Are Foreign Aid Objectives Attainable?
| DOI | 10.1177/106591296601900107 |
| Author | Doris A. Graber |
| Date | 01 March 1966 |
| Published date | 01 March 1966 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
68
ARE
FOREIGN
AID
OBJECTIVES
ATTAINABLE?
DORIS
A.
GRABER
University
of
Illinois,
Chicago
HE
AMERICAN
PUBLIC
and
Congress
have
long
expressed
widespread
and
deep
dissatisfaction
with
our
economic
and
military
foreign
aid
program.
JL
&dquo;As
inflated
as
a
pregnant
elephant,&dquo;
&dquo;globeloney,&dquo;
&dquo;a
shocking
waste,&dquo;
&dquo;bloated,&dquo;
&dquo;in
many
ways
dangerous,&dquo;
&dquo;overextended
in
resources
and
undercom-
pensated
in
results,&dquo;
are
but
a
few
of
the
epithets
and
slogans
current
in
Washing-
ton.’-
Testimony
in
hearings
on
Foreign
Aid
bills
is
full
of
complaints
about
specific
instances
of
wasted
money:
costly
roads
leading
to
nowhere
in
Panama;
rusting
trucks
along
the
wayside
in
Afghanistan;
food
supplies
smuggled
from
the
Congo
and
sold
on
the black
market;
embezzled
funds
in
Laos;
overstaffed
aid
offices
every-
where.
More
significant,
there
are
complaints
that
the
major
objectives
of
the
program
are
not
achieved.
We
are
spending
millions
of
dollars
in
Latin
America
to
pump-
prime
the
economy,
yet
industrial
growth
rates
decline,
and
so
do
living
standards.
Instead
of
retreating
communism,
we
are
faced
in
much
of
the
world
with
larger
and
more
active
communist
parties.
And
it
is
painfully
obvious
from
&dquo;Yankee
go
home&dquo;
signs
in
Africa
and
Latin
America,
to
formal
requests
for
an
end
of
aid
in
Cambodia,
that
anti-Americanism
is
on
the
increase
in
many
places.
THE
MYTHS
OF
FOREIGN
AID
Behind
these
complaints
lie
a
number
of
implied
and
often
contradictory
assumptions
and
expectations
about
the
role
foreign
aid
should
and
can
play
in
American
foreign
policy.
The
public,
and
many
members
of
Congress
and
the
administration
still
believe,
though
some
skepticism
is
setting
in,
that
foreign
aid
is
capable
of
fostering
economic
development
in
any
country
where
it
is
used
properly.
Such
development,
the
theory
runs,
will
produce
nations
which
are
economically
viable
and
independent,
and
which
have
democratic
governments
to
boot.
These
nations,
so
the
myth
goes,
will
be
hostile
to
communists
within
their
own
borders,
and
independent
or
pro-American
in
their
foreign
policies.
The
foreign
aid
program
is
condemned
by
the
public
because
it
has
rarely
achieved
these
goals,
despite
large
expenditures
of
money
and
effort
over
nearly
two
decades.
A
dissatisfied
Congress
has
slashed
foreign
aid
appropriations.
It
has
ham-
pered
executive
freedom
in
foreign
aid
administration
by
stipulating
that
continued
aid
must
be
contingent
on
the
achievement
of
some
of these
goals.
The
administra-
tion
has
tried
to
placate
Congress
by
asking
for
less
money,
by
repeated
reorganiza-
tion
of
foreign
aid
agencies
in
an
attempt
to
increase
efficiency,
and
by
appointing
1
In
order,
the
critics
are
Representative
Otto
Passman,
chairman
of
the
Subcommittee
on
For-
eign
Operations
Appropriations;
Senator
Wayne
Morse
of
Oregon;
Under
Secretary
of
State
George
Ball;
and
the
report
of
the
Clay
Committee
to
Strengthen
the
Security
of
the
Free
World,
March
20,
1963.
