Augustinian Radical Transcendence: Source of Political Excess.

• Author: Drury, Shadia B.

The relationship between Christianity and politics is paradoxical. On one hand, many Christians are inclined to shun politics and to wash their hands of the evils of the world, but, on the other hand, they cannot resist the temptation of creating God's state--a state that surrenders to God and that testifies to the need for salvation, the necessity of the redeemer, and the utter depravity of man.

I do not believe that Christians are necessarily doomed to this contradictory view of politics. Nevertheless, the contradictory stance toward politics described above has been a recurrent feature of Christian thought and sensibility. And it is clearly manifested in the writings of St. Augustine of Hippo and his admirers. It is to be understood that Augustinianism is not the whole of Christianity. Nor are the aspects of Augustine highlighted here the whole of Augustine. But it seems to me that they are the predominant aspect of Augustine's political thought, and, in my view, have inflicted great harm.

Radical transcendence begets political excesses.

In this article, I will argue that the political excesses of Augustinian Christianity have their source in the insistence on radical transcendence. However, I also believe that Augustinian Christianity is unable to sustain its own posture of radical transcendence. The latter position is so harsh, so immoderate, and so inhuman that it leads its advocates to succumb to an extremism of another kind--it leads them to the political temptations of using the power of the state for dogmatic ends. I will borrow some ideas from Hegel to show how the excesses of radical transcendence can be overcome, and I will defend a Hegelian position against the histrionic criticisms of Eric Voegelin, whom I regard as one of the representatives of Augustinianism in our time.

Augustinian Christianity

The excesses of Augustinian Christianity are well illustrated in Augustine's approach to two political issues: the Roman practice of torturing criminal suspects and war. I will discuss each in turn.

As much as he abhorred the Roman practice of torturing criminal suspects as well as totally innocent witnesses, and as much as he was opposed to the practice in court cases where the Church was involved (as in the proceedings against the Donatists), Augustine believed that this abhorrent practice was nevertheless a necessary and inevitable aspect of temporal order with which Christians need not meddle, since they are not part of the earthly city, but merely pilgrims, strangers, and sojourners in this world. It is not the duty of Christians to make right the wrongs of the world.

"No wickedness that innocent ... are tortured."

Augustine maintained that a righteous and godly man, even if he were to find himself in a position of power, need not make any effort to discontinue this terrible Roman practice. On the contrary, Augustine insisted that a good and wise judge need not shrink from the darkness in which human society is necessarily shrouded. As Augustine wrote, the wise and godly ruler

It may be argued that Augustine is someone with high ideals and low expectations, and that this is not an altogether unwise posture. However, it seems to me that, if our ideals are so high that they transcend altogether the domain of mundane existence, then we will lose sight of them and they will be of no relevance to the world in which we live. There is no doubt that Augustine's expectations of politics are low, but the exorbitant depths to which he carries his low expectations allow him to make drastic compromises with the ordinary standards of justice and decency. Such an understanding of Christianity not only undermines virtue, it invites depravity. I contend that it is the sort of picture of Christian piety that inflames the anticlerical imagination--from Lessing's Patriarch of Jerusalem to Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor. [2]

thinks it no wickedness that innocent witnesses are tortured ... or that the accused are put to the torture, so that they are often overcome with anguish, and, though innocent, make false confessions regarding themselves, and are punished; or though they be not condemned to die, they often die during, or in consequence of, the torture; ... These numerous and important evils he does not consider sins; for the wise judge does these things not with the intention of doing harm,.... he is compelled to torture and punish the innocent because his office and his ignorance constrain him. [1]

Augustine does not even pretend that these evils are necessary for maintaining order in a sinful world. He has banished the ideals of Christianity to such a distant heaven that they have no meaning, no place, no impact on the world. So understood, Christianity leaves the world not just as it found it, but worse. If there were no Christians around, a pagan man of decency might come to power now and again, and temporarily provide relief from the usual abominations. With Christians in power, no such relief is to be expected.

Augustine's political philosophy is often compared with Machiavelli's, but to my mind there is a very significant difference. Machiavelli believed that the moral standards that apply to private life do not apply to politics. In politics, the preservation of the state is the only good. This supreme end justifies the employment of whatever means are necessary. This is why Machiavelli maintained that a prince may have to do many evil and despicable things for the sake of his country, so he had better be a man who loves his country more than his soul; for the sorts of things he must do will surely compromise the purity of his soul and his chances for salvation. In contrast, Augustine's godly ruler is in the enviable position of not having to choose between his country and his soul. Augustine assures him that the necessary, as well as the not so necessary, evils he performs in his line of duty are not wicked. I am not suggesting that Augustine's godly ruler is a Machiavellian prince; he is more despicable. The ev ils he commands are unnecessary; and even if they were necessary evils, Augustine's godly ruler would still be a ghastly spectacle--a Machiavellian prince with a clear conscience!

Augustine's prince more despicable than Machiavelli's.

One thing is undeniable: the rule of the godly can be much more grotesque than that of the godless. With his eyes set on heaven, the godly ruler has little use for this world. Indeed, the more grisly the world gets the more need there is for salvation. Besides, in the face of so much devastation, faith in a good and just God is truly heroic. It is no wonder that Nietzsche connected modern nihilism with the Christian inability to affirm life in this world. If everything of worth is posited in a distant heaven, then, when that heavenly world disappears, all that is left is the worthless world in which we live. This is how Nietzsche understood the relation between Christianity and nihilism.

Christianity drained of earthly significance.

The trouble with the Augustinian version of Christianity is that the radical transcendence of God and of the good drains Christianity of earthly significance. Moreover, it makes Christianity so harsh and so uncompromising that it invites a drastic leap to another extreme--the desire to sanctify the world, to make it testify to the love and grace of God, and to use the power of the state to that end.

Augustine's discussion of war is a case in point. He denies that Christianity is a pacifistic religion that is incompatible with the obligations of citizens to fight for the state. He argues that, since political rulers are from God, Christians have an obligation to fight in all wars authorized by the powers that be. [3] More often than not, these wars are unjust, but that is irrelevant to the political obligation of Christians. When the Bible says "Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's," Augustine interprets this to mean that we should pay taxes to Caesar to finance his wars, which are generally wars of aggression. [4] So far, his position is totally compatible with the posture of radical transcendence discussed above: War is one of the evils of this world, and, as with other evils, we can do nothing except go along, all the while reassuring ourselves that we are ostensibly the humble servants of God's unfathomable will.

But Augustine goes further. War is not just one of the evils of this world. God himself has commanded the Israelites to wage righteous wars that would crush the wicked and humble the proud.[5] Some may think that this Old Testament view comes into conflict with the New Testament, which counsels us to turn the other cheek. But Augustine assures us that there is no conflict, and that the New Testament injunction is not intended to refer to our actions, but only to the "inward disposition of the heart." [6] We are to recompense evil with good only in the first instance in order to shame the wicked into changing their ways, but if this fails, then we are entitled to use force and correct them with a "benevolent severity" that is "contrary to their wishes." [7] In this way, "wars might be waged by the good" in order to bring the "unbridled lust of men" under the yoke of a just or Christian government that could abolish or...