B Permissible Scope of Stop
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B. Permissible Scope of Stop
Rodriguez v. U.S. ___ U.S.___, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (An officer pulled over a vehicle that illegally veered on to the shoulder of a road before jerking it back onto the driving lane. After running a record's check on both the defendant' s and passenger's identification information, the officer issued a written warning to the driver and returned the identification cards of the defendant and the passenger. The officer then asked permission to walk a drug sniffing dog around the defendant's vehicle. The defendant said no. The officer instructed the defendant to turn off the vehicle ignition and exit the vehicle while he radioed for backup. When another officer arrived, the officer that made the stop walked his dog around the defendant's vehicle two times. On the second pass around the vehicle, the dog indicated the presence of narcotics. The officers searched the vehicle and found a large bag of methamphetamine. Seven or eight minutes had passed from the time the officer issued the written warning until the dog had indicated the presence of narcotics. Defendant was indicted in federal district court on one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. He moved to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle on the ground, among others, that the officer prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff. The federal Magistrate Judge first found (1) no probable cause to search the vehicle independent of the dog alert and (2) no reasonable suspicion supporting detention once the officer issued the written warning. However, relying on United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit precedent, the Magistrate concluded that prolonging the stop by "seven to eight minutes" for the dog sniff was only a de minimis intrusion on defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and was for that reason was permissible. In conclusion, the Magistrate Judge recommended denial of the motion, whereupon the District Court accepted the Magistrate's recommendation and also denied defendant's motion. After defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, the Eighth Circuit ruled the seven or eight minute delay was an acceptable "de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez's personal liberty." The Eighth Circuit also declined to reach the question whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to continue defendant's detention after issuing the written warning. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve a division among lower courts on the question whether police routinely may extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff." HELD: Absent additional reasonable suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. A routine traffic stop's tolerable duration is determined by the seizure's "mission," which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop. Authority for the seizure ends when the tasks tied to the traffic infraction are completed. A traffic stop that is "prolonged beyond" that point is "unlawful." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) ("Because addressing the [traffic] infraction is the purpose of ... [a traffic] stop, it may 'last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose'"). Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's mission includes "ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop." These "inquiries involve checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly." However, a dog sniff. is a measure aimed at "detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." A dog sniff for drugs is beyond the officer's "traffic mission." Thus, "[h]ighway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the Government's endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular." The key question then becomes "whether conducting the sniff 'prolongs"-- i.e., adds time to - 'the stop.'" On the other hand, because the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals did not decide the question of whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detaining defendant beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation, this issue "remains open for Eighth Circuit consideration on remand").
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (Officers stopped a vehicle to check its registration, though they had no reason to believe it was being operated illegally. The officers recognized the defendant, a passenger, as a possible parole violator. The officer then confirmed the defendant was a parole violator via police radio, arrested the defendant and searched the defendant, the driver, and the vehicle finding items of meth manufacturing on both individuals and in the vehicle. The defendant moved to suppress the contraband found on him and in the vehicle, but the trial court and the California Supreme Court ruled the defendant, as a passenger, was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. HELD: When a vehicle is stopped by police, both passengers and drivers are in fact "seized" and, as such, have the authority to challenge the constitutionality of the stop. Any reasonable passenger would understand officers exercising control over the vehicle necessarily have the power to prevent their departure or ability to move about freely. Thus, the State courts must determine whether there was any basis for the defendant's seizure and the police search thereafter).
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (HELD: "The use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog - one that 'does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view' (U.S. v. Place, 1983) - during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests," and hence is not a Fourth Amendment "search" requiring suspicion or probable cause of any kind. A traffic stop can be unlawful "if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete" the stop - but that did not happen here. This traffic stop was valid based on probable cause). See also People v. Driggers, 222 Ill. 2d 65, 853 N.E.2d 414 (2006) (canine sniff of vehicle that revealed presence of drugs during a legal stop for a traffic violation did not violate Fourth Amendment privacy rights).
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (where the police conduct Terry stop of the defendant, the State of Nevada statute requiring the defendant to identify oneself as well as the statutory provision for arrest and conviction for a violation of the State "stop and identify" statute does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (The plaintiff, in §1983 action, was driving her pickup truck with her children in the front seat, with nobody wearing a seatbelt. An officer saw that no seatbelts were being worn and pulled her over. He allegedly stated "We've met before," and "You're going to jail." He had previously stopped her on suspicion of a seatbelt violation, but she was let off with a verbal warning when he realized that her son was buckled. On this occasion, she could not provide him with proof of insurance or a driver's license, which violated another state law. She stated that they were stolen along with her purse the day before, to which the officer replied that he had "heard that story two-hundred times." She was arrested and taken to jail while her children were taken by friends. She contended the Fourth Amendment forbids a custodial arrest, even upon probable cause, when a conviction could not ultimately carry any jail time and when the government shows no compelling need for immediate detention. HELD: The officer had probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed in his presence. Under State law the officer had the option to issue a citation or to arrest her, and he chose the latter course of action, which does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Although the officer may have exercised "extremely poor judgment," he was not under a duty to choose the less intrusive alternative, a "limitation.generally thought inappropriate in working out Fourth Amendment protection." Adoption of the plaintiff's suggested rule would be problematic because it: (1) might often be unclear to an officer if the instant offense was not a jailable offense; and (2) would require judicial "case-by-case determination of government need" and "judicial second-guessing months and years after an arrest...has been made").
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (The defendant was sitting in the front passenger seat of a car that had just been lawfully stopped following a pursuit. The police officer ordered the passengers to get out of the car. In the process of complying with the order, defendant dropped cocaine onto the street. The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the Mimms rule (ordering a driver out of his vehicle where no reasonable suspicion) did not apply to passengers. HELD: A police officer can order a passenger out of a car pursuant to a lawful traffic stop even where the officer has no suspicion of passenger wrongdoing. The rationale of Mimms allows a police officer to order a passenger out of a car during a lawful traffic stop in order to promote officer safety. Balancing the public interest against the passenger's right to personal security, the safety of the officer could be equally compromised by a passenger and, therefore, the Mimms rule is extended to cover passengers as well).
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)...
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