And the Heat Goes On: Police Repression and the Modalities of Power

• Published date: 01 November 2021
• Author: Christopher M. Sullivan,Howard Liu
• Date: 01 November 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/00220027211013099
• Subject Matter: Special Feature Articles

2021, Vol. 65(10) 1657 –1679

And the Heat Goes On:

Police Repression and

the Modalities of Power

Howard Liu

1

and Christopher M. Sullivan

2

Abstract

Among security institutions, police occupy a unique position. In addition to spe-

cializing in the repression of dissent, police monitor society and enforce order. Yet

within research studying state repression, how police institutions are used and

deployed to control domestic threats remain under-explored, particularly as it

relates to the dual functionality just described. In this study, we develop and test an

explanation of police repression accounting for the bifurcation of Mann’s two

modalities of state power: infrastructural power and despotic power. Infrastructural

power allocates police resources to surveil dissidents and preemptively limit dis-

sent’s emergence or escalation. Police deploy despotic power through repressive

responses to political threats. Empirically, we employ unique data to investigate

police repression and the modalities of power in Guatemala. To analyze how shifting

the balance between infrastructural and despotic power affects police repression,

we isolate damage occurring from an earthquake that exogenously reshaped the

landscape of infrastructural power. Results affirm the role of infrastructural power in

regulating the despotic power of the state. Where local infrastructure was most

affected by the earthquake, the security apparatus lost the capacity to surveil nascent

movements and predict their activity, thereby providing opportunity for dissidents

to mobilize and forcing police to (over-)react rather than shutdown resistance

preemptively. However, the intensity of state violence recedes as the state recovers

from the infrastructural damage and regains its control of local district.

1

Department of Government, University of Essex, United Kingdom

2

Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Christopher M. Sullivan, Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA,

USA.

Email: csullivanlsu@gmail.com

Journal of Conflict Resolution

ªThe Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/00220027211013099

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Special Feature Article

1658 Journal of Conflict Resolution 65(10)

Keywords

policing, repression, political order, conflict

States apply a diverse range of repressive tactics in their efforts to maintain political

order. For example, governments arrest, torture, and kill dissidents to squash mobi-

lization; they also track and surveil emergent organizations to deter resistance (Tilly

2003; Davenport 2009; Sullivan 2019; Ritter and Conrad 2016). At the extreme,

tactics of mass killing are deployed to violently remove civilians surrounding/sup-

porting insurgent challengers (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004). But while

there remains little disagreement over the willingness of states to repress political

dissidents, at present the microfoundational evidence on whether repression system-

atically improves or weakens political order remains inconclusive (Davenport

2007a).

1

When repression fails, it creates backlash, reshaping political alliances and

weakening state authority (Lucas 1998).

Equally puzzling, states employ starkly different levels of repression to govern

their societies. States like Somalia apply widespread violence to suppress chal-

lenger groups, while states like China utilize their security apparatus to detect

and repel potential threats with more limited reliance on overt repression. Gov-

ernments also vary in their application of coercive force across community

groups and across territory, as evidence from recent exposures of police vio-

lence in the United States make abundantly clear. Existing literature on state

repression does not yet provide satisfactory explanations specifying the condi-

tions under which different levels of repressive severity are applied (Davenport

2009; Hill and Jones 2014).

To explain repression, we differentiate two modalities of state power:

“infrastructural power” and “despotic power” (Mann 1984). The modalities are

differentiated both by the technologies through which power is applied and by the

corresponding coercive practices the y prescribe.

2

Infrastructural power allocates

resources to state institutions administering bureaucratic authority and enforcement;

despotic power involves repression intended to counter political challenges. The

former draws individuals into routine contact with the state’s legal apparatus,

enabling preemptive action to detect and manage nascent threats. The latter deploys

units to specific locations in order to respond to dissent and maintain order. Based on

this theoretical distinction, we argue that states substitute between these two meth-

ods of political control (Moore 2000). When the state has strong infrastructure to

monitor and control society, it can preemptively neutralize dissent before it breaks

out. In contrast, when the state has limited infrastructural power, it substitutes severe

repression in response to dissident threats.

Among security institutions, police occupy a unique position at the intersection of

the two modalities of power. Simultaneous to their role in monitoring society to

identify rogue behavior, police represent a core institution specializing in the

2Journal of Conflict Resolution XX(X)