Appellate Decisions
| Jurisdiction | Kansas,United States |
| Pages | 60 |
| Citation | Vol. 92 No. 5 Pg. 60 |
| Publication year | 2023 |
September, 2023
Kansas Supreme Court
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ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT
IN RE MICHAEL P. JAHN NO. 124,587 — JULY 7, 2023
FACTS: In May 2022, the Supreme Court suspended Michael P. Jahn's license to practice law in Kansas for six months. The suspension could be stayed after three months if Jahn entered a one-year probation plan with specified conditions. After two rejected motions denied for lack of proper service, Jahn now petitions for reinstatement. The Office of the Disciplinary Administrator did not object.
HELD: Jahn has served the entirety of his six-month suspension and complied fully with Rule 232(b)(1)(A) through (D). Because he served the full suspension, Jahn's license to practice law in Kansas is fully restored.
CERTIFIED QUESTION
ARBITRATION; CERTIFIED QUESTION HODGES V. WALINGA USA INC.
ORIGINAL ACTION — CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED
NO. 125,778 — JULY 21, 2023
FACTS: Timothy Hunt was employed by a farm in Kansas. In 2019, Hunt used a grain vacuum produced by Walinga Inc. and Walinga USA Inc. to remove corn from a grain trailer owned by his employer. To use the vacuum, Hunt had to stand on top of the corn. Hunt became trapped in the corn while operating the vacuum, suffocating him until his death. Hunt's daughter, Regan Hodges, filed suit in Kansas federal district court against the Walinga defendants. At nearly the same time, all of Hunt's children — including Hodges — entered into an arbitration agreement with Hunt's employer. The arbitrator found in favor of Hunt's heirs, ruling that the farm failed to exercise reasonable care in protecting Hunt from the dangerous vacuum. After the arbitration award was confirmed in state court, the Walinga defendants sought summary judgment, claiming the suit against them was now barred by Kansas' one-action rule. The federal district court was unable to find a clear answer as to whether the suit was barred and certified two questions for review by the Court.
ISSUES: (1) Under Kansas law, does an arbitration action qualify as a judicial determination of comparative fault; (2) If not, does the confirmation of an arbitration award by state court judgment qualify as a judicial determination of comparative fault
HELD: An arbitration action does not qualify as a judicial determination of comparative fault where no other potential tortfeasors were involved in the arbitration. Arbitration actions save judicial resources and are akin to mediation and settlement actions, which do not trigger the one-action rule. Similarly, the confirmation of an arbitration award by a state court judgment is also not a judicial determination of comparative fault. The confirmation process establishes an enforceable judgment but does not constitute an independent judicial proceeding establishing liability.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 5-442, -445, -446, 60-258a
CIVIL
CONDEMNATION
KANSAS FIRE AND SAFETY EQUIPMENT V. CITY OF TOPEKA
SHAWNEE DISTRICT COURT — COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED, DISTRICT COURT IS REVERSED, CASE REMANDED
NO. 123,063 — JUNE 30, 2023
FACTS: The City of Topeka passed an ordinance authorizing a public works project to improve drainage. As part of the project, the City negotiated with a group of tenants to buy the property the tenants leased to operate their businesses. The property owner and the City reached a purchase agreement in September 2013, and the tenants were ordered to vacate by January 2014. Before vacating, the tenants sought relocation cost reimbursement from the City. The City denied the request, noting that relocation costs were not statutorily required because the City acquired the property through a direct purchase from the owner, not through condemnation. The tenants sued for relocation costs, claiming they were displaced persons as defined in relevant statutes. The district court disagreed, finding that the tenants were not displaced persons under the Eminent Domain Procedure Act and that the City did not acquire the property "in advance of a condemnation action." The tenants appealed. The Court of Appeals found that the tenants were displaced persons under the EDPA, but that a question of fact existed about whether the City had acquired the property in advance of a condemnation action. On remand, the City argued for the first time that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there is no private right of action for relocation benefits under the EDPA. The district court agreed and granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling on subject matter jurisdiction, finding the EDPA only allows for review of just compensation for takings, which does not include relocation benefits. The Court of Appeals found the district court's order should have been a dismissal without prejudice on jurisdictional grounds rather than a grant of summary judgment, and it reversed and remanded so that order could be entered. The tenants petitioned for review.
ISSUES: (1) Whether K.S.A. 26-518 creates a private right of action; (2) Whether the EDPA provides a right to judicial review of relocation-benefit determinations; (3) Whether there is another vehicle for review
HELD: K.S.A. 26-518 does not create a private right of action, either express or implied. The plain language of other relevant statutes shows that the Kansas Relocation Assistance for Persons Displaced by Acquisition of Real Property Act is the exclusive remedy for relocation benefit determinations. Similarly, the EDPA does not provide a right to judicial review of relocation-benefit determinations in eminent domain appeals. The EDPA limits review to the issue of just compensation, which does not include relocation benefits. The only way for the tenants to challenge the lack of relocation benefits is to pursue an action under the KRA, which is the exclusive remedy for this type of question. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this action and the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 20-301, 26-504, -508, -513, -518, 58-3508, -3509
DIVORCE
IN RE MARRIAGE OF HOLLIDAY
JACKSON DISTRICT COURT — COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED, DISTRICT COURT IS AFFIRMED NO. 124,166 — JUNE 30, 2023
FACTS: Jon and Tamara divorced in 2009. The decree divided Jon's KPERS retirement account equally between the couple, with the valuation date tied to the filing of the divorce petition. The district court ordered Tamara to file within 60 days a qualified domestic relations order recognizing her right as an alternate payee, but the order was never prepared. More than a decade later, as Jon prepared to retire, he moved to extinguish Tamara's judgment under the dormancy statute. Recognizing the oversight, Tamara's attorney sent the divorce decree to KPERS and opposed Jon's motion. The district court denied Jon's motion, finding that the original filing of the divorce decree with the district court clerk was equivalent to filing a QDRO with KPERS. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Tamara's failure to send KPERS a copy of the decree within the seven years of the dormancy period was a fatal flaw.
The court granted Tamara's petition for review.
ISSUES: (1) Was the 2009 divorce judgment a final judgment subject to the dormancy statute; (2) If so, when did the dormancy period commence
HELD: The judgment here is the district court's 2009 divorce decree. There was testimony from KPERS that the decree was sufficient to act as a QDRO, and that combined with other factors conclusively shows that the decree was a final judgment under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-254(a). Evidence and statutory analysis show that the dormancy period was tolled until Jon's retirement benefits became payable to him from the account. There was no way for Tamara to enforce her judgment until Jon began receiving benefits. Although it was done for the wrong legal reason, the district court correctly denied Jon's motion to extinguish Tamara's judgment.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-254(a), -2401, -2403; K.S.A. 74-4923(b)
DIVORCE
IN RE MARRIAGE OF SHAFER JOHNSON DISTRICT COURT — COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED, DISTRICT COURT IS REVERSED, CASE REMANDED
NO. 124,529 — JUNE 30, 2023
FACTS: Jon and Lisa divorced in 2006. At that...
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