Arab politics and the Gulf war: political opinion and political culture.

• Author: Tareq Y.

THIS ARTICLE REFLECTS OUR EFFORTS TO UNDERSTAND the Gulf war in the way we are accustomed as social scientists to metabolize reality. Thus, it reflects two inter-connected though distinct dimensions of our enterprise: empirical and theoretical. These two dimensions were manifested simultaneously as separate projects, but they are compellingly inter-connected for us for at least two reasons. First, they had a cathartic effect on the anger, frustration and sense of utter futility the war triggered in us. Second, and perhaps more importantly from the perspective of social science, they helped us to make sense of the reality that confronts us, giving us a new prism through which to view our world and pointing to new directions in the social scientific enterprise.

The text is divided into two parts. The first reports the findings of our survey of the opinions of Arab academics and professionals on the Gulf war. The second part examines the dynamics of change in the Arab World from the perspective of chaos theory, and in essence constitutes the framework for interpreting the survey.

PART I: ABAB OPINION ON THE GULF WAR

There has been a strong tendency in the West to view the Arabs as incidental or accidental participants in the Gulf calamity. During the crisis and war phases of this episode, the media gave the distinct impression that Arabs coincidentally happened to be there. Usually passive, sometimes reactive, their presence was nonetheless incidental. The nature of this orientation to the Arabs--indeed, to the so-called "other"--has already been critically examined; and the role of the media in the Gulf crisis is under critical review. These are not our subjects. Rather, we wanted to examine Arab opinion on events in the Arab World since the beginning of the crisis in August 1990. Contrary to the general presentation of the Arabs in the literature (popular and otherwise), we assumed that what the Arabs think and feel about what happened is politically significant, even if that significance is not manifest in the short term. Many do not share this assumption.

METHODS

In August 1990, just after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, we initiated a 2-year residency in the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) Upon arriving there, we began sampling the opinions of professionals and academics in the Gulf. In addition, through participation in conferences in Amman and Tunis, we sampled opinions outside the Gulf as well. Our sample constituted a cross section of Arabs from different countries, and with differing ideological orientations. The sample was purposeful, focusing on professionals and academics.

We had a total sample of 264; of this, 60 percent were interviewed once, and the remaining 40 percent more than once. Re-interviews were based upon random samples drawn from the total sample at regular intervals after the war (February-March, May-June, August-September 1991). A total of three such reinterviews were conducted. In this way, we hoped to track changing attitudes among our population of respondents. A total of 264 interviews were conducted over the period September 1990-March 1991; and 105 re-interviews from February-September 1991.

Interviews were informal and open-ended. They were in the form of probes rather than specific questions and focused on the following topics:

1. Nature of Arab society: probes in this area focused on three dimensions: -- what the respondents considered the significant characteristics of Arab society--cultural, institutional, demographic. -- what were considered the major challenges facing Arab society as it approached the 21st century. -- what were considered the major dynamics of change shaping the Arab World as it approached the 21st century.

2. Diagnosis of the crisis: probes in this area focused on: -- what the respondents considered the immediate or direct causes of the crisis, and what was considered the long-term or indirect causes. -- what were considered the immediate or direct effects of the crisis, and what was considered long-term or indirect effects. -- what were considered the most critical events in the crisis.

3. Prescriptions for change, for improving the condition or situation of the Arab World in the 21st century.

   RESULTS

   Our preliminary results indicate several trends in opinion. The first relates to cause. Before the initiation of war on 17 January 1991, the majority of respondents--about 86 percent--placed primary responsibility for the crisis on Saddam Hussein, citing his invasion of Kuwait as the precipitating event. Ideological orientation (classified as Arab nationalist, Islamic revivalist or Marxist-based on questions related to the nature of the state and the nature of society) did not directly affect the assignment of primary responsibility. However, there was an association between ideological orientation and the assignment of secondary responsibility. Arab nationalists and Marxists held imperialism responsible for escalating the crisis into a military confrontation with the West; Islamic revivalists held Saudi Arabia and Egypt responsible for allowing the West to interfere. In addition, about 78 percent of the respondents felt that a resolution of the crisis should be based on an Arab solution and international economic sanctions.

   After the war, opinion began to shift. By May 1991, almost 64 percent of the respondents considered that the war was a result of an externally hateched conspiracy. Ideological orientation played a secondary role in terms of the nature of the conspiracy. The outcomes of the war, particularly Saddam Hussein's political and military survival, were the primary evidence used to substantiate this; and the increasing intransigence of Israel over the Occupied Territories the most commonly cited evidence.

   By September, the external conspiracy perspective deepended--in the sense that the percentage adhering to it increased to 76 percent, and the nature of the conspiracy was both more complex and expressed with greater conviction. The argument generally took the form that the objectives of the war were both the destruction of Iraq as an Arab military power in the Middle East, and as a civil society in the Arab World. Saddam Hussei's invasion of Kuwait was merely the pretext legitimating the military destruction (and in connection with this, credibility is given to the argument that Saddam Hussein was enticed into the invasion); and his remaining in power served to legitimate the annihilation of Iraqi civil society, as well...