b. Basic Principles.

JurisdictionArizona
i. Editor’s Note: For a discussion on causation and sufficiency of the evidence as these topics apply to mental impairments generally, see Section 34(a).

ii. Personality Disorders as Statutory Mitigation.

(1) Generally.

(a) In Richmond, in considering whether sociopathy could satisfy the statutory standard, the Court ruled that character and personality disorders, which the Court saw as including sociopathy, could not. 114 Ariz. at 198-99.
(b) A mere character or personality disorder alone is generally insufficient to constitute a statutory mitigating factor. Brewer, 170 Ariz. at 505; accord Wood, 180 Ariz. at 71; Stokley, 182 Ariz. at 521; Murray, 184 Ariz. at 42; Smith, 193 Ariz. at 462; Kayer, 194 Ariz. at 437, ¶ 49.
(c) A mental illness or psychological defect must usually exist before significant impairment is found. Rudi Apelt, 176 Ariz. at 377; accord Stokley, 182 Ariz. at 521-22; Murray, 184 Ariz. at 42.

(2) Rationale.

(a) Character and personality disorders differ in degree from “a slow, dull, brain-damaged” defendant whose judgment and rationality are marginal. Walton, 159 Ariz. at 588; accord Brewer, 170 Ariz. at 505.
(b) Mental impairments have a far greater mitigating effect because they may evidence an inability to control conduct. Walton, 159 Ariz. at 588.
(c) In Brewer, the Court said that it refuses to equate a defendant’s willingness to control action with an ability to do so. 170 Ariz. at 506.
(d) In Wood, the Court distinguished between “a form of mental illness” and “a form of character trait.” 180 Ariz. at 71.

(3) Indicative of Other Mitigation.

(a) Though a personality or character disorder is not alone sufficient to constitute a statutory mitigating circumstance, such evidence should be considered by the sentencer because it may suggest some reason other than the nature of the disorder why the defendant should receive leniency, such as difficult family history. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. at 459.

iii. Statutory and Then Nonstatutory Consideration.

(1) When a defendant’s character or personality disorder does not rise to the level of statutory mitigation, the sentencer must still consider whether it should be given independent mitigating weight. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. at 102; accord Brewer, 170 Ariz. at 505; Trostle, 191 Ariz. at 20.

iv. Nonstatutory Consideration.

(1) The Court has at times assigned nonstatutory mitigating value to personality disorders. E.g., Brewer, 170 Ariz. at 505-06; King, 180 Ariz. at 288; Stokley, 182 Ariz. at 524; Murray,
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