Army acquisition: not broken and not fixed.

• Author: Sapolsky, Harvey M.
• Position: Commentary

* The U.S. Army is prone to considerable introspection, and when it comes to reflecting upon its acquisition experience, which it does frequently, it is almost never happy.

The latest acquisition review effort is the so-called Decker-Wagner report, which says essentially what is usually said in such reports: Army acquisition is broken and it is going to take a lot of procedural changes, new organizational arrangements, and cooperation among the players to fix it. But we must.

With the report, Army management may be looking for absolution once more. Yes, it is broken again, but it is not our fault even though we have overseen the system and championed many of its previous reforms. Just adopt our 76 recommendations and we will have it flying right.

This seems wrong on two accounts. First, the report is unpersuasive in showing the acquisition system is broken. And second, the changes it suggests while perhaps beneficial are unlikely to produce much different results. The problems that beset Army weapon programs seem to lie elsewhere in the organization.

The Decker-Wagner panel concedes that the Army is surely the best equipped force in the world, but attributes that admirable state largely to "supplemental appropriations and rapid acquisition processes employed during the last nine years." Army acquisition experience, they insist, is more normally described as plagued with cancelled programs, scheduled slippages, cost overruns and weapon performance disappointments. It is a system, the study claims, without respect within the Army's leadership and among officials in the Pentagon, Capitol Hill and industry.

How broken is Army acquisition? The panel provides no comparisons, but one should ask: is the Army any worse off than the Navy, Air Force, our allies or industry in this regard? The answer is surely no.

The Navy made a mess of its new destroyer project, had enormous trouble with the LPD-17 amphibious ship, reneged on its promise to have an open competition for the Littoral Combat Ship, and had to be totally embarrassed by its failure to complete the presidential helicopter, a multi-billion dollar fiasco.

The Air Force is no better off having had the long playing drama of the KC-135 refueling tanker replacement program, the cancelled procurement of the pride of the force, the F-22 Raptor, the struggle to field the Joint Strike Fighter, and a costly series of space system acquisition disasters.

The Europeans have had serious problems with...