69
a
number
of
investigating
commissions
to
indicate
that
the
program
is
under
constant
expert
scrutiny.2
While
aid
practices
have
improved
as
a
result
of
these
measures,
basic
policies
and
approaches
have
not
changed.
The
public
continues
to
be
frustrated
in
its
expectations.
Still,
the
administration
claims
that
&dquo;the
national
security
of
the
United
States
is
enhanced
by
well-conceived,
well-executed
programs
of
economic
and
military
assistance&dquo;
3 and
that
&dquo;nearly
all
of
the
visible
improvements
in
the
position
and
condition
of
the
free
world
have
been
due
in
part
to
our
foreign
assist-
ance
programs.’ 1
4 Congress
grumbles,
but
seems
to
agree
at
least
tacitly,
since
it
continues
to
appropriate
large
sums
of
money.
How
is
it
possible
that
a
series
of
four
presidents,
their
secretaries
of
state,
and
other
highly
placed
officials
in
their
administrations
can
consider
a
program
vital
when
it
rarely
produces
the
results
for
which
it
was
started?
Why
does
Congress
castigate
the
program
savagely
and
then
provide
literally
billions
for
it?
Is
it
really
true
that
we
are
getting
too
little
for
too
much,
too
late?
Or
is
the
truth
rather
that
we
are
expecting
too
much
for
too
little,
too
soon?
Are
we
praising
or
blaming
the
program
for
events
which
have
nothing
to
do
with
it,
except
that
they
coincide
with
it?
Realistic
examination
of
the
foreign
aid
program,
as
it
has
operated
for
the
past
nineteen
years,
reveals
that
results
have
been
puny
only
against
a
background
of
naively
exaggerated
expectations.
The
program
has
been
important
as
a
catalyst
for
economic
development
in
a
number
of
countries.
But
it
has
been
oversold
in
terms
of
its
optimum
achievements,
range
of
applicability,
and
operational
speed.
When
disenchantment
has
set
in,
rather
than
scaling
down
the
promises
in
accordance
with
realistic
expectations
Democratic
and
Republican
presidents
and
their
secretaries
of
state
and
aid
officials
have
clung
to
the
old
image
for
fear
that
a
disillusioned
Con-
gress
might
abolish
the
program
entirely.
In
part,
too,
the
Executive
Department,
Congress,
and
the
public,
have
been
prisoners
of
their
own,
hopeful
visions.
They
have
been
unwilling
to
accept
the
lessons
which
the
harsh
realities
of
experience
should
have
taught.
CONTAINMENT
PHILOSOPHY
AND
MARSHALL
PLAN
The
blame
for
widespread
misconception
of
what
a
foreign
aid
program
can
and
can
not
accomplish,
must
be
placed
on
the
success
of
President
Truman’s
con-
tainment
philosophy
and
the
Marshall
Plan.
By
1947,
the
birth
year
of
the
Truman
Doctrine
and
the
Marshall
Plan,
the
Soviet
Union
had
expanded
its
control
over
much
of
Eastern
Europe.
It
seemed
that
the
nations
of
the
world
were
aligning
themselves
into
two
huge,
hostile
blocs.
Every
increment
in
strength
of
the
com-
munist
bloc
meant
a
corresponding
decline
in
the
strength
of
the
free
nations.
The
policy
of
the
United
States,
in
response
to
this
type
of
threat,
was
to
declare
that
the
2
The
committee
headed
by
General
Lucius
D.
Clay
in
the
spring
of
1963,
and
the
committee
headed
by
Under
Secretary
of
State
George
W.
Ball,
appointed
in
December,
1963,
are
recent examples.
3
David
E.
Bell,
Administrator
of
the
Agency
for
International
Development,
Foreign
Opera-
tions
Appropriations
for
1964,
Part
III,
p.
4.
’ Dean
Rusk,
Secretary
of
State,
ibid.,
Part
II,
p.
4.
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