Asia in the 21St Century.

• Author: Menon, Rajan

Power Politics Alive and Well

AFTER DECADES of Cold War-induced predictability, Asia today is rapidly transforming into something new and unrecognizable. The very term "Asia" has lost its clarity. As a consequence of a revolution in communications and the frenetic pace of globalization, parts of Asia that have traditionally been distinguished by their geography--East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia--tend increasingly to blur and merge. Developments in one region shape the strategies of distant states in another with unprecedented rapidity. This new "Asia" really sweeps from the Pacific to Russia's western border and from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean.

The region's breadth is equaled only by its volatility. Russia, the long-dominant Eurasian power, is in decline, and its very territorial integrity is in question. In contrast to much of the last century, Russia's weakness--rather than its strength--will have a determining influence on Asia. Along its vast periphery new coalitions are forming and new competitions are taking shape. China and India, for example, both view themselves as emerging powers destined to shape the region's future. And Japan--for half a century the most dynamic presence in Asia, the key American outpost there and the principal prism through which the United States assesses its interests throughout the region--has languished in the doldrums for the better part of a decade. Today it faces significant challenges and the prospect of a possible American retreat from the Pacific Rim.

As the hierarchy among Asian states has changed, so too have the political orders within them. Many are plagued by political turmoil, ethnic and religious strife, and economic collapse. Some may even disintegrate or disappear: Russia, Indonesia, Pakistan and Afghanistan seem poised for reconfiguration, if not extinction. From some of these upheavals, new states and confederations with distinctly new interests and strategic alignments will surely emerge.

Compounding these familiar sources of instability are threats of an unfamiliar kind. In Asia today, the very meaning of national economic policy is becoming unclear. Forces beyond the control of individual states have prompted capital to flee, currencies to plummet, and prices to soar. The costs of staying competitive in an unforgiving global marketplace are reforms that invariably worsen the lot of already impoverished citizenries. Social unrest looms as an ever present danger as budgets are slashed and subsidies eliminated; those who rule appear rudderless while those who are ruled grow ever more resentful. Some regimes will survive the storm, while others will watch as their already tenuous legitimacy crumbles around them.

In addition, the fragile consensus in Asia against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is beginning to disintegrate. States such as China and Russia have sought to improve their strategic leverage by transferring nuclear and missile technology to allies. Within a decade, accurate, long-range missile systems will be available to most of the region's players, as will a variety of other weapons that may dramatically alter the current balance of power.

Power Transitions and New Alignments

THE KEY determinant of the Asian balance of power in the next century will be China. If it remains stable and maintains the impressive rate of economic growth it has achieved since 1978, China's influence on the Asian order will rapidly increase. In a way that is characteristic of rising powers--democratic or authoritarian--it will seek to refashion the received order, one that was forged when it was weak, and to dominate its neighbors in the process. China's long economic tentacles already extend into Southeast Asia, Central Asia and, increasingly, the Russian Far East. An unstable or weak China could--some would say is likely to--pursue similar objectives, but in a different, more dangerous manner. Such a China would be more inclined to project military force beyond its borders to achieve the same results more quickly, if only to prop up the failing communist regime's legitimacy.

China's power will in turn likely expand in equal or greater proportion to the decline in the power of the United States. Here we should note that a unified Korea is a virtual certainty; the only questions remaining are how and when. Whatever the modality of Korean unification--a benign and peaceful one analogous to Germany's, or a violent affair with war, internal disorder and massive outpourings of refugees that shake surrounding countries--once it does happen, the continued presence of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula will likely be deemed unnecessary. China, which will undoubtedly participate in managing reunification, will almost certainly make the phased withdrawal of American troops a condition for its cooperation. The departure of U.S. forces from the peninsula may in turn generate pressure for an American military withdrawal from Japan as well. The Japanese would not wish to be the sole remaining platform for American troops and materiel in Northeast Asia, and the misgivings of Japanese citizens over U.S. bases on their soil would only be strengthened by the demise of the Pyongyang regime.

Even apart from the fate of Korea, political support for the U.S.-Japan alliance appears likely to erode in both countries unless a persuasive new rationale can be created for it. The incantation that Japan is the key bilateral partner of the United States is a bromide that will not prevent the weakening of an alliance that is bereft of a compelling mission, and in which the truly dangerous responsibilities are unevenly distributed. Absent such a new rationale, the Asian balance of power could well be recast by a radical change in Japanese defense policy Japan already has the world's third-largest defense budget, and "Self-Defense Force" is a euphemism for what is, in fact, a small but state-of-the-art military machine.

Though Japanese military power has for the past half a century been maintained at a level far below that of which it is financially and...