Are the Politics of the Christian Right Linked to State Rates of the Nonreligious? The Importance of Salient Controversy

• Published date: 01 December 2018
• Date: 01 December 2018
• Author: Paul A. Djupe,Jacob R. Neiheisel,Kimberly H. Conger
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912918771526
• Subject Matter: Articles

771526PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918771526Political Research QuarterlyDjupe et al.
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Political Research Quarterly
2018, Vol. 71(4) 910 –922
Are the Politics of the Christian Right
© 2018 University of Utah
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Linked to State Rates of the Nonreligious? https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918771526
DOI: 10.1177/1065912918771526
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The Importance of Salient Controversy
Paul A. Djupe1 , Jacob R. Neiheisel2, and Kimberly H. Conger3
Abstract
Hout and Fischer have made the repeated, controversial claim that the dramatic rise of “religious nones” in the United
States is due to the prominence of the politics of the Christian Right. As the argument goes, the movement’s extreme
stands on gay rights and abortion make religion inhospitable to those who take more moderate and liberal positions.
We take another look at this proposition with novel data drawing on expert reports and interest group counts
that capture the prominence of the movement in each American state from 2000 to 2010. We attach these data to
decennial religious census data on the unchurched, as well as estimates of the nones from Cooperative Congressional
Election Study data. At stake is whether religion is independent of political influence and whether American religion is
sowing its own fate by failing to limit taking extreme stands. Rising none rates are more common in Republican states
in this period. Moreover, when the Christian Right comes into more public conflict, such as over same-sex marriage
bans, the rate of religious nones climbs.
Keywords
religious nones, Christian Right, same-sex marriage, ballot measures
The marquee religious trend in the United States over the
sympathetic to its political and religious agenda” (Klemp
last thirty years is the rapid rise of the “religious nones”—
2010, 25). As discussed later, our measures capture mul-
those who claim no religious affiliation in surveys—from
tiple facets of the movement, including a specific focus
just 6 percent in the early 1990s to about 25 percent today
on the social movement organizations (see Miceli 2005;
(PRRI 2016; Thiessen and Wilkins-Laflamme 2017).1
Rozell and Wilcox 1996; Wilcox 1992), as well as more
Perhaps not coincidentally, that meteoric rise started
holistic sense of anything elite observers would lump
around 1994, just when the Christian Right rose to promi-
together as the movement. We use the term “Christian
nence within the Republican Party in government, as
Right” throughout the paper to refer to both, and in this
Republicans swept the House of Representatives for the
way our operational definition of the Christian Right cap-
first time in forty years.2 As the argument goes, the
tures both sides of what Rozell and Wilcox (1996, 7)
Christian Right is the most visible manifestation of reli-
cover: “organizations that attempt to mobilize orthodox
gion in the United States, and the extreme positions taken
Christian religious views behind a very conservative
by the movement on abortion and especially gay rights
political agenda.”
made all religion inhospitable for liberals and moderates
Our works draws on a decade and a half of data gath-
(Hout and Fischer 2002, 2014; see also Evans 2016). We
ering, surveying elite observers in the electoral moment
aim to revisit this claim by taking one of the mechanisms
regarding whether Christian Right organizations were
seriously—Is there a relationship between Christian
active and influential in their state’s politics. Taking
Right presence in (state) politics and the supply of nones?
place in 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2016 (Conger 2010a,
We define the Christian Right in much the same way
as others have: “as a social movement that attempts to
1
mobilize evangelical Protestants and other orthodox
Denison University, Granville, OH, USA
2University at Buffalo, NY, USA
Christians into conservative political action” (Wilcox and
3University of Cincinnati, OH, USA
Larson 2006, 6). Moreover, we acknowledge that the
Christian Right encompasses a wide variety of different
Corresponding Author:
Paul A. Djupe, Department of Political Science, Denison University,
actors, including “everyone from movement leaders to
100 W. College St., Granville, OH 43023, USA.
activists to ordinary group members and those Email: djupe@denison.edu

