9/11 and agricultural security.

• Author: Leviten, Aaron

The events of September 11 accelerated congressional focus on the necessity of counterterrorism efforts and strengthening of critical infrastructure to better protect American agricultural production and resources. Because of the importance of agriculture to American economic, political, and social stability, addressing the bioterrorism threat to agriculture has taken on a new urgency.

For decades during the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union researched numerous ways to destroy or severely damage each other's agricultural systems. Both nations well understood the importance of agriculture. The same threat to American economic and political stability exists today on a much broader international scale. The reality of this threat has prompted policy makers to focus on measures to ensure American agricultural security.

History of Agricultural Biological Warfare

* Government Sanctioned Agricultural bioterrorism. The first contemporary use of agricultural biological warfare originated in World War I during sabotage campaigns by Germany against the Allies. German efforts targeted draft animals, military cavalry, and food animals with anthrax and glanders in order to disrupt Allied supply and logistical efforts. During World War II, Germany experimented with the use of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). Nazi experiments also were conducted against Russia by the use of potato beetles and other insects as well as weeds in cropping systems. (1) Japan also engaged in crop destruction experiments, including the effects of fungi, bacteria, and nematodes on grains and vegetables grown in Manchuria. (2)

During World War II, biological warfare efforts were not limited to the Axis powers. Both the United States and Great Britain engaged in extensive plant research as a counterbalance to the Axis powers. In 1969, President Nixon barred offensive biological warfare. (3)

The Soviet Union also developed a variety of offensive biological agents, targeted at American and West European crops. Soviet scientists experimented with FMD, African swine fever, mutants of avian influenza, and other contagions to attack livestock production.(4) It also had an active plant program focusing on wheat, barley, potatoes, and tobacco viruses. (5) Recently, rogue states such as Iraq have pursued agricultural biological warfare methods by researching and experimenting with wheat stem rust and camel pox. (6)

* Terrorist Application of Agricultural Bioterrorism. Terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida could utilize agricultural bioterrorism as an inexpensive and unsophisticated method for inflicting massive economic damage as well as undermine political stability of target countries. Agricultural interests are a prime target mainly because they are exposed, generally unprotected, and spread throughout a wide number of states or countries. The simple manner in which a bioterrorist attack could manifest itself illustrates the threat caused by such a terrorist incident. For example, introducing a pathogen to crops or animals could create damage and havoc much less costly or traceable than a weapon of mass destruction generally feared by many pundits.

Two recent such historical incidents include the use of mercury to contaminate Israeli citrus in 1978 and terrorist's claims in Sri Lanka and Chile of contaminating tea and grapes with cyanide in 1985. (7) The economic impact of bioagents would be far more devastating than these limited efforts.

Vulnerability of American Agricultural Resources to Biological Terrorist Attack?

Agriculture represents 13 percent of U.S. gross domestic product and accounted for $52 billion in exports in 2001. (8) It is obvious that the economic impacts of biological agroterrorism would be felt throughout the U.S. and abroad. As an example, we need not look much farther than the damage caused by FMD in England and the European continent. FMD resulted in significant economic costs to the United Kingdom's economy during the most recent outbreaks of the disease. The overall economic costs in the food and farming sectors of the UK economy totaled an estimated 5 [pounds sterling] billion, roughly $10 billion. (9) This compares to an annual gross output of the entire UK agricultural sector of 25 billion [pounds sterling]. (10)

The UK economy suffered other economic costs associated with the outbreak of FMD. Outside the agricultural sector costs, the UK endured additional losses to the leisure and tourism sector of the economy. The UK Department of Environmental Food and Rural Affairs estimated that the leisure and tourism sector of the economy lost 5 to 6 billion [pounds sterling] pounds as a result of the outbreak of FMD in 2001. (11)

In the U.S., crop systems may have a high level of genetic homogeneity. If such is the case, lack of genetic diversity in three main food crops--wheat, corn, and soybeans--creates a potential danger that an entire crop may be susceptible to a released pathogen. Beginning in the 1990s only six varieties of corn accounted for 46 percent of the crop production, while nine varieties of wheat made up half of the domestic wheat crop. (12) Localization and concentration of specific agricultural industries also causes reason for concern. Prior to the 1970s, most cattle and livestock operations were small-scale and numerous. However, as agriculture has become more industrial and corporate in nature, the number of specialized feedlots have increased with lots of over 32,000 head of cattle increasing to 42 per cent of all feedlot capacity in this country. (13) In 2001, the 10 largest feedlots increased their total capacity to 53 percent over the capacity in 1988. (14) The 20 largest feedlots increased their capacity by 39 percent between 1988 and 2001. (15) The 20 largest feedlots accounted for 24 percent of total steer capacity in the U.S. in...