Anti-regime Uprisings and the Emergence of Electoral Authoritarianism

• Author: Nam Kyu Kim
• Published date: 01 March 2017
• Date: 01 March 2017
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912916675739
• Subject Matter: Articles

Political Research Quarterly

2017, Vol. 70(1) 111 –126

© 2016 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912916675739

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Article

Przeworski (2009, 291) asks a puzzle fundamental to

democratic political reform:

Why would people who monopolize political power ever

decide to put their interests or values at risk by sharing it

with others? Specifically, why would those who hold

political rights in the form of suffrage decide to extend these

rights to anyone else?

He argues that revolutionary threats compel elites to

acquiesce to demands for the institutional reform. This

article asks a similar question regarding the introduction

of multiparty elections with universal suffrage for the

national executive and legislature in authoritarian

regimes. Why would autocrats embrace electoral compe-

tition that puts their own interests at risk?

Given the widespread adoption of authoritarian elec-

tions, a growing body of studies purports to explain the

functional roles of multiparty elections in autocracies.1

These studies tend to “view the establishment of elections

as a means by which dictators hold onto power” (Gandhi

and Lust-Okar 2009, 404). Yet as Brancati (2014, 321)

points out, they often “infer leaders’ motivation for adopt-

ing nominally democratic institutions from the outcomes

they produce.” Inferring the reasons for the emergence of

multiparty elections from the roles those elections play in

regimes, however, misses the fact that the functions served

by authoritarian elections do not necessarily explain their

causes (Brancati 2014, 321; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009,

407).

Consequently, the current literature is plagued by a

lack of systematic cross-national studies on the establish-

ment of electoral authoritarianism (EA), defined as autoc-

racies that have multiparty elections, based on universal

suffrage, for the executive and legislature (Schedler 2013,

29). This is in marked contrast to the accumulation of

sophisticated empirical studies on the determinants of

democratization (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2008). Researchers

have yet to develop a systemic understanding of what fac-

tors are significantly associated with regime change to

EA as well as whether the determinants of democratiza-

tion also promote such transitions.

In this article, I analyze the role of mass uprisings2 in

prompting transitions from closed regimes to EA regimes,3

drawing on mass-based perspectives about democratiza-

tion (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Bratton and Van de

Walle 1997; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Przeworski 1991;

675739PRQXXX10.1177/1065912916675739Political Research QuarterlyKim

research-article2016

1University of Nebraska–Lincoln, USA

Corresponding Author:

Nam Kyu Kim, Department of Political Science, University of

Nebraska–Lincoln, 511 Oldfather Hall, Lincoln, NE 68588, USA.

Email: namkyu@unl.edu

Anti-regime Uprisings and the

Emergence of Electoral

Authoritarianism

Nam Kyu Kim1

Abstract

This paper explores the role of threats from below in the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. Mass uprisings

for democratic regime change undermine closed authoritarian regimes by making it difficult for autocrats to maintain

their regimes through repression and co-optation. Anti-regime uprisings also promote the establishment of electoral

authoritarianism by toppling the existing closed regime or by compelling autocrats to offer political reform as a

survival strategy. Looking at closed authoritarian regimes from 1961 to 2006, my analysis reveals that anti-regime mass

uprisings are significantly associated with transitions to electoral authoritarianism. I also find that nonviolent uprisings

are more likely than violent uprisings to result in the establishment of electoral authoritarianism and that the effect

of anti-regime uprisings on transitions to electoral authoritarianism is greater when a country is surrounded by more

democracies or is ethnically or religiously homogeneous.

Keywords

protest, nondemocratic regimes, political survival, transition

112 Political Research Quarterly 70(1)

Schedler 2013; Wood 2000). Widespread and sustained

mass uprisings demanding democratic reform produce

significant social unrest and political instability, under-

mining the regime’s legitimacy and thereby precipitating

regime overthrow. Therefore, anti-regime mass uprisings

pose a credible threat to leader tenure, making it difficult

for autocrats to maintain their rule through repression and

co-optation. I propose that mass uprisings promote the

emergence of EA in two ways: (1) they can topple existing

closed regimes, which may lead to the establishment of

new EA regimes or (2) they can compel authoritarian

elites to offer political reform as a survival strategy with-

out producing leadership change.

