Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil–Military Relations

• Author: Derek Lutterbeck
• Published date: 01 January 2013
• Date: 01 January 2013
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X12442768
• Subject Matter: Articles

Armed Forces & Society
39(1) 28-52
Arab Uprisings,
ª The Author(s) 2013
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Armed Forces, and
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X12442768
http://afs.sagepub.com
Civil–Military Relations
Derek Lutterbeck1
Abstract
Since late 2010, an unprecedented wave of protests demanding greater political
freedoms, and in several countries even regime change, has swept across much of
the Arab world. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, long-standing autocrats have been
toppled, and in other countries of the region seemingly well-established authoritar-
ian regimes also appeared increasingly shaky in the face of growing opposition move-
ments. The aim of this article is to examine the role of the armed forces in these
popular uprisings. While military forces have been key actors in these Arab uprisings,
they have responded quite differently across the region to prodemocracy move-
ments, ranging from openness to protest movements, to internal fracturing, to firm
support for the regime in power. This article argues that these differences can be
explained with reference to different forms of civil–military relations and different
characteristics of the military apparatus. It claims in particular that the degree of
institutionalization of the armed forces and their relationship to society at large can
account for the divergent responses to pro-reform movements.
Keywords
armed forces, Arab countries, popular uprisings, civil–military relations
Since late 2010, an unprecedented wave of protests calling for greater political free-
doms, and in several countries even regime change, has swept across much of the
1Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC), University of Malta, Malta
Corresponding Author:
Derek Lutterbeck, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC), University of Malta, MSD06
Msida, Malta
Email: derek.lutterbeck@um.edu.mt

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Lutterbeck
29
Arab world.1 Following the Tunisian revolution in January 2011, which lead to the
toppling of the country’s long-standing autocrat, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, protest
movements gained momentum in Egypt, where the country’s president for almost
thirty years, Hosni Mubarak, stepped down after some three weeks of massive anti-
regime demonstrations. In mid-2011, it was the turn of Libya’s leader, Colonel
Muammar Qaddafi, who was removed from power (and subsequently killed) after
a six-month-long civil war between his regime and rebel fighters. In other countries
of the region, as well, seemingly well-established leaders have appeared increas-
ingly shaky in the face of growing opposition movements calling for both greater
political freedoms and an end to the regimes in power.
The aim of this article is to examine the role of the armed forces in these Arab
uprisings. Powerful militaries and a robust security apparatus more generally have
been seen by many analysts as one, if not the main obstacle to political reforms and
democratization in the Middle East and North Africa.2 However, military forces
have responded quite differently across the region to prodemocracy movements,
ranging from openness to, and even support for, protest movements, to internal frac-
turing, to firm support for the regime in power. This article argues that these differ-
ences can be explained with reference to different forms of civil–military relations
and different characteristics of the military apparatus in the countries of the region.
In particular, it argues that the degree of institutionalization of the armed forces and
their relationship to society at large can account for their divergent responses to pro-
reform protest movements.
The article is divided as follows. In the first section, it discusses the nature of
civil–military relations in the Middle East and North Africa and some typologies
which have been suggested in the existing literature. It then turns to four case studies
of countries which have witnessed large-scale prodemocracy and antiregime protests
but where the armed forces have reacted in different ways to these popular uprisings:
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Bahrain. In the four cases, the responses of military
forces to the antiregime movements are explained with reference to the armed
forces’ degree of institutionalization and their relationship to the population.3 The
main argument advanced here is that the more institutionalized the armed forces are,
and the stronger their relationship to society at large, the more open they have been
to prodemocracy uprisings.
One limitation needs to be noted here: this article does not cover the actions of the
entire coercive apparatus of Arab countries during the current upheavals. Rather its
focus is confined to one element of these countries’ security structures, that is, the
armed forces, although the distinction between these and other security forces might
not always be clear-cut. This is not to argue that other security agencies, such as
police and other internal security forces or intelligence agencies, have not also
played a significant part in dealing—and in particular suppressing—the popular
uprisings in the countries of the region. However, as subsequent sections will argue,
the armed forces have certainly been key actors in this regard, thus meriting separate
analysis of their role in the Arab uprisings.

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Armed Forces & Society 39(1)
Civil–Military Relations in the Middle East and
North Africa
While the 1960s and 1970s saw a wealth of studies on civil–military relations in the
Middle East and North Africa, the issue has received somewhat less attention in
subsequent years.4 These earlier studies have generally highlighted the important
role played by the armed forces in the political systems in most Middle Eastern
states, as evidenced by the frequency of military coups and other forms of military
intervention into politics, and the fact that the military often provided the backbone
and ultimate power base of these countries’ regimes.5 A commonly used concept in
this context has been the one of the praetorian state, a term which was coined by
Amos Perlmutter with particular reference to the case of Egypt. According to
Perlmutter, a praetorian state is one ‘‘in which the military tends to intervene in the
government and has the potential to dominate the executive.’’ The political leader-
ship of a praetorian state, he argues, comes mainly from the military, or from groups
close to the military, and the military plays a dominant role in all key political insti-
tutions. Perlmutter further distinguished between two types of praetorian armies: the
‘‘arbitrator army’’ which tries to limit military rule and seeks to influence politics
mainly from behind the scenes; and the ‘‘ruler army’’ which exercises direct military
rule over extended periods of time.6
Even though nowadays none of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa
can be described as ‘‘military ruler’’ regimes, where the armed forces are directly
and openly involved in politics on a day-to-day basis, in many of them the military
continues to play an important part in overseeing the political process from the back-
ground—in Perlmutter’s terms, they may rather be qualified as ‘‘military arbitrator’’
regimes. Indeed, the Middle East and North Africa continues to be the region in the
world where the armed forces currently play the relatively most important role in
domestic politics.7 While most areas of policy making are left to governments which
nowadays are largely civilianized (even if they are often headed by former military
leaders), the armed forces remain a key factor in the political system, and in partic-
ular in times of crisis, or when the military sees its core interests as threatened, it is
likely to grab the reins of power, and take direct control of political decision
making.8
Whereas this general description applies to most Arab countries, a somewhat
more elaborate typology of civil–military relations in the Middle East and North
Africa has recently been suggested by Mehran Kamrava. He has distinguished
between three types of civil–military relations in Arab countries: ‘‘autocratic offi-
cer–politician’’ regimes, ‘‘tribally dependent monarchies,’’ and regimes with ‘‘dual
militaries.’’9 The first type of regimes is usually led by former military officers who,
over time, have turned into civilian politicians. The state apparatus as a whole has
also been largely civilianized, not least because the leaders have themselves become
wary of the political power of the army. However, while the military is no longer
directly involved in politics, it still plays an important role in the background, often

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Lutterbeck
31
through more informal channels. Countries such as Algeria, Egypt, or Syria are
examples of such autocratic officer–politician regimes. In all of these countries, the
armed forces exercise political power in particular through their organic relationship
with the all-powerful presidency. The military has held a de facto monopoly, or veto
power, over the presidency, for which the armed forces remain the ultimate power
base.10
A different form of civil–military relations can be found in the tribally based
monarchies of the Arab world, such as the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf, or
Morocco and Jordan. The distinguishing feature of these countries is their heavy reli-
ance on either forces which are drawn from tribes which are particularly loyal to the
regime, or foreign mercenaries. The latter is the case in the small monarchies of the
Persian Gulf, such as Bahrain, Oman, or Qatar, which due to their small size are...