Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty

• Citation: Vol. 34 No. 0
• Publication year: 2019

Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty

Sherrod Lewis Bumgardner

ARTICLE 4 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY^†

Sherrod Lewis Bumgardner^*

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.¹

Introduction

Article 4 is a statement of action. Mandatory consultation by the Parties together occurs when any Party believes the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened. The Parties confirmed the reach of Article 4 through a written interpretive minute of the text of the North Atlantic Treaty at the conclusion of the top-secret negotiations that created the North Atlantic Alliance. "Article 4 is applicable in the event of a threat in any part of the world, to the security of any of the Parties, including a threat to the security of their overseas territories."² While not included in the interpretive minute, very early in the negotiations the Parties recognized the power of consultation and agreed to use it to address undefined threats such as "indirect aggression."³

One 21st Century view is that Article 4 enshrines territorial integrity, political independence, or security as "NATO's original threat perception."⁴ But

[Page 72]

this view overlooks Article 4 as a means, through consultation, to collectively consider threats that were something other than an armed attack.

To explain this broader view of the role of Article 4 during the seventy-year history of the North Atlantic Alliance, this essay has three aims. First, to use now available declassified online records of the negotiation of Article 4 and the North Atlantic Treaty to show how the Parties drafted Article 4 to ensure their response to the threat of aggression, short of an armed attack, remained consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Second, to summarize the role Article 4 has played in the process of consultation of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Third, and finally, to highlight how the Parties through subsequent agreement have relied upon Article 4 in NATO's Strategic Concept, the high-level policy guiding NATO's evolution, to undertake new tasks.⁵

I. Drafting Article 4

As Lawrence S. Kaplan has described, by 1948 the United Nations Security Council could not fulfill its decision-making responsibilities about threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and actions of aggression as required by Article 39 of the U.N. Charter.⁶ To address this reality, in December 1948 the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, encouraged by France, proposed to the United States Secretary of State, George Marshall, a system of Western defense that also protected overseas territories.⁷ The United States responded by hosting on March 22, 1948 in a clandestine corner of the Pentagon, the United States-United Kingdom-Canada Security Conversations on alternative international security arrangements.⁸

During the six meetings, "the most secret ever held in Washington,"⁹ the British sought "a firm commitment on the part of the US to aid militarily in the

[Page 73]

event of any aggression in Europe."¹⁰ This request matched the strategic thinking of both the U.S. and Canada. Since early 1948 the United States had been considering a new collective defense arrangement.¹¹ Independently Canada was exploring a response to the threat of attack or aggression not subject to Security Council veto.¹² The outcome of the tri-nation meeting was agreement by the United States to pursue formation of a North Atlantic regional security arrangement as a U.S. led initiative.¹³ A U.S. position paper was drafted explaining proposed next steps and Western European nations to be invited to a larger discussion of this new defense arrangement.¹⁴ Based upon a shared understanding by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada of what a new treaty would require, the position paper also proposed eight provisions for the defense agreement.¹⁵ Paragraph 5. f. became the first version of what would later become Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, identifying the concepts of armed attack and indirect aggression as the two threats to territorial integrity and political independence.¹⁶ It states that "Provision for consultation between all the Parties in the event of any Party considering that its territorial integrity or political independence is threatened by armed attack or indirect aggression in any part of the world."¹⁷

The Washington Security Talks¹⁸ began the negotiation of a North Atlantic security pact on July 6, 1948 with twenty senior ambassadors and diplomats of six nations present.¹⁹ After nineteen meetings, on September 9, 1948, they

[Page 74]

completed the Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks, July 6 to September 9, Submitted to Their Respective Governments for Study and Comment.²⁰

The Memorandum recommended "those nations having a primary interest in the security of the North Atlantic area should collaborate in the development of a regional or collective defence arrangement ... Such action should be taken within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations."²¹ It echoed statements that George F. Kennan, who took part in the discussions, had made in his 1946 Long Telegram and published in the 1947 article, The Sources of Soviet Conduct.²² "The U.S.S.R. under Kremlin dictatorship, utilizing the technique of indirect aggression and the threat of direct aggression, is an implacable enemy of western civilization and the present situation in Europe must be regarded as extremely insecure."²³

The Memorandum offered an "Outline of Provision Which Might be Suitable for Inclusion in a North Atlantic Security Pact."²⁴ This version broadened Article 4. Specific citations to the Rio and Brussels treaties were included so national governments could check the references the drafters drew from:

Provision for consultation (a) in the event of a threat to the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or the political independence of a Party, (b) in the event of an armed attack against a Party outside the area delineated in article 7, (c) if the security of any Party should be affected by an armed attack against a nation not a party to the Treaty, or (d) in

[Page 75]

the event of any other fact or situation which might constitute a threat to the peace. (Rio, Art. 6; Brussels, Art. VII, Par. 2).²⁵

Noticeably absent was the phrase, indirect aggression in any part of the world, proposed in the April 1948 draft.²⁶ This deletion sustained the comment made in the minutes of the United States-United Kingdom-Canada meetings. "Abandon any attempt to define 'indirect aggression' substituting therefore provisions for consultation in the event any party to the pact considers itself thus menaced."²⁷ This comment captured the United States and British view that, "indirect aggression could not and should not be defined, as this might suggest that the signatory powers were attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of other states."²⁸

The Washington Exploratory Talks on Security reconvened in December 1948 following the November reelection of President Harry Truman.²⁹ Three meetings occurred. On December 13, after considering the September 9 version of Article 4 proposed in the Memorandum, Canada observed:

The proposed treaty contemplated consultation between the parties in the event of a threat to peace anywhere in the world. This would be a matter more for Foreign Ministers or their representatives than for Defense Ministers or Chiefs of Staff. There should therefore be, as the senior agency under the treaty, some sort of council on a ministerial level made up of Foreign Ministers or their deputed representatives. This council would have the task of creating any other agencies necessary to give effect to the treaty.³⁰

This proposal to create a decision-making body within the Alliance was woven into the 19-page report delivered on December 24, 1948. Annex A to this

[Page 76]

report provided a new draft treaty and included an organizational article that established a council.³¹ Shorter Article 4 now contained just two clauses:

Article 4 (Consultation) The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them,
(a) the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened; or
(b) there exists any situation which constitutes a threat to or breach of the peace.³²

The Nations judged the shorter draft sufficient to cover "all threats to the peace, including attacks against the overseas territories of any of the parties to the Treaty."³³ The draft of Article 6 provided equivalent notice to the Security Council when Article 4 consultation occurred or, following an armed attack, Article 5 actions were taken. Article 6(2) provided, "Any fact or situation constituting a threat to or breach of the peace and deemed to require consultation under Article 4, or any armed attack requiring action under Article 5, shall be immediately reported to the Security Council."³⁴

The nations accepted Article 4 as final on January 14, 1949.³⁵ The text permitted the Parties to consult together about threats to "territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties."³⁶ The territorial scope of matters subject to consultation was world-wide, including overseas territories.³⁷ The Parties also understood consultation could occur about threats

[Page 77]

not amounting to an armed attack such as indirect aggression³⁸ or aggression by subversive action.³⁹

While these understandings provide some scope to the consultations Article 4 offers, much is left unstated about the workings of these consultations. What kind of threat is valid? What level of threat to the core interests listed in Article 4 may cause a Party to call for consultation?

At the March 4, 1949 meeting, the newly arrived...