ARTICLE 80 LIMITATIONS - PERSONAL ACTIONS
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Editor's note: This article was numbered as article 1 of chapter 87, C.R.S. 1963. The substantive provisions of this article were repealed and reenacted in 1986, resulting in the addition, relocation, and elimination of sections as well as subject matter. For amendments to this article prior to 1986, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editors' notes following those sections that were relocated. For a detailed comparison of this article, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.
Cross references: (1) For the general rule that a statute of limitations, although barring the use of a claim for affirmative relief after the limitations period has run, is not a bar to asserting that claim as a defense, see Ackmann v. Merchants Mortg. & Trust Corp., 645 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1982) and Dawe v. Merchants Mortg. & Trust Corp., 683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984).
(2) For the holding by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that for purposes of the statute of limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, all civil rights claims are to be generally and uniformly characterized, regardless of discrete facts involved, as actions for injury to personal rights, see Wilson v. Garcia, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 85 L. Ed.2d 254 (1985). For previous cases dealing with the statute of limitations in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Mucci v. Falcon School Dist. No. 49, 655 P.2d 422 (Colo. App. 1982) and McKay v. Hammond, 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984). For article, "Civil Rights", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with the applicable statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 67 (1985).
(3) For the general rule that it is the nature of the right sued upon and not the form of the action or the relief requested which determines the applicable statute of limitation, see Richards Engineers, Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031 (Colo. App. 1987).
(4) For the statute of limitations on the misappropriation of trade secrets, see § 7-74-107; for limitation of actions concerning real property, see part 1 of article 41 of title 38.
Law reviews: For article, "United States Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit Decisions", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with the applicable statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 63 Den. U.L. Rev. 473 (1986); for article, "Legal Aspects of Health and Fitness Clubs: A Healthy and Dangerous Industry", see 15 Colo. Law. 1787 (1986); for article, "1986 Colorado Tort Reform Legislation", see 15 Colo. Law. 1363 (1986); for article, "1988 Update on Colorado Tort Reform Legislation — Part II", see 17 Colo. Law. 1949 (1988); for article, "Civil Procedure" which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with the statute of limitations applicable in section 1983 actions, see 65 Den. U. L. Rev. 429 (1988); for article, "Finding the Right Limitations Period for "New" Intentional Torts", see 19 Colo. Law. 875 (1990); for article, "Fifteen Years of Colorado Legislative Tort Reform: Where Are We Now?", see 30 Colo. Law. 5 (Feb. 2001).
■ 13-80-101. General limitation of actions - three years. (1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:
(a) All contract actions, including personal contracts and actions under the "Uniform Commercial Code", except as otherwise provided in section 13-80-103.5;
(b) Repealed.
(c) All actions for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or deceit except those in section 13-80-102 (1)(j);
(d) and (e) Repealed.
(f) All actions for breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty;
(g) All claims under the "Uniform Consumer Credit Code", except section 5-5-201 (5), C.R.S.;
(h) All actions of replevin or for taking, detaining, or converting goods or chattels, except as otherwise provided in section 13-80-103.5;
(i) All actions under the "Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act", article 7 of title 42, C.R.S.;
(j) All actions under part 6 of article 4 of title 10, C.R.S.;
(k) All actions accruing outside this state if the limitation of actions of the place where the cause of action accrued is greater than that of this state;
(l) All actions of debt under section 40-30-102, C.R.S.;
(m) All actions for recovery of erroneous or excessive refunds of any tax under section 39-21-102, C.R.S.;
(n) (I) All tort actions for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle including all actions pursuant to paragraph (j) of this subsection (1).
(II) The provisions of this paragraph (n) do not apply to any action for strict liability, absolute liability, or failure to instruct or warn governed by the provisions of section 13-80-102 (1)(b) or section 13-80-106.
(o) and (p) Repealed.