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Djupe et al.
911
2014), we attach these elite perception data to survey
Writing after the 2008 presidential elections—a con-
estimates, religious census, and U.S. Census data, in
test in which the Republican Party nominated a candidate
addition to other data sources, to assess why the supply
who was widely seen as hostile to the movement—Mark
of nones changed in the states. We argue that the rate of
Rozell (2011, 116) opined that “the best days of the
change is uneven across the states, driven by the salient
Christian Right are in its past and that the movement is
policy controversy linked to Christian Right activism.
without direction.” What is more, the early luminaries of
Our findings suggest that Christian Right influence in
the Christian Right’s leadership class have passed away
state politics seems to negatively affect religion, such
or have otherwise faded from the scene (Rozell 2011),
that religious attachments fade in the face of visible
leaving the movement’s future in the uncertain hands of a
Christian Right policy victories.
new generation of evangelical elites—a group that was
wholly unable to coalesce around a candidate in the 2016
Christian Right in American Politics
Republican primaries (Merritt 2016), though many ral-
lied behind Trump. Scholarly observers of the Christian
Although the provenance of the modern Christian Right
Right have written the movement’s obituary more than a
varies somewhat from account to account, from its
few times (e.g., Bruce 1988; Guth 1996) only to be sur-
infancy it has been in the mix of many of the most divi-
prised to see it make a comeback in a future contest (see
sive political debates in American politics. Motivated
Rozell 2011 for an overview). The popular perception of
by opposition to both African American (Claassen
surge and decline may rest in part on the movement’s
2018; see also Guth 1996, 8) and LGBT civil rights
continued presence and influence in the politics of some
(Fetner 2008) and the legalization of abortion (Zwier
states (Bentele et al. 2013; Conger 2010a, 2010b, 2014;
1982), the Christian Right movement in its most recent
Rozell and Wilcox 2018). So while national Christian
incarnations has continued to be composed of a shifting
Right organizations may finally be fading away, enough
mix of elites, organizations, and identifiers with a fairly
pockets of influence and activism exist in the states that
broad, “family values” and “religious freedom” continued attention to the movement is worthwhile.
agenda.3 The public face of the movement has often
The Christian Right continues to push for policies that
been formed by fundamentalist leaders making extreme
are far right, though it is important to note that public
political and religious claims (see Evans 2016), whose
opinion is not always opposed to them. For instance,
image more moderate elements within the Christian
while only a small minority supports a staunchly pro-life
Right have occasionally sought to shed (see Shields
position, many in the public identify as pro-life and sup-
2009). As a result, perhaps, its claim to speak for the
port at least some restrictions (Shaw 2003). Many
“moral majority” did not necessarily equate to defer-
Americans also support religious liberty in principle,
ence from the Republican Party (Oldfield 1996; Soper
though they do not support the right of service refusal to
and Fetzer 2000), and the movement has had to com-
LGBT Americans in particular (PRRI 2017). LGBT
pete for influence along with other interest sectors in
rights are at least one issue where shifting public support
the conservative movement and in the Republican
has clearly undercut the Christian Right’s claim to express
Party.
the moral majority opinion.
The movement has worked to shape the platform, con-
American support for gay rights generally and same-
trol party organizations, and recruit candidates, thus orga-
sex marriage specifically has undergone one of the most
nizing (in part lately through the Tea Party—see Skocpol
drastic changes in the history of American public opin-
and Williamson 2013) to take the Republican Party from
ion. Opinion has shifted from widespread opposition in
within (Cigler, Joslyn, and Loomis 2003; Diamond 1989;
the early 1990s to widespread support today (depending
Moen 1992; Rozell and Wilcox 1996). And there is some
on the measure). Thus, the consistent stance of Christian
evidence that such efforts have been successful by several
Right-affiliated actors in opposition to same-sex marriage
measures (Conger 2010b; Layman and Brockway 2018),
and other civil rights protections has become more and
much as early observers predicted (Green and Guth
more out of step with American culture, especially among
1988). These successes have shaped both the actions of
the young, and there are generational splits on this issue
the Republican Party and public perceptions of the move-
even within the evangelical community (Rozell 2011).
ment’s values and appeal (e.g., Patrikios 2013). PRRI...