Assessing the Effects of Partisan Bias at the Group Level of Analysis: A Hidden Profile Experiment

AuthorDaniel E. Bergan,Brian Manata,Gwen M. Wittenbaum,Franklin J. Boster
DOI10.1177/1532673X18788052
Published date01 November 2019
Date01 November 2019
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X18788052
American Politics Research
2019, Vol. 47(6) 1283 –1302
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X18788052
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X18788052
American Politics Research
2019, Vol. 47(6) 1283 –1302
© The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X18788052
journals.sagepub.com/home/apr
Article
Assessing the Effects
of Partisan Bias at the
Group Level of Analysis:
A Hidden Profile
Experiment
Brian Manata1, Franklin J. Boster2,
Gwen M. Wittenbaum2, and Daniel E. Bergan2
Abstract
Although there is some evidence in the political arena that pooling
information can overcome individual biases to improve decision-making
accuracy, research from the group communication and psychology arenas
suggests otherwise. Specifically, research on the hidden profile, a group-
level decision-making problem, suggests that groups are decidedly biased
when making decisions. This laboratory experiment tested whether or not
partisan biases manifest at the group level of analysis. In the main, it was
found that groups composed of either all Republican or all Democratic
group members were likely to make a decision that was consonant with their
party’s political ideology, which ultimately impacted hidden profile solution
rates (i.e., decision accuracy). Moreover, supplemental analyses suggest that
Republican and Democratic groups reached their biased decisions through
different means. A discussion is provided in which the implications of these
results are considered.
Keywords
motivated reasoning, partisan bias, decision-making, hidden profile, groups
1Portland State University, OR, Portland, USA
2Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA
Corresponding Author:
Brian Manata, Portland State University, P.O. Box 751, Mailstop SP-COMM, Portland,
OR 97207-0751, USA.
Email: manata@pdx.edu
788052APRXXX10.1177/1532673X18788052American Politics ResearchManata et al.
research-article2018
1284 American Politics Research 47(6)
Despite concerns about biased reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge,
2006), there is some evidence in the political arena that pooling information
appears to overcome individual biases to improve decision-making. For
example, the forecasting successes of political markets, in which markets
pool private information to provide accurate election forecasts, suggest
that, in the aggregate, people’s judgments are accurate (Berg, Forsythe,
Nelson, & Rietz, 2008; Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). Similarly, classic work
in public opinion suggests that in spite of the idiosyncrasies of individual
political attitudes (Converse, 1964), in the aggregate, public opinion is sta-
ble and responds to real world events in a rational manner (Page & Shapiro,
1992).
Ultimately the ability to discuss and share information in groups could be
important in reducing the impact of individual biases in political decision-
making. Deliberation forums, for instance, in which people discuss contro-
versial political issues in a structured setting, have been shown to influence
people’s attitudes (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Moreover, allowing people to
consider multiple dimensions of controversial issues rather than considering
only one salient dimension has been shown to benefit decision-making qual-
ity (Druckman & Nelson, 2003).
Nevertheless, literature on the hidden profile, a group-level decision-mak-
ing paradigm (Stasser & Titus, 1985), suggests that, under some general con-
ditions, groups fail to overcome individual biases. As a decision-making
problem, the hidden profile task typically unfolds in two phases. First, groups
are required to assess the favorability of multiple hypothetical decision alter-
natives (Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004). Second, members are
asked to convene and choose the group’s preferred alternative (e.g., best job
candidate, Cruz, Boster, & Rodriguez, 1997). Notably, some alternatives are
assigned more positive attributes (optimal alternatives) when compared with
others (suboptimal alternatives), which implies that, by weight of the evi-
dence, some alternatives are better options than others (Wittenbaum, 2010).
Presumably, when all information about each of the alternatives is avail-
able and pooled, choosing the optimal alternative is a simple task. In desig-
nating candidate attributes as either shared (known by all members) or
unshared (known by a single member), however, the difficulty of solving the
hidden profile task increases substantially. Specifically, despite the existence
of an optimal solution, information about each of the alternatives is largely
unshared and dispersed throughout the group (Stasser & Titus, 2003;
Wittenbaum, 2010; Wittenbaum et al., 2004). Hence, solving the hidden pro-
file and thus making an optimal decision require that members exchange
unshared information and engage in the “systematic and balanced explora-
tion of relevant issues” (Stasser & Titus, 1985, p. 1467).

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