B Search Warrants

• Library: Illinois Decisions on Search and Seizure (2017 Ed.)

B. Search Warrants

1. Necessity of a Warrant

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (Having reason to believe that defendants were transporting narcotics illegally, federal agents arrested them at their car that was waiting outside a train station. Defendants possessed a locked footlocker, and, without defendants' consent or a search warrant, the agents opened the locker and found a large amount of marijuana. Defendants were indicted for violation of federal narcotics law. HELD: The suppression of the marijuana was upheld. The government's argument that the search was incident to the arrest was rejected because the footlocker was in the agents' "exclusive control" and occurred "long after [defendants] were securely in custody." Also, it was not justified under the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement because the footlocker had been "safely transferred" to a federal building by agents "under their exclusive control." It must be stressed that "luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile"). Accord, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (Chadwick was extended to an unlocked suitcase seized at airport and searched while "exclusively" in agents' control).

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (After receiving a confidential informer's tip, federal agents learned that people were smoking opium in a hotel room. Outside the room, the agents smelled the drug, entered the room without a search warrant, and arrested defendant on federal narcotics charges. The government asserted that the search of the room after the warrantless entry was a proper search incident to a lawful arrest. HELD: The defendant's conviction must be reversed. The warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no reason provided by the government for not obtaining a warrant. "The point of the Fourth Amendment...often is not grasped by zealous officers." It must be noted that "exceptional circumstances" might permit authorities to enter private premises without a warrant, but there were no such circumstances here. "When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent").

People v. Nevarez, 2012 IL App (1st) 093414, 971 N.E.2d 579 (Officers received a tip from defendant's ex-girlfriend, in which she told them that defendant had murdered a man almost nearly four years earlier, and buried the body in the basement of an apartment complex. Based on this information, which was corroborated by the girl's father, the police obtained a search warrant on December 28, 2007 for the apartment building. On December 29, 2007, officers began execution of the search warrant between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. by forcibly entering. The apartment building had two basement apartments, and the initial search focused on the rear of apartment. After entering, the police drilled holes in the floor to release potential odors from a decomposing body under the floor, and a cadaver dog alerted to one of the holes. This process continued until between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on December 29th, when they discontinued their effort due to physical exhaustion. The police then posted guards and boarded up the site, in order to secure it until they resumed the search on the next day. Meanwhile, the police located a friend of defendant's, who admitted to helping defendant dig the hole in which to bury the victim. This individual came to the apartment building on December 30, and told the police to dig in the front room instead of the rear room. The search continued until between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on December 30, when the police unearthed a piece of fabric and a human bone. The officers again posted a guard, and determined to await the arrival of the mobile crime lab the next day. On December 31, the mobile crime lab and a coroner from the medical examiner's office arrived. Ultimately, the examiners located and identified the body of the victim. At trial, defendant moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that probable cause to search dissipated when the search was suspended on December 29th, and that a second search was conducted on December 30th. Defendant argued that the police needed a second search warrant to continue the search on December 30th. HELD: No second search warrant was needed. Because the cadaver dog had alerted on one of the holes, this evidence showed that the police still had probable cause to believe there was a body in the room somewhere. When the officers exhausted themselves after the first evening, they demonstrated their intent to continue the search by boarding up the site, and by posting officers to guard it. The fact that officers subsequently spoke with defendant's collaborator was irrelevant to the continuing probable cause to search that the police already had. The police were not required, therefore, to go before a judge with this new information. Also, the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the apartment where the victim's body was found).

People v. Bryant, 389 Ill. App. 3d 500, 906 N.E.2d 129 (4th Dist. 2009) (A trial judge [issuing judge] issued a warrant to search the defendant's residence based on a written complaint including a description of the property to be searched and the items to be seized, and oral testimony from a police officer. The oral testimony indicated that police officers had received three different tips from unidentified tipsters that meth was being cooked at the defendant's residence. Upon executing the search warrant, officers recovered drugs and manufacturing chemicals, and charged the defendant with possession of methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals and possession of a controlled substance. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that there was no probable cause for the issuing judge to grant the search warrant. The trial court examining the issuing judge's decision [reviewing judge] initially denied the motion, but later changed its decision and ruled that (1) no probable cause existed to issue the search warrant, and (2) pursuant to a Leon hearing, the good faith exception did not apply; thus, the evidence was suppressed. The State appealed these rulings and the appellate court agreed with the State, remanding the case for further proceedings. The defendant's petition for rehearing was also denied, as was the defendant's petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court; however, the Supreme Court subsequently entered a supervisory order, directing the appellate court to vacate its initial judgment, grant the defendant's petition for rehearing, and address the omissions alleged therein. HELD: The reviewing judge erred in suppressing the evidence because probable cause existed to issue the warrant. Also, the trial court erred in finding that the good faith exception, pursuant to Leon, did not apply. Although the defendant claimed that the tips were all received from anonymous tipsters, this was not the case, as the third caller dialed 9-1-1, and calls to emergency police lines should not be viewed as "anonymous" or viewed with skepticism; thus, this caller's status was elevated to that of at least a confidential informant, if not a citizen informant. The defendant's claim that the information was not corroborated by police was also dismissed, as the officer who testified demonstrated that he was able to corroborate some of the information (that the defendant lived at the residence and that the description of the premises was accurate). Additionally, the officer was able to further corroborate the information; because of his specialized training and experience, he was able to recognize the ingredients and procedures used to manufacture meth. The Leon good faith exception also should have applied in this case, as the evidence presented at the Leon hearing contained no suggestion that the officer misled the issuing judge by presenting information known to be false or what he should have known to be false but for a reckless disregard of the truth. Thus, the trial court's judgment suppressing the evidence was reversed and the case remanded).

People v. Wheat, 383 Ill. App. 3d 234, 889 N.E.2d 1195 (2d Dist. 2008) (In early March, 2005, an inspector with a state narcotics team witnessed an undercover officer give money to a man to purchase cocaine. The man walked to a house, entered and exited, and delivered cocaine to the undercover officer. In late October, 2005, the same inspector took garbage from the curb of the same residence the man walked into earlier that year and found 52 grams of cannabis. Based on this information in an affidavit, a court issued a search warrant for the residence, from which cocaine, a digital scale, over $9000 in cash, and documents with the defendant's name were recovered. The defendant was charged and subsequently convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence since the circumstances - the March 2005 observation and the October 2005 garbage search - did not establish the requisite probable cause for a search warrant. HELD: The affidavit alleged sufficient facts to allow the judge to make a practical decision that there was a fair chance that contraband would be found at the residence. A recent cell phone bill, addressed to another person, not the defendant, which was found in the trash can provided a direct indicia of residency connecting the trash to that address. Although the garbage was loose and not tied in a garbage bag, the additional evidence that police had seen a drug dealer enter and exit the residence earlier in the year was sufficient to lend support to a probable cause finding for a warrant).

People v. Smith, 372 Ill. App...