East Asia Should Take Charge of Its Own Security.

• Author: BANDOW, DOUG

"Jettisoning antiquated alliances and commitments and reducing a bloated force structure do not mean the U.S. would no longer be an Asian-Pacific power."

AFTER WORLD WAR II, the U.S. established an extensive forward military presence and fought two wars in East Asia as part of its strategy to contain communism. The Cold War ended a decade ago, but America's defense posture has changed little. The Clinton Administration is determined to keep at least 100,000 military personnel in East Asia and the Pacific, apparently forever.

The Pentagon's 1995 assessment of U.S. security policy in East Asia (the so-called Nye Report) made the assertion that "the end of the Cold War has not diminished" the importance of any of America's regional security commitments. In November, 1998, the Department of Defense (DoD) released an updated report, but it reflected the same outdated analysis in reaffirming support for every one of America's treaties and deployments throughout the region.

The Administration's watchword is simply more of everything. The DoD gives a nod to multilateralism and cooperation among the countries in the region, but it is clear that the U.S. is to remain East Asia's dominant actor, and that dominance must be demonstrated in military terms.

The report's commitment to permanent intervention was preordained. Secretary of Defense William Cohen admitted: "When I first took over, I said everything is on the table for review, except we are going to keep 100,000 people in the Asia-Pacific region--that is off the table." In short, the Pentagon conducted a supposedly searching review that ignored the most important issue. Rather than expand America's military presence in East Asia at a time when security threats against the U.S. have diminished dramatically, the Administration and Congress should together initiate a phased withdrawal of American forces from Korea and Japan; center Washington's reduced military presence in the Central Pacific, rather than East Asia; and adopt the role of ultimate balancer, rather than constant meddler.

U.S. taxpayers spent roughly 13 trillion dollars and sacrificed 113,000 lives (mostly in East Asian wars) to win the Cold War. For five decades, Washington provided a defense shield behind which noncommunist countries throughout East Asia were able to grow economically (despite their recent setbacks) and democratically. That policy achieved its objective. Japan is the world's second-ranking economic power, and Taiwan's dramatic jump from poverty to prosperity forced the leaders of the communist mainland to undertake fundamental economic reforms. South Korea now outstrips communist North Korea on virtually every measure of national power. After years of failure, the Philippines seems to be on the path to prosperity, while countries like Thailand have grown significantly and will eventually recover from their current economic travails.

At the same time, the threat environment has become more benign. The Soviet Union has disappeared, and a much weaker Russia has neither the capability nor the will for East Asian adventurism. Elsewhere, tough-minded communism has dissolved into a cynical excuse for incumbent officeholders to maintain power. A decade after the Tiananmen Square massacre, China is combining support for greater economic liberty with (admittedly inconsistent) respect for greater individual autonomy, if not political freedom. So far, Beijing's military renewal has been modest, and China has been assertive, rather than aggressive--although its periodic, blustering saber-rattling toward Taiwan remains of concern.

Southeast Asia is roiled by economic and political instability, but such problems threaten no one outside the immediate neighborhood. Only North Korea constitutes a current East Asian security threat, but that totalitarian state, though odious, is no replacement for the threat once posed by the U.S.S.R. Pyongyang is bankrupt and starving, essentially friendless, and, despite its willingness to wave the threat of an atomic bomb to gain respect, will continue to fall further behind its South Korean rival.

Some analysts privately--and a few publicly--believe that Japan poses a potential threat to regional peace. However, Tokyo has gained all of the influence and wealth through peace that it had hoped to attain 60 years ago through war and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Moreover, the lesson of World War II remains vivid in...