Are UK alcohol industry political donations intended to influence public health policies? – Analysis of publicly available data on donations and lobbying

• Published date: 01 December 2022
• Author: Crispin Acton,Benjamin Hawkins
• Date: 01 December 2022
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2740

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Are UK alcohol industry political donations intended to

influence public health policies? –Analysis of publicly

available data on donations and lobbying

Crispin Acton

1

| Benjamin Hawkins

2

1

Faculty of Public Health and Policy, London

School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine,

London, UK

2

MRC Epidemiology Unit, University of

Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

Correspondence

Crispin Acton, London School of Hygiene &

Tropical Medicine, Keppel Street, London

WC1E 7HT, UK.

Email: crispinacton2@gmail.com

Transnational alcohol corporations seek to influence public health policies in ways

reminiscent of the tobacco industry. Relatively little is known, however, about the

extent of such activities in the alcohol sector, particularly their use of political dona-

tions. This study analyses data from the UK Electoral Commission on donations and

from Transparency International UK on UK Government Ministerial meetings.

Further research is needed to establish whether donations contribute to the dispro-

portionate exposure of Ministers to alcohol industry lobbying. However, our combi-

nation of data on UK alcohol industry donations with data on lobbying provides

important new evidence. Most larger company donors are active in lobbying and a

significant minority of companies meeting Ministers are donors.

KEYWORDS

alcohol industry, corporate political action, lobbying strategies, political donations, tobacco

industry

1|INTRODUCTION

Previous studies have found that transnational tobacco corporations

(TTCs) and transnational alcohol corporations (TACs) employ highly

similar political strategies, including lobbying and attempts to frame

public debates, in order to influence public health policies (Hawkins

et al., 2018). Compared to the now extensive literature on TTCs,

significant gaps exist in the evidence on the policy influencing activi-

ties of the alcohol industry, particularly their use of political donations

(Hawkins et al., 2012). This aspect of political strategy is critical to

understanding how the alcohol industry seeks to influence policy and

to considerations of whether industry actors should be involved in

policy making and delivery and how the independence of these

processes can be safeguarded (Hawkins et al., 2018).

Internal tobacco industry documents, many released following the

1998 Master Settlement Agreement,demonstrate an intention by large

tobacco companies to influence tobacco control policies in the USA

through political and campaign contributions (Clawson et al., 1998,

pp. 135–136; Givel & Glantz, 2001; Nixon & Glantz, 2002;Spivak&

Givel, 2005).

McMenamin (2013, p. 11), looking at corporate donations

broadly, argues that: ‘An enormous effort by American political scien-

tists has failed to show a consistently convincing link between dona-

tions and political decisions’.

There are methodological challenges in showing such a link. Even

so, statisticalstudies have related the votingbehaviour of US Congress

members and California legislatorson tobacco related bills to campaign

contributions, controllingfor party, and other factors, finding a relation-

ship between contributions and voting behaviourand between individ-

ual policy stances and contributions given in reward (Glantz &

Begay, 1994; Luke & Krauss, 2004;Monardi&Glantz,1998;

Robbins, 2016).Other studies have not been ableto show such effects

at federal orstate level (Bergan, 2010; Wright,2004).

Studies of tobacco industry political donations outside the

USA are rare. Two systematic reviews of tobacco industry

influencing activities do not cover political donations at all (Savell

et al., 2014;Smithetal.,2013). Some studies touch on donations

as part of a broader review of industry political activities,

with very limited analyses of the intentions behind p olitical dona-

tions (Alexander et al., 1997;Barnsleyetal.,2017; Cooper &

Received: 18 March 2021 Revised: 28 July 2021 Accepted: 30 July 2021

DOI: 10.1002/pa.2740

J Public Affairs. 2022;22(Suppl. 1):e2740. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1of9

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2740