Averting an Iraq syndrome.

• Author: Rivkin, David B., Jr.
• Position: Early withdrawl from Iraq sends wrong message

WHILE Iraq-related debates continue to dominate the headlines, Morton Abramowitz, in the Spring 2004 issue of The National Interest, was the first senior member of the foreign policy establishment to attempt to furnish a veneer of intellectual respectability for the proposition that a precipitous American withdrawal from Iraq would not necessarily be calamitous. (He has been followed more recently by William Odom, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who is a contributor to this symposium as well.) Accordingly, these views merit attention, even if they are, in my opinion, ultimately unpersuasive.

Abramowitz analyzes both the probability and the consequences of our success in Iraq--success being defined as the establishment of "a stable, reasonably democratic system"--as well as the implications of an early departure, both on the country itself and the Greater Middle East. Although there is some analytical overlap between these two issues, they are not identical. Indeed, while the prospects and strategic implications of building a U.S.-prompted Iraqi democracy are probably better than Abramowitz seems to suggest, it is fair to acknowledge that they are inherently speculative and uncertain.

The analysis is further complicated by the fact that there is a range of plausible outcomes in Iraq which feature different degrees of stability and democracy. For example, the United States could succeed in stabilizing Iraq and a reasonably friendly and democratic, albeit weak, government could emerge. Should this government be eventually displaced by an authoritarian regime either as a result of a democratic process or through some less salutary means, the consequences of this regrettable evolution might well be manageable. Likewise, should an interim Iraqi government or its elected successor request a withdrawal of American forces--a possibility inherent in the restoration of Iraq's sovereignty--American credibility should not be adversely affected. While the United States is willing to spend blood and treasure to shore up a friendly Iraqi government, it cannot and should not seek to impose its largesse. Yet what Abramowitz seems to countenance is a prompt, unilateral American withdrawal, literally under fire, which would leave Iraq a failed state. Unfortunately, the consequences of our cutting and running in this scenario are far more certain and disastrous than Abramowitz acknowledges.

His overarching thesis is that the United States enjoys such global preeminence that it "can endure early withdrawal from Iraq", just as we had survived our defeat in Vietnam and have apparently muddled through various other ignominious withdrawals. Unfortunately, this proposition is true only in the truistic sense. The United States did not, indeed, collapse or fall prey to foreign occupation in the aftermath of Vietnam. In all other respects, the view espoused by Abramowtiz and others is profoundly wrong.

To begin with, the defeat in Vietnam cast a long shadow over American foreign and defense policy, greatly emboldened our key strategic adversary at the time--the Soviet Union--and led to more than a decade of Moscow's ambitious foreign endeavors in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and Africa. To be sure, the Soviet Union's eventual collapse--driven by its fundamental internal weaknesses and the decades of relentless American pressure, culminating with bold Reagan-era policies, not to mention the Sino-Soviet Cold War confrontation--provided the United States with important geopolitical leverage, fortuitously mitigating the adverse consequences of...