B. [§ 3.33] Proximate Cause and Superseding/Intervening Cause

• Jurisdiction: Maryland

B. [§ 3.33] Proximate Cause and Superseding/Intervening Cause

Proximate cause exists where the injury complained of is the natural and probable result of the defendant's negligence, taking into consideration the "current societal standards with respect to an acceptable nexus between the negligent act and the ensuing harm." Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 503 A.2d 1333 (1986); Medina v. Meilhammer, 62 Md. App. 239, 489 A.2d 35 (1985). Two subparts comprise the element of proximate cause, requiring that the negligence be: (1) a cause in fact of the injury; and (2) a legally cognizable cause. Blake v. Chadwick, 249 Md. App. 696, 706 (2021). The Blake Court discussed causation issues including proximate cause, substantial factor, "but for" causation, and generic negligence vs. contributory negligence. Id. at 703-10.

The canonical case for proximate cause and superseding/intervening cause issues is the Court of Appeals opinion Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, 973 A.2d 771 (2009). Judge Raker, writing for a unanimous court, began with a review of the first element of proximate causation—cause in fact:

It is a basic principle that "[n]egligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the harm alleged." Stone v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 330 Md. 329, 337, 624 A.2d 496, 500 (1993). Proximate cause "involves a conclusion that someone will be held legally responsible for the consequences of an act or omission." Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 16, 264 A.2d 851, 855 (1970). To be a proximate cause for an injury, "the negligence must be 1) a cause in fact, and 2) a legally cognizable cause." Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135, 156-57, 642 A.2d 219, 230 (1994). In other words, before liability may be imposed upon an actor, we require a certain relationship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries. The first step in the analysis to define that relationship is an examination of causation-in-fact to determine who or what caused an action. The second step is a legal analysis to determine who should pay for the harmful consequences of such an action.
Causation-in-fact concerns the threshold inquiry of "whether defendant's conduct actually produced an injury." Peterson, 258 Md. at 16-17, 264 A.2d at 855. Two tests have developed to determine if causation-in-fact exists, the but for test and the substantial factor test. See id. at 16, 264 A.2d at 855; Yonce v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., 111 Md. App. 124, 138, 680 A.2d 569, 575 (1996), cert. denied, 344 Md. 118, 685 A.2d 452 (1996); Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md. App. 34, 56-57, 651 A.2d 908, 918-19 (1994), cert. denied, 338 Md. 557, 659 A.2d 1293 (1995). The "but for" test applies in cases where only one negligent act is at issue; cause-in-fact is found when the injury would not have occurred absent or "but for" the defendant's negligbrun2bridgesent act. Peterson, 258 Md. at 16, 264 A.2d at 855; see also Sindler v. Litman, 166 Md. App. 90, 113, 887 A.2d 97, 110 (2005).
When two or more independent negligent acts bring about an injury, however, the substantial factor test controls. Causation-in-fact may be found if it is "more likely than not" that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injuries. See Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 240, 630 A.2d 1145, 1152 (1993) (recognizing and applying the factors); Eagle-Picher v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 208, 604 A.2d 445, 459 (1992). This Court has adopted the substantial factor test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Eagle-Picher, 326 Md. at 208-09, 604 A.2d at 459. 409 Md. at 243-44, 973 A.2d at 786-87.

She then turned to the second element of proximate cause—legally cognizable cause:

Once causation-in-fact is established, as in the case sub judice, the proximate cause inquiry turns to whether the defendant's negligent actions constitute a legally cognizable cause of the complainant's injuries. This part of the causation analysis requires us to consider whether the actual harm to a litigant falls within a general field of danger that the actor should have anticipated or expected. Stone, 330 Md. at 337, 624 A.2d at 500. Legal causation is a policy-oriented doctrine designed to be a method for limiting liability after cause-in-fact has been established. See Prosser & Keeton, § 42, at 273 ("Legal causation" depends "essentially on whether the policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which have in fact

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