B Justifying Warrantless Search

• Library: Illinois Decisions on Search and Seizure (2017 Ed.)

B. Justifying Warrantless Search

General Rule: The ultimate standard of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search under this standard. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (concern for public safety is a reasonable basis for a warrantless search. Knowledge that a driver injured in vehicle accident was a Chicago police officer, presumably carried his gun with him, but did not have it on his person, supported search of vehicle for the weapon, when vehicle was not stored closely to local police station). Compare Arizona v. Gant, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (where arrestee in handcuffs in squad car, search of defendant's vehicle was not justified under search incident to arrest doctrine and, as such, a warrant was required).

Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (At approximately 2:08 a.m., an officer stopped the defendant after observing his vehicle exceed the posted speed limit and repeatedly cross the centerline. While speaking to the defendant, the officer noted that the defendant's eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and his breath smelled of alcohol. The defendant admitted to the officer that he had consumed a "couple beers" at a bar earlier that morning. The officer then had the defendant exit his vehicle and perform a battery of field sobriety tests. When the defendant then refused to use a portable breath-test device to measure his BAC, the officer placed him under arrest. The officer then began transporting the defendant to the station house. However, when the defendant indicated that he would again refuse to provide a breath sample, the officer took the defendant to a nearby hospital for blood testing. After they arrived at the hospital, the officer asked the defendant if he would consent to a blood test. When the defendant refused, the officer directed a hospital lab technician to draw a sample of the defendant's blood. The officer never secured or attempted to secure a warrant for the blood draw. Based on the results of the blood test done on the defendant's sample, the defendant was charged with DWI. The defendant later moved to suppress the results of the blood test. Granting the defendant's motion, the trial court found that the exigency exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to the case because there were no circumstances suggesting the officer faced an emergency in which he could not obtain a warrant. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals stated an intention to reverse but transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Missouri Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the trial court's ruling, finding that there were no factors outside of the natural dissipation of blood alcohol that suggested an emergency in which the officer could not obtain a warrant before securing the defendant's blood. In appealing the Missouri Supreme Court's decision, the State argued that because BAC evidence is inherently evanescent, the United States Supreme Court should adopt a per se rule that blood testing in drunk-driving cases falls under the exigency exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. HELD: While the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood stream may allow for a warrantless search in the form of a blood draw, it does not do so categorically. Whether the warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined according to the facts of the specific case based on the totality of the circumstances. The relevant factors, including the problems surrounding the obtaining of a warrant in a timeframe that would allow for the collecting of reliable evidence, will vary depending on the circumstances of the case. As such, the Missouri Supreme Court was correct in refusing to adopt a per se rule allowing for blood draws that are a result of drunk-driving stops).

Ryburn v. Huff, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 987 (2012) (per curiam) (When Burbank, California officers responded to a call at a Burbank high school, the principal informed them that a student, Vincent Huff, was rumored to have written a letter threatening to "shoot up" the school. The principal reported that numerous parents, after hearing the rumor, had decided to keep their children at home. The principal expressed concern for the safety of her students and requested that the officers investigate the threat. Further investigation revealed that Huff had been absent from school for two days and that he was frequently subjected to bullying. Also, the officers learned that one of Huff's classmates believed that Huff was capable of carrying out the alleged threat. The officers believed Huff's absences from school and his history of being subjected to bullying were consistent with characteristics common among perpetrators of school shootings. When the officers went to Huff's home to interview him, they knocked on the door and then called the phone number listed for the home, receiving no answer in both instances, even though the police determined Huff and his mother in reality were inside. Calling Mrs. Huff's cell phone resulted in her answering, hanging up and then exiting the home with student Huff a couple minutes later. When police inquired if they could speak to them inside their residence about the rumors of threats, Mrs. Huff refused the request. When asked if there were any guns in the house, Mrs. Huff immediately turned around, ran into the house, while two officers and student Huff followed. Two other officers entered moments later. After entering the house, the officers remained in the living room with Mrs. Huff and her son. Eventually, Huff's father entered the room and challenged the officers' authority to be there. The officers continued to remain inside the house for a total of 5 to 10 minutes. During that time, the officers talked to Mr. Huff and his son. They did not conduct any search of Mr. Huff, Mrs. Huff, or their son, or any of their property. The officers ultimately concluded that the rumor about their son was false, and they later reported their conclusion to the school. The Huffs then bought a §1983 civil right action against the police. The complaint alleged that the officers violated the Huffs' Fourth Amendment rights by entering their home without a warrant. The District Court entered judgment for the police. It concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because Mrs. Huff's odd behavior, combined with the information the officers gathered at the school, could have led reasonable officers to believe "that there could be weapons inside the house, and that family members or the officers themselves were in danger." The District Court noted that "[w]ithin a very short period of time, the officers were confronted with facts and circumstances giving rise to grave concern about the nature of the danger they were confronting." Given this kind of "rapidly evolving incident," the court added, courts must be especially reluctant "to fault the police for not obtaining a warrant." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court as to two of the officers who later entered the house on the assumption that Mrs. Huff had consented, but reversed as to the two petitioner-officers who had immediately entered following her. The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court's findings of fact, but disagreed with the District Court's conclusion that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity. Petitioners were granted certiorari. HELD: When confronted with the facts found by the District Court, reasonable officers in the position of petitioners could have come to the conclusion that there was an imminent threat to their safety and to the safety of others. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (referring to emergency exception to warrant requirement). The Ninth Circuit's contrary conclusion based on the same facts was flawed for numerous reasons. First, although the panel majority purported to accept the findings of the District Court, its opinion changed those findings in several key respects. To illustrate, the District Court found Mrs. Huff ran into the house when asked about guns in the home, while the Ninth Circuit accepted the claim that she merely walked into the house to get her husband. Second, the Ninth Circuit appeared to believe that conduct cannot be regarded as a matter of concern so long as it is lawful. Accordingly, they concluded that Mrs. Huff's act of running into the house in response to the question whether there were any guns in the house was not a reason for alarm because she was under no legal obligation to converse with the police. Yet, "it should go without saying, however, that there are many circumstances in which lawful conduct may portend imminent violence." Third, the Ninth Circuit looked at each separate event in isolation and concluded that each, in itself, did not give cause for concern. However, "it is a matter of common sense that a combination of events each of which is mundane when viewed in isolation may paint an alarming picture." Fourth, reasonableness "must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight" and that "[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). As such, the officers' perception and conclusion must be respected, even if in error. In sum, reasonable police officers in petitioners' position could have come to the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permitted them to enter the Huff residence if there was an objectively reasonable basis for fearing that violence was imminent. And a reasonable officer could have come to such a conclusion based on the facts as found by the District Court. Hence, the Ninth Circuit denial of petitioners' claim of qualified...