The 'al-Aqsa Intifada' as a result of politics of transition.

• Author: Schulz, Helena Lindholm

THE VIOLENT CLASHES BREAKING OUT in the West Bank and Gaza in late October 2000-following the breakdown of negotiations in Camp David and the provocative visit at the Haram ash-Sharif by Likud-leader Ariel Sharon have shown a greater persistence and momentum than most observers initially thought possible. To Palestinians, demonstrations and attacks against army posts and settlements have become known as the 'new intifada,' or the 'al-Aqsa Intifada,' drawing on the rich symbolic capital of the intifada in the late 1980s. According to most observers the reasons for an upheaval at this point is to be found in the profound mistrust of the peace process and the intentions of the Israeli regime that is to be found in the Palestinian population. (1) Growing discontent was evident in the Spring of 2000. Although a clear majority of 71 percent continued to support the peace process, there was an increase in the support for armed attacks against Israelis from 39 percent in February 2000 to 44 percent in April that same year. Confidence in Barak's government declined from an already low 29 percent in July 1999 to 13 percent in April 2000. Forty-six percent of the Palestinians believed that a Palestinian state would be established in the near future, but 59 percent did not consider it possible to reach a mutually acceptable solution to final status issues. However, 63 percent of the Palestinians were still optimistic about the future. (2) A particular source of frustration was the expansion of settlements under the leadership of Ehud Barak. (3)

Widespread Palestinian disappointment over a faltering and protracted peace process was therefore certainly one of the primary factors behind the outbreak of violence at this particular time. Less noticed, but equally important was the fact that clashes took place within the framework of an established Palestinian authority. Domestic politics were as much a part of the picture as were the peace process and the Israeli actions. This article analyzes this phase of transition of Palestinian politics as a necessary point of departure for understanding the turn of events in late 2000 -- the year that was supposed to mark the signature of a peace agreement.

THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: FORMATION OF A PROTO-STATE

Despite the highly restricted circumstances of Palestinian autonomy (4), Palestinian self-rule during the last years has implied the gradual establishment of state-like structures. (5) This quasi-state, under establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), has become known for authoritarianism, centralization, personalism, neo-patrimony, violence, lack of rule of law, and arbitrariness in decision-making. (6) Also, however, self-rule has implied the holding of general elections, institutionalization of political processes and the emergence of new discussions on internal politics, features of government, prospects for democracy and the content of the potential state-to-be.

Rather than viewing the Palestinian Authority as an already established regime with a set of established rules of governance, an alternative approach would be to conceive of the PNA, representing an interim government, as a transitional regime. Self-rule represents a transition from external to internal rule, from occupation to some sort of state-hood, although territorial sovereignty does not yet exist and the institutional powers of the PNA are limited. Also, this transition implies a simultaneous transformation from a military, revolutionary, exiled liberation organization to a territorial government with responsibility for administration and bureaucracy. These shifts raise questions related to the possibilities of a corresponding third transition from an authoritarian and centralized movement to a democratic government.

The concern in the following is the position and discourses of different elites within the political system: how elites position themselves vis-a-vis core institutions, how they view potentials for democratization and what discourses they use to legitimize their claims. The focus is on the mainstream political elite, i.e., representatives of core institutions of government, leaving aside the (equally important) factional divisions and the oppositional challenge. This is motivated by the fact that the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative branches of government has become of major importance in order to understand the characteristics of the post-Oslo political regime in the West Bank and Gaza. Also, despite participation of Hamas and the leftist opposition in the current uprising, it is clear that organizations under the command of Fateh pull the strings. Thus, this means that the article focuses upon the contemporary intra-Authority and intra-Fateh problematique. (7)

TRANSITIONS AND ELITES

During the last decade, much attention has been devoted to times of 'transitions' to democratic rule in different parts of the world. (8) A transition is defined as 'the interval between one political regime and another,' (9) and thus not an established order. Transitions therefore constitute periods of disorder. There are no clear-cut rules of the political game and those that do exist are still controlled by the authoritarian power structure. Simultaneously, however, the rules of the political system are contested. Different actors struggle not only to pursue their own interests, but to influence the hows of the political system in the long run. (10) The most general claim to be made about 'transitions' or 'democratization processes' is that they are uncertain, often slow, rocky and uneven. (11) As Przeworski has explained:

Anyone who has lived through moments when a dictatorship was about to fall and democracy become a real possibility remembers almost constant tension, hopes that repeatedly alternated with fears, outbursts of enthusiasm and the pain of defeat. Every step seems difficult and yet nothing seems out of reach. (12)

Periods of transition are underdetermined and our tools for the study of such processes are necessarily insufficient. (13) Limited political openings or political reforms create a space for other spheres of elites as well as for civil society, which in turn tend to give rise to a reaction by authoritarian regimes, often implying repression.

In this process, the role of elites is of particular importance. Transitions to democracy only rarely imply the complete defeat of elites that have previously constituted the backbone of authoritarian regimes. Instead, transitory periods often include pacts (14) and accommodations between different segments of the political elite, as well as internal struggles and battles over power as well as values and ideas. 'Pacts' are thus forms of compromises between groups in order to seek stability during a period of transition. If a transition to democracy occurs, the function of the pact has been to introduce democracy by 'undemocratic means.' (15) A slightly different view of the role of elites is provided by Rustow, (16) who has claimed that 'inconclusive political struggles' between elites are significant of early phases of democratization.

This struggle may be fought between 'hard-liners' and 'soft-liners,' where 'hard-liners' are constituted by those who struggle for the perpetuation of some kind of authoritarian rule, while 'soft-liners' also are represented in the authoritarian power structure but increasingly come to embrace the idea that legitimacy must be sought through elections. (17) Elites that do opt for democracy may motivate their choice by self-interest, which is why elite support for democracy is one of the weak points in democratization processes. (18) Therefore, in all transitory periods, we need to understand the position, interests and political orientations of elites.

Assessments of the Palestinian political system during the last few years have tended to emphasize not only the authoritarianism and personalism of this regime, but also the political monopoly held by Yasir Arafat and the hegemony of the political class surrounding him. This political class is primarily constituted by Fateh members and cadres, by returning Fateh/PLO bureaucrats and former fighters and by the traditional conservative family elite of the West Bank and Gaza. (19) This article suggests an alternative approach, implying that the contemporary period implies contestation between different elite sections, although asymmetric power relations are certainly evident.

The article is divided into three sections. First, there is an outline of the legacy of the PLO in terms of democracy. Second, there is a description of the role and position of elites vis-a-vis core institutions in the contemporary phase of state-building. Third, I draw attention to the discourses used by elites in order to legitimize their claims.

THE PLO LEGACY: AUTHORITARIANISM AND PLURALISM

As a de-territorialized, exiled organization with its main energies directed towards the liberation of land, the PLO provides a particular historical legacy when it comes to politics and democracy. The 'armed struggle' of the late 1960s and early 1970s was seen as requiring a secretive, consensus-based political system. The decision-making structure (20) of the PLO has been based on appointments according to a quota system, allocating places in the PNC according to pre-set quotas that assured Fateh's dominance. The absence of access to a constituency as well as lack of territory has further rendered democratic processes troublesome. Elections for seats in the PNC have taken place in, for example, trade unions, women's movements, and student unions. General elections were considered impossible as long as the Israeli occupation continued, the population was dispersed and the land was not liberated. The Palestinian movement nevertheless fostered semi-democratic institutions in the form of its intense political d ebates and the existence of several ideological...