Attribution of Guilt to Offspring of Perpetrators of the Genocide: Rwandan People's Perspectives

• Date: 01 September 2015
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/crq.21128
• Published date: 01 September 2015

C R Q, vol. 33, no. 1, Fall 2015 75

© 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. and the Association for Confl ict Resolution

Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) • DOI: 10.1002/crq.21128

Attribution of Guilt to O spring of Perpetrators of

the Genocide: Rwandan People’s Perspectives

Immaculée Mukashema

Etienne Mullet

 is study, conducted in Rwanda, examined the attribution of guilt

to off spring of people who were directly involved in mass atrocities: To

what extent can the son or grandson of a small farmer who participated

in the genocide be considered as guilty of his father’s or grandfather’s

deeds? Two qualitatively diff erent views were found.  e majority view

was that off spring were totally free of guilt.  e minority view was that

perpetrators’ off spring inherited at least part of their genitors’ guilt, espe-

cially that of their fathers.

When a person has committed bad deeds toward someone or a group

of persons, this person is deemed to be guilty. Guilt is attributed

on the basis of a discrepancy between this person’s behavior and social

norms (e.g., the law). In some European and African countries, guilt can,

for this reason, be associated with the absence of any concrete deed. For

example, when a person has witnessed others’ bad deeds and has decided

not to do anything to redress the situation, this person is also deemed to

be guilty, even if he or she has not personally benefi ted from the perpe-

trator’s deeds (Belgium n.d.; Germany n.d.; Rwanda n.d.b). Although

guilt from a juridical viewpoint is a dichotomous concept, retribution

for being guilty is not.  e level of severity of punishment or penalty

depends on the many circumstances that surround the presence of anti-

social behavior or the absence of prosocial behavior (e.g., attenuating

circumstances).

76 MUKASHEMA, MULLET

C R Q • DOI: 10.1002/crq

Feeling Guilty

When people have objectively performed bad deeds or did nothing to

redress a harmful or unjust situation, they usually feel guilty (Baumeister,

Stillwell, and Heatherton 1994). But some people, under the same circum-

stances, may not feel guilty because they do not consider that their behavior

was contrary to social norms or are not personally troubled (e.g., they have

a psychopathic personality; Skeem et al. 2011). People may also feel guilty

in circumstances where they have not performed any bad deed—when, for

example, they have falsely been convinced that they are the perpetrator of a

crime or suff er from psychopathology (e.g., pathological guilt; Shapiro and

Stewart 2011). Still another situation is when a person feels guilty for not

doing anything to repair the many injustices committed around the world,

especially when this person lives where justice prevails and affl uence is the

rule. In summary, objective guilt (e.g., as determined by the law) and feel-

ings of guilt are only loosely related at the personal level. One can be objec-

tively guilty and not feel so, and one can experience strong feelings of guilt

without any objective basis. A dramatic example of disconnection has been

off ered in a study by Kanyangara, Rimé, Philippot, and Yzerbyt (2007)

showing that people rightly accused of having perpetrated the genocide in

Rwanda expressed surprisingly moderate levels of personal guilt (see also

Johnsson et al. 2014).

People can also feel guilty by association (Branscombe 2004, Doosje

et al. 1998). People live in groups of various sizes: families, neighborhoods,

communities, clans, tribes, cities, nations, and states. When, for example,

members of a person’s family have done harm to other people, this person

can feel guilty by identifying herself with the family, even when the event

took place decades ago.  is process, called depersonalization (Turner et al.

1987), occurs by the introduction of past family members as more or less

central parts of the current self. It can also occur by the introduction of

more abstract entities such as the clan, the city or the country, and even

humanity as a whole. Although this person has not committed any act

that would qualify her as objectively guilty, she may still feel so, even if she

never directly benefi ted from the harmful act.

Alternatively, this person may feel personally not guilty but may instead

feel angry at her past family members or fellow countrymen or compas-

sionate toward the victims of her family’s or countrymen’s past deeds,

and as a result, feel that she has a special duty toward the victims or the