Antitrust Standing after Apple v. Pepper: Application to the Sports Betting Data Market

AuthorRyan M. Rodenberg
Published date01 December 2019
Date01 December 2019
Antitrust Standing after Apple
v. Pepper: Application
to the Sports Betting
Data Market
Ryan M. Rodenberg*
In Apple v. Pepper, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed a largely permissive view about whether certain
potential plaintiffs have legal standing to pursue antitrust lawsuits in federal court. The Apple v. Pepper
ruling provided important clarity about the scope of the so-called indirect purchaser rule set forth
forty-plus years earlier in Illinois Brick. This paper first summarizes the key takeaways from the Apple v.
Pepper decision released on May 13, 2019, positioning the ruling vis-`
a-vis other standing-related cases
that have sometimes closed the courtroom doors to plaintiffs alleging anticompetitive conduct under
the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. This paper then applies the lessons from Apple v. Pepper to sports
betting data, an emerging tech-focused market. This paper concludes by outlining how—and why—this
market will likely be subject to antitrust scrutiny soon.
antitrust standing, Illinois Brick, data market
I. Introduction
On May 13, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court—by a 5-4 vote in the long-running Apple v. Pepper
—provided future antitrust plaintiffs a boost when faced with a motion to dismiss premised
on a lack of standing. In Apple v. Pepper, a group of iPhone app purchasers alleged that Apple charged
too much for apps and monopolized the app market.
Apple claimed that the plaintiffs did not have
*JD/PhD, Associate Professor, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida,USA
Corresponding Author:
Ryan M. Rodenberg, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA.
1. 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). Justice Kavanaugh wrote the Court’s majority opinion and was joined by Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan. Justice Gorsuch penned a dissent and was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito. See id. at 1525–31.
2. Id. at 1518–19.
The Antitrust Bulletin
2019, Vol. 64(4) 584-593
ªThe Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
DOI: 10.1177/0003603X19875045

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