Australian Experience of Antitrust Regulation—A Vindication of the per Se Approach

Date01 June 1973
AuthorWarren Pengilley
DOI10.1177/0003603X7301800213
Published date01 June 1973
Subject MatterArticle
AUSTRALIAN
EXPERIENCE
OF
ANTITRUST
REGULATION-A
VINDICATION OF THE
PER
SE
APPROACH
by
,V
ARREN
PENGILLEY·
Australia
has now seen about 5
years
of restrictive
trade
practices enforcement. This is almost the first period of
attempted
trade
practices control in
Australia
since the
1!106-
11 period.
1.
PRIOR
ENDEAVOURS
Australia
amere 5yean;
after
the formation of the Com-
monwealth entered into what was a distinctively
"North
American" approach to trade practices control.
The Irl06
Australian
Industries
Preservation
Act was
passed in terms distinctly similar to the Sherman Act of the
United States. The Irl06 Australian legislation declared
with
great
simplicity
that
"any
person who enters into
any
contract or engages in any combination in relation to
trade
or commerce with
other
countries or among the states
...
with
intent
to
restrain
trade
and commerce to the detriment of
the public" shall be guilty of an offense.' Treble damages
were also provided,"
The North American approach, however,
ran
into
diffi-
culties when confronted by the English
Privy
Council," The
,. Solicitor
and
Attorney of the Supreme Court of N.S.W. Aus-
tralia.
1Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 Section 4.
2Australian Industries Preservation
Act
1906 Section 11.
SThen the highest appellate tribunal of the Australian Court
System along with most other then British Empire countries. The
Privy
Council still retains extensive jurisdiction as the final appellate
court of Australia though this is now mostly in respect of state
and
non-federal appeals only.
355
356
THE
ANTITRUST
BULLETIN
first Australian appeal to the
Privy
Council under the
Act"
found their Lordships holding
that
prices were
not
"unrea-
sonable" in a coal vend conspiracy involving price fixing,
quotas, boycotts and reciprocal exclusive arrangements with
a"shipping vend." Furthermore, it was held
that
the
"intent"
which had to be proven was a "sinister intent" to
injure
the
public, and
"the
public" which had to be injured included the
parties
to the agreement itself. The decision is one of naive
economics, to
say
the least. Their Lordships' comments on
"reasonable" prices were certainly unconvincing, as one would
think
that
(coal being at the
particular
time virtually the sole
source of bulk power) the incentive would be to charge what
the market could bear. No
trade
agreement has "sinister
intent" in the sense of their Lordships'
interpretation
of the
term
and clearly it would be virtually impossible to show
detriment to the
parties
in the agreement. Obviously such
agreement was to their benefit in
order
to obtain monopoly
power over the price of a product with an inelastic demand.
The
Privy
Council thus gave to Australia the background
case which was to give rise to innumerable
restraints
of
trade
to follow. The case duplicated
for
Australia the "pro-collu-
sion" views expressed and to be expressed by the
Privy
Council also in the cases of Canada" and New Zealand." The
Australian Act was amended in 1911 to remove the
"intent"
provision;
but
in view of the
Privy
Council decision in Coal
Vend.tsubsequent
Privy
Council
interpretation
of the New
A.G. (Oommonwealth) v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd., 18 CLR
30 (1911-13); All
ER
1120 (commonly known as "The Coal Vend
Case"). .
5See, for example, United Shoe Manufacturing 00. of Oanada v.
Brunet (1909), AC 330.
6See, R. v. Crown Milling Co. (1927), AC 394, giving interpreta-
tion to the Commercial Trusts Act of New Zealand similar to
that
given to Australian legislation and overruling New Zealand decisions
making conspiracies under such Act criminal and allowing an in-
jured
party
to sue for damages (Merchants Assoc. of N.Z. [Inc.]
and
Ors v. The King [1913], 32 NZLR 537; Fairbairn
Wright
Co. v.
Levin
d1
00.
[1915],34
NZLR
1).
7See note 4 above.

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