for physical survivorship to be distinctly superior to that of their United Nations a1lies.O Whether the alleged disloyalties, to list some of the sundry theories advanced, were precipitated by decaying morals, defective education, military unpreparedness, or noneof these, are intrinsically debatable issues unnecessary to decide or even discuss here. The foregoing rudimentary discussion, never. theiess, presages engagement of an allied but more materialistic sphere-human survival. In that sphere, the survivorship of the Turkish prisoners in the midst of wholesale allied fatalities is patently demonstrable of weakness on the part of the other prison-ers. As previously mentioned, of 1,190 United Nations prisoners captured by the Communist forces, 2,130 died during their captivity, which in moat cases was less than two years. But, atrik. in&, of the 229 Turks taken captive, not a single one died during

   *A RBDOP~by the ileoretarg of DeIonse'B Advisory Commlttee on Prlsoners of

   'Prngh, The Code o! Canduof for the Arne6 FOICeb. 66 Colum L Re7 68:

   'See Klnkead, of. cli BUwa note 7, &t 166. QOD Pam. 1-16, 08. 011 Suva note 1. at 14

   War, July 1915 [herelnaller elled 88 Prlaaner Report] 8t vi

   (1956): Klnkead, In Ever7 War But One 88 (1959)

   *GO lUOB R

   captivity, although the? espeiienieil eiactly the same treatment and further notwithstanding the fact thal mow than half were wounded on capture." If the Turks had experienced the mme death rate as their allies, 81 Turks would have perished. What spared the lives of these statistical 87 Turks? There is evidence now that it may simply have been a question of prisoner organization patterned to challenge and contain the hostile environment which enveloped them. The senior Turk took care to inform the captors that he mas in charge of the other Turks-that if he were to be removed the next senior muld amirne charge and so on down to the last two privates and, betn een them, the senior private would be in charge." Il'hen a Turk became ill, he was nursed hack to health b3- the group and supplied with extra food and clothing sacrificed by the group: when hospitalized, two Turks \rere detailed by the senior Turk to go along and remain with the patient as chambermaid and champion until he recarered. The)- shared clothing and food as need required and attended to hsgenic policing, all under superrision of the senior Turk. The sanitation and other orders of the senior were rigidl!- enforced by the entire group.12 You might validly ask: "But were not these same basic health precautions, social decencies and military fundamentals folloaed by the other allies?" The aforementioned committee appointed by the Secretary of Defense vas later to report of con. ditions among Americaii prisoners of war in Korea in the foliawinp language :

   By design and because some officers relued to asbume leaders hi^ re. BpolBlbllltY, organllation ?n some ol the POW camps deteriorated to an erery-man.for-bimaelI sltuarlan. Some al the cmips hecame Indescribabl) hltby. Hoarders grabbed all the fobaem Yo~sle decayed to the vanishing ~alnf EaOh man mistrusted the next Bullies PBrseellted the weak and 81ok Filth bred dlreaae and oontagian srwt the camp

   The men seumed far tllelr rood.

   Sa men dled liam laok 01 leadershin and discipline.

   Violating perhaps already the previous resolution to avoid loyalty eraluatians, it is nevertheless worthy here to mention incidentall)-that the Turks also scared a better record for resiatance ta political ind~ctrination.~' Constance in political allegiance xould seem. therefore, to be an automatic benefit incidentall>- associated xith a proper and purposefully directed struggle to survive.

   Serious and exhaustive studies af disloyalty among American repatriates in Korea were undertaken by individuals as xell RS by

   6. See slso Klnkead. op CII mpru nore 7. at 150.

   ?bid.

   kead. 08 iil S ~ ~ Q I O

   note 7, at 166

   "note - at 1611 A&" Il!mE

   BARBED WIRE...