In my analysis of closed authoritarian regimes from

1961 to 2006, I find strong evidence for a relationship

between mass uprisings for regime change and transitions

to electoral autocracies. Anti-regime uprisings prompt

both EA transitions with and without leadership turnover.

Furthermore, my additional analyses confirm that EA

transitions follow anti-regime uprisings, not the other way

around. Last, consistent with previous studies on nonvio-

lent movements (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013;

Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2005; Sharp 1973),

I find that nonviolent uprisings are more likely than vio-

lent uprisings to result in the establishment of EA and that

the effect of nonviolent anti-regime uprisings on EA tran-

sitions strengthens when a country is surrounded by more

democracies and is less ethnically fractionalized.

This article contributes to the burgeoning literature on

EA by systematically exploring the role of popular pro-

tests and by evaluating such protests against the political

and socioeconomic factors emphasized by competing

explanations. My study also weighs in on the ongoing

debate over the extent to which popular protests prompt

the collapse of authoritarian regimes and promote politi-

cal liberalization. These results contribute to a growing

body of quantitative evidence demonstrating the impor-

tance of popular protests in prompting suffrage exten-

sions (Aidt and Jensen 2014; Przeworski 2009) and

democratizations (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; Teorell

2010; Ulfelder 2005). Last, this study provides a rare

cross-national examination of transitions to EA regimes,

highlighting the importance of both mass protests and

international factors.

EA

Scholars generally agree over two defining characteris-

tics of EA: the existence of electoral contestation and the

violation of democratic principles of freedom and fair-

ness. The first attribute distinguishes electoral authoritar-

ian regimes from “closed” authoritarian regimes (Howard

and Roessler 2006; Schedler 2013). EA regimes regularly

allow electoral contest for executive power, although

elections are often flawed and minimally competitive.

Hence, EA regimes also differ from multiparty autocra-

cies, which emphasizes party pluralism without subject-

ing the head of government to electoral competition

(Schedler 2013, 82). Thus, authoritarian regimes, such as

Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco, that allow for multiparty

competition only in legislative or subnational elections

do not qualify as electoral autocracies.

However, the formal properties of representative insti-

tutions do not distinguish between electoral autocracies

and democracies. As Diamond (2002, 28) notes, “The

distinction between electoral democracy and EA turns

crucially on the freedom, fairness, inclusiveness, and

meaningfulness of elections.” When an electoral regime

fully violates at least one of these minimum attributes of

democratic elections, it qualifies as EA (Schedler 2013,

80). In EA regimes, violations of the democratic princi-

ples through electoral manipulation are both frequent and

serious enough that the regime fails to meet conventional

minimum standards for democracy (Levitsky and Way

2010; Schedler 2013).

Theoretical Discussion

I argue that mass uprisings demanding regime change

promote institutional reform. In making this argument, I

follow extant scholarship on political liberalization and

democratization from below, focusing on the conflict

between regime and opposition actors (Acemoglu and

Robinson 2006; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Bunce

and Wolchik 2010; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011;

Howard and Roessler 2006; Wood 2000). According to

this perspective, multiparty politics are “extorted conces-

sions” (Cox 2009, 4) in that autocrats are compelled to

hold elections in response to popular revolutionary

threats. Below, I describe how mass protests for regime

change undermine closed authoritarian regimes and pro-

mote the introduction of multiparty politics. I also explain

why nonviolent protests are more effective in doing so

than violent protests.

Anti-regime Uprisings and Emergence of

Multiparty Elections

Widespread and sustained mass protests seeking regime

change pose a direct threat to incumbent authoritarian

regimes simply because they can expel long-ruling auto-

crats and overthrow incumbent regimes (Teorell 2010;

Ulfelder 2005). Such protests signal not only widespread

discontent with the government but also the potential for

regime change, demonstrating that many obstacles to

mobilizing and organizing popular support, to a degree,

have been overcome. Mass movements often serve as

focal points for facilitating coordination against the