Lessons--and warnings--from the Libyan intervention.

• Author: Samples, John
• Position: International Affairs

IN MID FEBRUARY 2011, protesters in Libya began opposing the regime of Col. Muammar Qaddafi that had ruled the nation for four decades. The protests in the cities of Benghazi and Zentan became violent, and then quickly spread to the capital of Tripoli, where the government responded in kind. Over the next week, civil war in Libya began in earnest. On Feb. 25, the government fired on protesters in the capital while a rebel commander claimed 2,000 troops were ready to attack Tripoli. The claim was credible; several cities in eastern Libya had fallen to the rebels, and the Qaddafi regime appeared in trouble, but the government's fortunes improved over the next two weeks as its control over air power put the rebels on the defensive. By the middle of March, the regime seemed at the point of retaking the lost cities in the east and ending the civil war.

Would outsiders intervene? The New York Times reported that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was "concerned about getting into another war in the Middle East and worried about the political fallout of the United States attacking yet another Muslim country, even on behalf of a Muslim population." James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence, opined that the Qaddafi regime eventually would win its civil war. However, other members of the Obama Administration favored regime change. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton set up a meeting with a rebel leader. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon outlined ways to drive Qaddafi from power short of a military attack. Anonymous sources assured leading journalists that "the President does not think Qaddafi will prevail."

Pres. Barack Obama then appointed a special representative to the rebels as the slide toward intervention continued, insisting that "Muammar el-Qaddafi has lost the legitimacy to lead, and he must leave." He did not say whether the U.S. military would be willing to use force to bring about his departure.

Then, as the rebel came seemed lost, the Arab League invited non-Muslim nations to impose a no-fly zone in Libya. This invitation to intervene turned out to be crucial. The U.S. pushed a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. The Security Council passed a resolution backing a broad use of force on behalf of the Libyan rebels. The Obama Administration later would argue that the UN resolution legitimated (i.e., made lawful) its participation in the war in Libya.

In part, the UN resolution and the American support for it embraced a proposed international "Responsibility to Protect" civilians from their government, articulated in 2005 in a UN World Summit...