B Illinois Statutory Limitations

• Library: Illinois Decisions on Search and Seizure (2017 Ed.)

B. Illinois Statutory Limitations

Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561 (7th. Cir. 2012) (Plaintiff-employee sued her employer, a coworker and the coworker's wife, all defendants here, alleging violations of an Illinois eavesdropping statute arising from the coworker's wife's recording of a telephone call from the plaintiff-employee to the coworker, and the subsequent use of the recording by the coworker and the employee's supervisors, resulting in the employee's termination. Specifically, at approximately 9:00 p.m. on Thanksgiving Day, plaintiff called her coworker on the telephone and began yelling at him about an employment matter in such a loud and boisterous manner that the coworker's wife could hear plaintiff's voice blaring from her husband's phone. Becoming concerned, she began listening in on the phone call from another receiver in a different room. As plaintiff's "rant" continued, the coworker's wife became increasingly concerned and upset. She pushed the "record" button on her answering machine and recorded the rest of the call. She later explained she made the recording because she was scared, the caller was using profanity and she feared for her and her husband's safety. The next day, the coworker played the recording at his supervisor's request. After that, the coworker and his wife reported plaintiff's call to the police. Thereafter, plaintiff filed her own police report, claiming a civil violation of the Illinois eavesdropping statute occurred as a result of the recording of the call and the subsequent use of it by her employer, who had terminated plaintiff. Plaintiff followed suit against each of the defendants, who filed for summary judgment on the eavesdropping claims. Specifically, defendants alleged the "fear of crime" exemption contained in 720 ILCS 5/14-3(i) applied to the recording and the district court agreed. Plaintiff appealed. HELD: The fear of crime exemption contained in 14-3(i) allows unconsented recordings when: (1) the recording is made by or at the request of a person who is a party to the conversation; (2) under a reasonable suspicion that another party to the conversation is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal offense against that person or a member of his or her immediate household; and (3) the recording may yield evidence of that criminal offense. Here, defendant-coworker's wife had a reasonable suspicion considering all the circumstances that plaintiff had committed, was committing or was about to commit a crime. Because no genuine dispute of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment, defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. As such, the district court ruling is affirmed).

People v. Kladis, 2011 IL 110920, 960 N.E.2d 1104 (2011) (defendant was arrested for DUI by Northlake police. Five days after her arrest and 25 days prior to the first court date, defendant filed and hand delivered to the State's Attorney's office a petition to rescind her statutory summary license suspension. The defendant also filed and delivered on the same date a document captioned "Notice to Produce at Summary Suspension Hearing," which requested that at the first court date the State produce the arresting officer along with copies of various reports and "any and all video tapes of defendant" while she was in custody for the DUI. When the parties returned to court, the State tendered to defense counsel a two-page business record from the Northlake police department, which stated that pursuant to departmental policy, video recordings are automatically purged within 30 days of arrest, and that the tape requested by defendant had been erased just hours before the parties first appeared in court. Because the requested evidence had been destroyed, and in view of the fact that, but for its absence, defendant would have been ready to proceed on her petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension, the trial court granted her leave to file a written motion for sanctions against the State. At a later proceeding, the trial court found that the "Notice to Produce" placed the State on clear notice that she wished to have a copy of the video recording at the first court date—a fact which the State did not dispute. The State, however, did nothing in response. The trial court observed that the State "could have called the police department and got the tape prior to the time that it ran out" or it "could have filed an answer * * * stating it's not our obligation [to produce the tape] yet because we don't deem this to be a discovery motion * * * [because it includes] things requested in here that we don't have to supply to you." Noting that this was "the third case I have had like this in three weeks" where a defendant asked the State to preserve a video recording and it was destroyed, the trial court found the recording of defendant's traffic stop to be "an important piece of evidence," held that imposition of a sanction against the State for its destruction was proper and barred the State from any testimony describing what information was reflected on the tape. When the hearing on defendant's petition proceeded, after the State failed to present evidence regarding the DUI arrest, the trial court (1) held that the arresting officer had no probable cause to stop, detain and arrest defendant and (2) granted defendant's petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of her driver's license. On appeal, the appellate court held the situation was governed by People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill.2d 572, 309 N.E.2d 557 (1974) (in misdemeanor cases, State is obliged to make available to defendant certain key pieces of evidence it has at its disposal), and upheld the sanctions imposed by the trial court after finding the video recording was discoverable, that the State was placed on notice that it should not be destroyed, that the State nevertheless took no action in response to defendant's discovery request, which set the stage for the deletion of the recording, that the sanction imposed by the trial court was proportionate to the State's discovery violation and that there was no abuse of discretion. The State appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. HELD: The law in Illinois regarding pretrial discovery "presupposes a range of relevance and materiality which includes not only what is admissible at the trial, but also that which leads to what is admissible." Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill.2d 37, 41, 132 N.E.2d 532 (1956). "[R]outine video recording of traffic stops has now become an integral part of those encounters, objectively documenting what takes place by capturing the conduct and the words of both parties. We therefore hold that this important and relevant evidence falls within the scope of materials held to be discoverable under [People v.] Schmidt." In point of fact, "the great importance placed by the General Assembly upon the production and preservation of video recordings made by squad car cameras during law enforcement actions confirms our recognition of their significant evidentiary value and relevance." For example, "[i]n late 2008 our legislature mandated that Illinois State Police squad cars be equipped with recording equipment," 20 ILCS 2610/30(b), and "specified that both video and audio must be captured (id.) and required that these recordings be maintained for a storage period of at least 90 days before being destroyed. 20 ILCS 2610/30(f)." Moreover, the "following year, the General Assembly clarified and broadened the production and preservation safeguards for police recordings. It established the general rule that when any law enforcement agency makes an in-squad video and audio recording in connection with either law enforcement or investigative duties, that recording shall be retained for a minimum period of 90 days. 720 ILCS 5/14-3(h-15).. Significantly, the legislature has also mandated an extended period of storage for certain recordings. Where 'the recordings * * * are made as a part of an arrest or * * * are deemed evidence in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding' they cannot be destroyed except 'upon a final disposition and an order from the court.' Id. We note that this heightened protection is triggered either where, as here, an arrest occurred or where the recording is considered to be evidence in any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding. Significantly, the General Assembly placed no restriction on this latter factor, encompassing all proceedings." Obviously, these various "enactments express the clear legislative intent that the purpose of recording traffic stops and preserving these recordings for later production is to assist in the truth-seeking process by providing objective evidence of what occurred between the law enforcement officer and the citizen." In this case, "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the video recording of defendant's stop and arrest was subject to discovery in her misdemeanor DUI case and that the State committed a discovery violation by allowing the destruction of the recording." Moreover, the "narrowly tailored" trial court ruling allowed for the State to prove defendant's DUI with evidence separate from the barred testimony directly related to the video evidence. But, the State...