Source: L. 86: Entire article R&RE, p. 695, § 1, effective July 1; (1)(b) repealed and (1)(c) amended, pp. 708, 707, §§ 4, 1, effective July 1. L. 87: (1)(a) and (1)(c) amended and (1)(l) and (1)(m) added, p. 567, §1, effective July 1; (1)(c) amended, p. 538, § 10, effective July 1; (1)(e) repealed, p. 600, § 38, effective July 10. L. 91: (1)(a) amended, p. 270, § 7, effective July 1. L. 92: (1)(d) repealed, p. 244, § 3, effective July 1. L. 94: (1)(n) added, p. 2824, § 1, effective July 1. L. 99: (1)(o) added, p. 215, § 3, effective July 1; (1)(p) added, p. 593, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(g) amended, p. 1872, § 108, effective August 2; (1)(c) amended, p. 3, § 4, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2003: (1)(j) amended, p. 1572, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2011: (1)(o)(I), (1)(o)(II)(C), and (1)(p) repealed, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1153, § 21, effective August 10. L. 2013: (1)(o)(II) repealed, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1674, § 34, effective August 7. L. 2017: (1)(c) amended, (SB 17-294), ch. 264, p. 1390, § 27, effective May 25.
Editor's note: The provisions of this section are similar to provisions of several former sections as they existed prior to 1986. For a detailed comparison, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.
Cross references: For the "Uniform Commercial Code", see title 4.
I. General Consideration.
II. Paragraph (a).
A. Applicability.
B. Nonapplicability.
III. Paragraph (c).
A. In General.
B. Applicability.
IV. Paragraph (d).
V. Paragraph (f).
VI. Paragraph (h).
VII. Paragraph (j).
VIII. Paragraph (k).
IX. Paragraph (n).
Law reviews. For article, "Federal Practice and Procedure", see 56 Den. L.J. 491 (1979). For article, "Securities", see 59 Den. L.J. 367 (1982). For article, "Will Contests — Some Procedural Aspects", see 15 Colo. Law. 787 (1986). For article, "Tort Reform's Impact on Contract Law", see 15 Colo. Law. 2206 (1986).
Annotator's note. For cases concerning when a cause of action accrues under this section, see the annotations to § 13-80-108.
Purpose of statute of limitations is to promote justice, discourage unnecessary delay and forestall the prosecution of stale claims. Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Jorgensen, 198 Colo. 275, 599 P.2d 869 (1979).
Uncertainty as to the precise extent of damage neither precludes the filing of a suit nor delays the accrual of a claim for purposes of the statute of limitations. Palisades Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 816 P.2d 961 (Colo. App. 1991); Broker House Int'l, Ltd. v. Bendelow, 952 P.2d 860 (Colo. App. 1998); Grant v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 314 F.3d 488 (10th Cir. 2002).
Uninsured driver's cause of action for reimbursement of medical expenses paid to such uninsured driver's passenger against insurer of vehicle which caused accident pursuant to § 10-4-713 does not accrue until actual payment of medical expenses. Sakala v. Safeco Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 879 (Colo. App. 1992).
Coverage for underinsured motorist benefits accrues under the terms of the policy when settlement under the tortfeasor's liability policy is obtained, not on the date of the accident. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Springle, 870 P.2d 578 (Colo. App. 1993).
The statute of limitations does not run against the state unless the law expressly states otherwise. Grogan v. Taylor, 877 P.2d 1374 (Colo. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 900 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1995).
Applied in Kanarado Mining & Dev. Co. v. Sutton, 36 Colo. App. 375, 539 P.2d 1325 (1975); D'Amico v. Smith, 42 Colo. App. 369, 600 P.2d 84 (1979); Lucas v. Abbott, 198 Colo. 477, 601 P.2d 1376 (1979); Soehner v. Soehner, 642 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1981); Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 703 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824, 104 S. Ct. 92, 78 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1983); Barker v. Jeremiasen, 676 P.2d 1259 (Colo. App. 1984); Brown v. Am. Family Ins. Group, 989 P.2d 196 (Colo. App. 1999); Oaster v. Robertson, 173 F. Supp. 3d 1150 (D. Colo. 2016).
Law reviews. For article, "State Statutes of Limitation Contrasted and Compared", see 3 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 106 (1931).
Annotator's note. Since § 13-80-101 (1)(a) is similar to former § 13-80-107 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this paragraph (a).
This provision applies only to personal actions. Folda Real Estate Co. v. Jacobsen, 75 Colo. 16, 223 P. 748 (1924).
This provision applies only to actions on contract. Bonfils v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 Colo. 563, 189 P. 775 (1920); People ex rel. Fed. Land Bank v. Ginn, 106 Colo. 417, 106 P.2d 479 (1940).
Such as where a breach of the covenant of seisin, if any, occurred at the time of the giving of the deed in 1921, and action thereon was...
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