Baker v. General Motors: the Work Product Doctrine in the Eighth Circuit

• Publication year: 2022
• Citation: Vol. 34

34 Creighton L. Rev. 475. BAKER v. GENERAL MOTORS: THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Creighton Law Review

Vol. 34

Amy L. Pinkerton - '02

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1937 and were intended to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."(fn1) To promote this goal, broad pretrial discovery rules were adopted, and have been expanded, in subsequent revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.(fn2) In Hickman v. Taylor,(fn3) the United States Supreme Court articulated that the purpose of pretrial discovery is to allow the parties to ascertain relevant facts, determine the true nature of the controversy between the parties, and adequately prepare for trial.(fn4) By allowing all parties access to the evidence prior to trial, discovery decreases the effects of potentially discrepant attorney skills, reduces surprise during the trial and increases the likelihood that all the evidence will be exposed.(fn5) However, the Hickman Court also stressed that "discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries."(fn6)

In an adversarial system of justice, limits must be placed on discovery.(fn7) To render adequate legal counsel and representation to a client, an attorney must be allowed some privacy in preparation for trial.(fn8) In recognition of this fact, certain exceptions have evolved to limit discovery.(fn9) Limitations on discovery arise from the assumption that an attorney must be allowed to keep certain matters from their adversaries in order to adequately represent their clients.(fn10) One limitation on discovery is the work product doctrine.(fn11) The work product doctrine fosters thorough and careful preparation by attorneys by assuring protection of materials prepared "in anticipation of litiga-tion."(fn12) Courts must maintain a delicate balance between the policy of liberal discovery and the countervailing interests of attorneys and clients in keeping certain information undiscoverable.(fn13)

In Baker v. General Motors Corp.,(fn14) the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit enunciated the scope of the work product doctrine.(fn15) In Baker, General Motors sought and was granted a writ of mandamus requesting relief from an order to produce documents that the company claimed were protected under the attorneyclient privilege and the work product doctrine.(fn16) The documents consisted of handwritten notes and a typed summary of interviews conducted by General Motors' counsel of a General Motors employee.(fn17) After reviewing the documents, a magistrate judge determined the documents were not protected by either the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine.(fn18) The magistrate judge reasoned that the materials were not entirely protected by the work product doctrine because they contained factual details.(fn19) The Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, finding that the records were shielded from discovery by both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.(fn20) With regard to the work product doctrine, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that attorney notes, such as those at issue, constituted opinion work product and were to be granted nearly absolute protection.(fn21)

This Note will endeavor to define the current scope of the work product doctrine in the Eighth Circuit by analyzing the holding and reasoning in Baker.(fn22) This Note will first discuss the facts and holding of Baker.(fn23) Second, this Note will demonstrate that the decision in Baker complied with the doctrine of stare decisis because it followed the reasoning of prior United States Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit case law.(fn24) Third, this Note will discuss and criticize the dissent's argument with regard to the work product doctrine.(fn25) Finally, this Note will conclude that the Eighth Circuit correctly found that the documents at issue in Baker constituted opinion work product and, as such, were entitled to nearly absolute protection from discovery.(fn26)

FACTS AND HOLDING

Baker v. General Motors Corp.,(fn27) was a civil action brought by Kenneth and Steven Baker (collectively the "Bakers") against General Motors Corporation ("General Motors") for the wrongful death of their mother, Beverly Sue Garner.(fn28) On February 23, 1990, Gerald Shoemaker and Garner were involved in a head-on collision in which both died.(fn29) Shoemaker and Garner were traveling in a 1985 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer in which Garner was a front seat passenger.(fn30) The engine compartment of the S-10 Blazer caught on fire after the collision and Garner died as a result of the severe burns she sustained.(fn31) Witnesses reported hearing Garner screaming from inside the vehicle.(fn32) Additionally, rescuers on the scene reported that the fire repeatedly reignited after they had extinguished it.(fn33)

On September 27, 1991, the Bakers sued General Motors, in Missouri Circuit Court, to recover damages for the wrongful death of their mother.(fn34) The Bakers' suit against General Motors was based on a product liability theory.(fn35) On November 11, 1991, General Motors sought removal of the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship.(fn36) The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.(fn37)

The Bakers claimed that the S-10 Blazer in which their mother was traveling was equipped with a defective fuel pump which caused the fire in the engine compartment and, ultimately, their mother's death.(fn38) Specifically, the Bakers "alleged that the fuel pump relay, designed to shut off the fuel pump when the oil pressure went to zero, was defective because it was placed in a location that made it vulnerable to collisions."(fn39) The Bakers contended that the defective placement of the fuel pump led to a condition in which the pump continued to pour gasoline into the fire, impeding efforts to extinguish it.(fn40) The Bakers further alleged that Garner's death was the result of severe burns caused by the fire.(fn41)

In November 1994, the district court sanctioned General Motors for pretrial discovery violations.(fn42) Specifically, the district court sanctioned the company for failing to provide certain reports compiled prior to 1988 on "underhood engine compartment electrical fires," as had been previously ordered by the court.(fn43) The district court entered an order establishing that 1985 Chevrolet S-10 Blazers were defective because they were equipped with fuel pumps that would continue to pump fuel rather than shutdown in the event of a malfunction or collision.(fn44) The district court's order also established that General Motors knew of this defect for many years prior to Garner's death.(fn45) The district court order further established that the particular fuel pump in the S-10 Blazer in which Garner was traveling continued to pump fuel after the collision.(fn46) Once the established items were incorporated into jury instructions, the case went before a jury to decide whether the defective S-10 Blazer directly caused or contributed to Garner's death.(fn47) The jury returned and the court entered a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount of 11.3 million dollars.(fn48)

During the course of the trial, the district court allowed the Bakers to call Ronald Elwell to testify.(fn49) Elwell was a former employee of General Motors.(fn50) For fifteen years of his employment with the automobile manufacturer, Elwell was part of an Engineering Analysis Group.(fn51) The purpose of this group was to examine the performance of General Motors vehicles, focusing on vehicular fires.(fn52) Following his termination of employment, Elwell filed suit against General Motors for wrongful discharge.(fn53) The parties reached a settlement agreement, which included a permanent injunction filed with a Michigan court, barring Elwell from testifying to or disclosing any information relating to General Motors' trade secrets.(fn54) Based on the Michigan injunction, General Motors objected to the admittance of Elwell's testimony.(fn55)

The district court overruled General Motors' objection against Elwell's testimony for two reasons.(fn56) First, the court stated that the Michigan injunction violated the public policy of Missouri and that Missouri's Rules of Civil Procedure favor full disclosure of all relevant information that was not privileged.(fn57) Second, the court reasoned that the injunction was modifiable in Michigan and, therefore, based on full faith and credit, was also modifiable in Missouri.(fn58) Hence, the court allowed Elwell's testimony.(fn59) At trial, Elwell testified in support of the Bakers' claim that the fuel pump system in the vehicle in which Garner was traveling was defective and that the defect contributed to the fire after the collision.(fn60) Additionally, Elwell "identified and described a 1973 internal [General Motors] memorandum bearing on the risk of fuel-fed engine fires."(fn61) This memorandum, known as the "Ivey Analysis," was prepared by Edward Ivey and proved valuable to the Bakers' case during trial.(fn62)

General Motors appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing, inter alia, that the district court erred in allowing Elwell to testify.(fn63) The Eighth Circuit reversed the district...