Attorney Discipline
| Publication year | 2023 |
| Pages | 0049 |
Attorney Discipline Summaries
March 21, 2023, through May 31, 2023
BY LEIGH BURGESS
Disbarments
Willie George Davis Jr.
881 Cascade Crossing
Atlanta, GA 30331
Admitted to the Bar 1996
On March 21, 2023, the Supreme Court of Georgia disbarred attorney Willie George Davis Jr. (State Bar No. 213371) from the practice of law in Georgia with conditions on reinstatement. This was the third appearance of this disciplinary matter before the Court, following the rejection of the petition for voluntary discipline filed by Davis after a formal complaint was filed against him (Davis II). The matter was before the Court on the report and recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board, which recommended that Davis be disbarred based on his violations of Rules 1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (I) (a) and (c), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 3.4 (a), 3.5 (d), 8.1 (b) and 8.4 (a) (5) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct stemming from his mishandling of his sister's estate and his nephew's conservatorship as well as his repeated failure to comply with orders of the Cobb County Probate Court.
In Davis II, the special master recommended that Davis be suspended for at least 18 months with reinstatement conditioned upon Davis providing proof that he satisfied the probate court judgment and that he was no longer suffering from any mental disability that would make him unable to practice law. But if Davis failed to meet these conditions within 60 days after the 18-month suspension expired, the time-limited suspension would be converted automatically to an indefinite suspension under the same conditions. The Court rejected this recommendation, reasoning that "to impose an indefinite suspension until the reinstatement conditions are met would effectively result in Davis being suspended for approximately 50 years if he continued paying restitution at the rate the record shows he is currently paying," and the Court does not allow suspensions of that length. The Court also concluded that the reinstatement conditions recommended by the special master for Davis were "considerably less stringent than for disbarred attorneys, insofar as Davis could remain
suspended for far longer than five years but—upon satisfying the conditions of his suspension—not be required to re-certify his fitness before he resumes the practice of law." The Court also noted that the conditions seemed "more punitive to Davis" because "the large discrepancy between the amount he would be required to repay and his current rate of repayment" meant that "the recommended conditions could place Davis in disciplinary purgatory: if he cannot finish paying restitution, his discipline will be endless."
After Davis II, the State Bar took Davis' deposition and filed its motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the record, including Davis' deposition and unconditional admissions in his petition for voluntary discipline, established as a matter of law that he violated Rules 1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (I) (a) and (c), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 3.4 (a), 3.5 (d), 8.1 (b) and 8.4 (a) (5). After Davis failed to file a response to the motion for partial summary judgment, the special master granted the motion, finding that Davis had violated the above rules by clear and convincing evidence. After granting partial summary judgment, the special master issued her second report and recommendation that Davis be disbarred with reinstatement conditional upon (1) his payment in full of the probate judgment and (2) his obtaining a certification of fitness to practice law from a licensed mental health professional. Davis filed exceptions and requested review by the Review Board. Subsequently, the State Bar filed a response.
In its report and recommendation, the Review Board adopted the special master's findings of fact and conclusions of law and incorporated them by reference, concluding that the special master's recommendation of disbarment with conditions for reinstatement was the appropriate level of discipline. In her second report and recommendation, the special master summarized the procedural history of the disciplinary proceeding, including that she had granted partial summary judgment as to Davis' violations of Rules 1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (I) (a) and (c), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 3.4 (a), 3.5 (d), 8.1 (b) and 8.4 (a) (5). The special master also adopted the facts as stated by the Court in Davis II. The special master concluded that Davis violated the Rules as follows: Rules 1.7 (a) and (b) by drafting his sister's will without first obtaining informed consent, confirmed in writing, that his sister was aware of a potential conflict of interest in Davis naming himself the executor of the will; Rule 1.15 (I) (a) by depositing his sister's life insurance proceeds into his IOLTA account, transferring the proceeds to his personal investment account and failing to maintain accurate records; Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by (1) failing to deliver the full amount of the life insurance proceeds to his nephew and "treat[ing] [him] abysmally and failed in his basic duties to him as a child," and (2) failing to provide his nephew with an accounting of the life insurance proceeds and by admitting that an accounting was not possible because he did not maintain records of how he used the funds; Rule 1.15 (II) (a) because as a fiduciary, he was required to deposit his sister's life insurance proceeds into an interest-bearing trust account for the benefit of his nephew, but instead, he deposited them into a personal investment account and "administered" the funds from there; Rule 1.15 (II) (b) by failing to keep and maintain accurate records of expenditures made from the life insurance proceeds; Rule 3.4 (a) when he unlawfully obstructed his nephew's access to evidence for nearly a year during the probate court proceedings and failed to provide an accounting of expenditures of the funds after the nephew's attorney repeatedly requested it and when he failed to produce an accounting of expenditures after ordered to do so by the probate court; Rule 3.5 (d) by failing to attend the probate proceedings; Rule 8.1 (b) by failing to provide the accounting requested by the State Bar during its investigation and failing to respond to the notice of investigation; and Rule 8.4 (a) (5) by violating his fiduciary duties to account for funds held in trust which formed the basis of the judgment against him by his nephew and by failing to pay the probate court judgment.
The special master found that Davis violated his duties by (1) failing to preserve his nephew's property; (2) failing to obtain informed consent regarding the conflict of interest inherent in drafting a will that allowed him to serve, without bond, as executor, conservator and guardian; (3) failing to diligently handle his nephew's affairs entrusted to him both before and after the nephew turned 18; (4) failing to recognize his lack of competency in acting as a fiduciary for his nephew; (5) misleading the nephew's attorney and the probate court in order to protect his actions from scrutiny; (6) deliberately withholding material information regarding the status of his sister's estate and the nephew's conservatorship from the probate court; and (7) violating duties owed to the probate court by unnecessarily delaying the progress of the nephew's reasonable efforts to obtain an accounting of the funds that had been entrusted to him.
Regarding Davis' mental state, the special master found that Davis was affected by grief, depression and anxiety but that he never suggested he was incompetent. The special master accepted that Davis' clinical depression and anxiety played a role in his general avoidance of duties but concluded that Davis' mental state when he drafted his sister's will and when his sister died shortly thereafter was different than the mental state he had five years later when his nephew reached the age of majority and the probate court became involved. Ultimately, the special master concluded that Davis' depression did not explain his behavior when the probate court and his nephew's attorney requested that he provide an accounting and appear in court. The special master found that while Davis did not admit to stealing the money, he could not establish that he used all the money to pay his nephew's expenses. Nonetheless, Davis acknowledged he owed his nephew the amount of the probate court judgment but stated he could not pay because the funds had been depleted. Ultimately, the special master found that some of Davis' conduct was negligent but that a significant amount appeared to be knowing and intentional with the...
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