A second line of defense for public officials asserting qualified immunity: what "extraordinary circumstances" prevent officials from knowing the law governing their conduct?

AuthorLittman, Adam L.

"Given the complexities of the law today, it should not be surprising to find intelligent, conscientious, well-trained public servants who do not know all the clearly established law governing their conduct. The statement ... that reasonably competent public officials know clearly established law is a legal fiction." (1)

  1. INTRODUCTION

    The qualified immunity defense shields public officials from liability for civil rights violations committed during the exercise of their official duties. (2) The defense, which the United States Supreme Court deems necessary for officials to perform their duties effectively, has, in practice, caused great confusion in law enforcement. (3) Public officials often confront constitutionally uncertain circumstances while performing their everyday duties, but unfortunately, they often lack the legal guidance to know whether their actions are lawful. (4) Consider a recent Tenth Circuit case, Lawrence v. Reed, (5) in which the Rawlins, Wyoming Police Chief faced an unusual situation. (6)

    For years, Rawlins residents had complained to city officials that a certain landowner, Mrs. Lawrence, was storing junk vehicles on her property and creating an eyesore adjacent to the county fairgrounds. (7) After a number of unsuccessful settlement proposals with Lawrence, the city council consulted the derelict vehicle ordinance to lawfully seize and junk the vehicles. (8) Pursuant to the ordinance, the city may give notice of intent to impound after it determines that a vehicle is derelict, and may give the property owner thirty days notice of removal. (9) Thereafter, if the owner does not remove the derelict vehicles within twenty-four hours of the second notice, the city may seize them. (10) The Rawlins Police Chief, with the assistance of the city attorney, undertook each step of the mandated procedure without receiving an adequate response from Lawrence and eventually towed her vehicles to a local landfill. (11) The chief received approval from the city attorney prior to each critical decision he made. (12)

    Following the incident, Lawrence instituted a lawsuit against the chief and other officials under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983 (Section 1983), alleging constitutional violations of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures and her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. (13) After concluding that the chief had violated Lawrence's constitutional rights, the district court held him immune from liability due to his repeated consultations with the city attorney. (14) On Lawrence's appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's application of qualified immunity, rejecting the chief's argument that he relied on the city attorney and the Rawlins derelict vehicle ordinance. (15) The court reasoned that any reasonable officer would have understood that due process requires a hearing before depriving an individual of his property interest, regardless of the existence of a conflicting ordinance or the approval of a practicing attorney. (16) Although his argument failed, the chief was invoking the "extraordinary circumstances" exception to the qualified immunity defense, which has succeeded in many other cases and confused qualified immunity jurisprudence in the federal courts. (17)

    In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, (18) the Supreme Court indicated that there may be some cases where, although the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of clearly established federal law, "extraordinary circumstances" require the court to sustain the qualified immunity defense. (19) The Court stated that the defendant official must prove that he "neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard." (20) Under the Court's guidance in Harlow, federal courts have recognized a qualified immunity defense for extraordinary circumstances where an official has relied on advice from counsel or a legislative enactment. (21) The Court has not directly addressed the extraordinary circumstances exception since its Harlow decision, leaving the circuit courts to interpret the defense. (22)

    The purpose of this Note is to explore the application of the extraordinary circumstances defense within the federal judicial system. (23) Specifically, this Note will analyze situations that constitute extraordinary circumstances for purposes of the qualified immunity defense and identify those circuits that accept it. (24) Part II.A provides a background of Section 1983 actions and the qualified immunity defense. (25) Parts II.B and II.C focus on the early development of qualified immunity, and, in particular, the Supreme Court's creation of a purely objective, two-part qualified immunity inquiry. (26) Part III explores circuit court decisions relating to the extraordinary circumstances defense and highlights two Supreme Court cases that have guided the circuit courts' analysis. (27) Finally, Part IV of this Note suggests that the Supreme Court should revisit the extraordinary circumstances defense and clarify that reliance on legal advice and statutory authority is a critical factor in determining the objective reasonableness of an official's actions. (28) In particular, the Court should impose a presumption of immunity when an official relies on a statute, regulation, or ordinance. (29)

  2. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

    1. The Elements of a Section 1983 or Bivens Claim and an Introduction to Qualified Immunity

      When facing constitutional tort allegations under Section 1983, public officials may argue qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. (30) The Supreme Court describes the defense as a "shield" from liability for government officials performing discretionary functions, provided "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." (31) The immunity provides an exemption from the litigation process, not simply immunity from monetary damages. (32) The qualified immunity defense balances the public's interest in effectively vindicating constitutional guarantees with the state's equally strong countervailing interest in protecting officials from the threat of liability when performing official duties. (33)

      Qualified immunity in the United States traces its origins to the doctrine of sovereign immunity that existed in medieval England. (34) The principle originally provided that no person could sue the King in his own court, however, the English later reformed the system to permit suits against the King upon his consent. (35) English common law eventually extended sovereign immunity to public officials so that government agents could effectively perform their official duties without fear of liability. (36)

      Under United States federal law, qualified immunity, like sovereign immunity, operates to defend government officials from liability for constitutional violations under Section 1983 and actions under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. (37) Congress enacted Section 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act in 1871 to provide citizens with a procedural device to remedy constitutional violations by "state actors." (38) The plaintiff in a Section 1983 action must establish two elements: deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or other laws of the United States, and the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. (39) Although federal officials are not included under the statute, the Supreme Court later recognized in Bivens an analogous right of action against federal agents. (40)

    2. Qualified Immunity Pre-Harlow: A "Good Faith" Defense

      In 1967, in Pierson v. Ray, (41) the Supreme Court recognized that qualified immunity is a necessary defense to protect public officials who have been sued in an individual capacity. (42) In Pierson, police officers arrested a group of African American and Caucasian clergymen under a Mississippi statute when they attempted to use segregated waiting room and restaurant facilities. (43) The statute made it unlawful for anyone to publicly congregate in a manner that breached the peace and refuse to vacate when ordered by an officer. (44) The Court did not explicitly frame the defense in terms of qualified immunity, but held that the defendant officers could assert a "good faith and probable cause" defense where the officers made the arrests under a state statute that the officers believed to be valid. (45) The Court stated that, even if the arrest was unconstitutional, the jury should enter a verdict for the officers upon finding that the "officers reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional." (46) The Pierson holding reflects the present qualified immunity standard in that the law excuses officials from liability where their conduct is reasonable under the circumstances. (47)

      The Supreme Court next addressed the qualified immunity standard in 1974 in Scheuer v. Rhodes, (48) after the Kent State tragedy. (49) The Court clarified the Pierson good faith defense, holding that qualified immunity is available when the official has both "reasonable grounds" and a "good faith belief" for his actions under the circumstances. (50) The Court's holding implicitly required government officials to meet both objective and subjective components to establish qualified immunity. (51) Scheuer is most significant, however, for the Court's emphasis on whether the official's conduct was reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances, which continues to be the critical analysis in qualified immunity cases and the prism through which the Court has analyzed more recent cases. (52)

      One year after Scheuer, the Court explicitly held in Wood v. Strickland (53) that the qualified immunity test contained distinct subjective and objective elements. (54) The Court stated that school board members should not receive immunity if they "knew or should have known" that expelling students from school would be a constitutional violation, or...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT