Case Notes

• Publication year: 2014
• Citation: Vol. 18 No. 04

CASE NOTES

Supreme Court

Attorneys' Fees

In the Matter of Attorney's Fees Pertaining to John C. McLaren, No. SCWC-11-0000460, February 21, 2014 (McKenna, J.). This case concerns McLaren's attorney's fees request to the Director of DLIR through the Disability Compensation Division of DLIR (DGD) for his representation of a claimant in a workers' compensation case. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the ICA erred in concluding that McLaren's appeal to the LIRAB was untimely made and that his requests to DCD for reconsideration were insufficiently supported. Moreover, the Hawaii Supreme Court also held that McLaren did not have a right to have a contested case hearing before the DCD, but the DCD was required to provide its reasons for reducing McLaren's attorney's fees and costs request.

Civil Procedure

Asato v. Procurement Policy Bd., No. SCAP-12-0000789, February 14, 2014, (Acoba, J. with Recktenwald, C.J. dissenting, joined by Nakayama, J.). Appellee brought an action challenging the validity of Haw. Admin. R. § 3-122-66 because § 3-122-66 was contrary to the 'minimum of three persons' requirement. The Hawaii Supreme Court agreed that Appellee had standing to bring his claim based on his status as an "interested person" pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 91-7 and that Haw. Admin. R. § 3-122-66 was invalid because it exceeded the scope of authority given to the Haw. Procurement Policy Bd.

Recktenwald, C.J. and Nakayama, J., dissented from the majority's conclusion, stating that the majority abandoned the "injury in fact" test normally used to determine whether a plaintiff had standing to challenge an administrative rule under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 91-7 in favor of a rule that granted standing to any person who was willing to bring suit. Moreover, Appellant did not satisfy the requirements of taxpayer standing because he failed to demonstrate that the use of Haw. Admin. R. § 3-122-66 increased either his personal taxes or those of taxpayers in general. Damage to Appellant could not be presumed because the facts of the instant case were distinguishable from the "special situation" presented in Federal Elec. Corp. v. Fasi, 56 Haw. 57, 527 P.2d 1284 (1974). Finally, Appellant did not demonstrate standing under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 632-1.

Appeal Pointers

An appeal is in default if the record on appeal is not filed with the appellate clerk within 60 days after the notice of appeal is filed. Relief from default must be obtained from the appellate court. Failure to cure the default may result in dismissal of the appeal. HRAP 11(a).

Goo v. Arakawa, No. SGWG-30142, February 19, 2014, (Pollack, J.). This case addressed the issue of the procedure that an appellate court should follow when a case becomes moot on appeal and one party seeks vacatur of the lower court's judgment. The Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that the IGA did not explain how the defendants carried their burden of remedy of establishing their equitable entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of vacatur and did not take account of how vacatur would serve the public interest. Also, when a case becomes moot on appeal and the trial court has not had an opportunity to evaluate a motion for vacatur, the appellate court, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, should remand the case to the trial court to give the court the first opportunity to evaluate the cause of the mootness based on a complete record.

In re Marn Family Litigation, No. SGWG-10-0000181, February 12, 2014, (Nakayama, J.). In the most recent iteration of the Marn Family Litigation, Appellant, who had frequently appeared pro se throughout the course of the litigation, filed an appeal to the IGA pro se. The IGA dismissed Appellant's appeal for failure to comply with the Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure in his briefing to the court. While it was uncontested that Appellant's brief did not comply with the Haw. R. Giv. P., the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the IGA failed to provide Appellant with notice before dismissing his appeal.

Criminal

Fagaragan v. State, No. SGWG-11-0000592, February 14, 2014, (Pollack, J., Recktenwald, C.J. and Nakayama, J., dissenting). This case required the Hawaii Supreme Court to determine whether the Hawaii Paroling Authority (HPA) erred in determining the minimum prison terms to be served by Appellant. Appellant was convicted of multiple crimes in connection with two separate incidents. The HPA subsequently set minimum prison terms in both cases in a consolidated hearing. However, it later redetermined the minimum terms in one of those cases after a count in that case was reversed on appeal; when the HPA did so, it re-imposed the same minimum terms on the remaining counts. The Hawaii Supreme Court stated that Appellant had a colorable claim for Haw. R. Penal P. Rule 40 relief and that he did not fit the criteria for categorization as a Level III offender. Therefore, Appellant should have another hearing to have his minimum term reset as a Level I or II offender.

Recktenwald, C.J., joined by Nakayama, J. dissented because the reversal of a count on appeal in this case could not change the HPA's assessment of the culpability of Appellant. The count that was reversed on appeal involved exactly the same underlying criminal conduct as one of the remaining counts of conviction. Thus, nothing material had changed about Appellant's culpability and it was reasonable for HPA to impose the same minimum terms.

State v. Acker, No. SGWG-30205, February 14, 2014, (Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Acoba, J. joined by McKenna, J. to granting of application of writ of certiorari). Appellants were indicted for various charges. While incarcerated in prison, William apparently testified under oath that he was solely responsible for one of the murders. Maryann filed a petition for postconviction relief on the basis that William had admitted he killed one of the victims. The court granted her petition and the ICA granted her a new trial. At the retrial, the primary issue was the credibility of the two primary witnesses, William and Maryann. The trial court denied Maryann's request to recall William as a witness in her case-in-chief and instead allowed a deputy sheriff to testify regarding William's refusal to testify. Maryann was again convicted and the ICA affirmed and the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the ICA's judgment.

Acoba, J. joined by McKenna, J. concurred and dissented concluding that denying Maryann's request to recall William violated Maryann's constitutional right to compulsory process, right to confrontation, right to present a complete defense, and right to fair trial. The court's decision to accept the...