Anarchy in Afghanistan.

AuthorKhalilzad, Zalmay

Almost 20 years of war have shattered Afghanistan. Today e country is divided into several hostile fiefdoms and anarchy reigns in much of the countryside. Putting back the pieces has been difficult, and the prognosis for peace in the immediate future is bleak.

Although Soviet meddling sparked the conflict in 1978, their withdrawal in 1989 did not end Afghanistan's woes. Instead, war, anarchy and fragmentation followed the Soviet withdrawal, as fighting continued against the Soviet-installed Najibullah government. Mohammed Najibullah's overthrow in 1992 finally brought the anti-Soviet resistance groups--called the mujahedin--to power, but still the war did not end. Without the glue of a common enemy, the mujahedin turned their guns on each other in a brutal civil war.

Peace remains an unlikely prospect in the near future because no Afghan group has been able to impose its will on the other factions. In addition to disagreement among the various factions over the division of power, constant competition among outside states for influence has also destabilized Afghanistan. Indeed, if anything, competition among regional powers has become more intense after Kabul's takeover in September 1996 by the Taliban guerrilla group.

The conflict in Afghanistan has deep social and political roots. But the immediate factors responsible for the fighting are the fragmentation of power during the years of resistance to the Soviet Union and increased ethnic tensions. The most desirable outcome for the civil war would be: an agreement among the warring factions on a cease-fire; the establishment of a broadly acceptable interim government; the disarming and integration of the various militias into a national army; the reconstruction of the country's economy; the resettlement of refugees; and the reestablishment of civil society and the rule of law. Peace in Afghanistan also requires that its government pursue good relations with all its neighbors. Afghanistan's neighbors, in turn, would have to abandon plans for hegemony. For such a settlement to take place, greater international support--especially American--for a negotiated settlement is vital. Unfortunately, efforts at promoting peace have been half-hearted. No serious attempts have been made to develop a true international consensus in favor of a political settlement or to deal with the issue of the multiplicity of armed forces backed by rival regional powers. Nor has there been any effort to punish factions opposed to peace.

This article analyzes both the internal and external factors contributing to the continuation of the civil war and assesses future prospects for stability in Afghanistan. It concludes by identifying the conditions conducive to promoting peace in this wartorn country.

The Causes of Anarchy in Afghanistan

Afghanistan's anarchy has two sets of causes: domestic and international. At the domestic level, Afghanistan's ethnic and tribal politics have long contributed to instability. The largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, the Pashtuns, are divided into many tribal confederations with major inter-tribal rivalries, especially between the Durranis and the Ghelzais. Some, especially those living in or near Kabul and Herat, were Tajikized (Persianized)--that is, their mother tongue changed from Pashtun to Dari (Afghan Persian). For much of Afghanistan's recent history, the Pashtuns produced the Afghan monarchs and dominated the military arid the bureaucracy.

Among Afghanistan's other main ethnic groups, the Tajiks participated more in running the country than the Uzbeks or Hazaras. The Hazaras in particular were disenfranchised and impoverished. They were forcefully brought under central control in the 1880s and 1890s.(1)

Afghanistan has also been the scene of great power rivalry. In fact, the borders of what is now Afghanistan came about as result of the rivalry between the Russian and British empires. These two empires decided that Afghanistan should become a buffer separating them from each other.

The origins of the current war can be traced back to 1978, when the pro-Soviet Communist Party took over Afghanistan. The Communist takeover was the culmination of decades of wrenching change, which strained the country's political and social fabric. Road-building and other infrastructure projects extended the central government's reach to more parts of the country and ended the isolation of many areas. The armed forces had grown significantly; increasing the center's military capability compared with that of the armed tribes. These developments and the extension of centrally-controlled education to all parts of the country spread Afghan national consciousness, but also disrupted traditional ways of life.(2)

These changes fragmented traditional ethnic loyalties among the four main Afghan ethnic groups--the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. A variety of political movements were formed in and across these ethnic groups. These movements included ethnic nationalists; centrists or Afghan nationalists; Islamists; and Communists. The political impact of these changes was particularly strong among the minority Tajiks and Uzbeks. Increased education made people from the minority areas aware of the disparities between their own people and the other groups--especially the Pashtuns--who dominated the government and the armed forces. Groups such as the Setami Melli were formed in the 1960s to advocate the rights of non-Pashtuns.

However, a major change took place in 1978. Two factions of the Communist Party--Khalq and Percham--seized power in a military coup. Pashtuns dominated the Khalq, and Tajiks and Tajikized Pashtuns controlled the Percham. Both rival groups were pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninists who had come together just prior to the coup and who planned on embarking on an agenda of modernization and centralization. They also promoted a nationality policy similar to the one in the Soviet Union. For example, Radio Afghanistan began airing programs in Uzbek and some of the other minority languages.

The Soviet Union, which may have encouraged the leftist coup, provided military, political and economic support to the regime, including the sending of several thousand military advisors. The policies of the regime created widespread opposition in many regions of the country Religious, traditional and nationalist forces resented the centralized control coming out of Kabul, and led the opposition to the regime.

Paradoxically, the practical effect of the Communists' centralizing policies was political decay. As opposition to the government increased, Kabul's control over tribal and minority areas declined. Government offices and schools closed down in many areas and parts of the army disintegrated, with some elements even joining the rural-based opposition. As the opposition to the regime increased, the Khalq-Percham coalition collapsed--with the Khalqis becoming victorious.

The decay continued after the Soviet Union's invasion in December 1979 when the Soviets installed the Perchamis to power. The Babrak Karmal regime, backed by 100,000 Soviet troops, sought to rebuild the state and extend its authority As we shall see, this attempt failed.(3)

Afghan nationalism and traditional values, galvanized by the Islamic belief in jihad or "holy war," drove the initial anti-Soviet opposition, although ethnic politics were not a crucial factor at first. Moscow, however, used ethnicity to gain support for its occupation by offering concessions to minority groups and tribes in return for their support or neutrality in the war. In addition, Moscow encouraged the growth of rural militias that would protect their areas from the opposition. One important example of ethnic militias was the Jawzjani militia comprised of Uzbeks. This militia was used in non-Uzbek areas--with the expectation that it would act as brutally as need be against the other ethnic groups. The strategy of using ethnic groups against each other did not succeed in defeating the mujahedin, but it did encourage the .growth of regional and ethnic-based armed factions. Moreover, this strategy also strained relations among ethnic groups.

The policies of the regime and the Soviet authorities were not the only factors that contributed to the post-occupation anarchy. Resistance rivalries--and the rival policies of resistance supporters--also reinforced the fragmentation of power that would continue after the Soviet withdrawal. Resistance members ranged from organized, full-time partisans to individuals acting sporadically The total number of local commanders involved in the war was more than 200, with a dozen or so major players.

Resistance to the Soviets had a major impact on the balance of power among Afghan ethnic groups. Before the communist takeover and the Soviet invasion, the Pashtuns were the dominant group. Not only did they dominate the armed forces, but they were also well-armed. During the Soviet occupation, other groups such as the Tajiks and the Hazaras acquired arms and gained military experience. Not surprisingly, these groups have been reluctant to go back to the status quo ante in the post-Soviet era. Power also shifted away from the Pashtuns as they fragmented into several rival groups.

The foreign-based opposition groups in Pakistan and Iran perhaps might have contained the tendency toward fragmentation, but instead they contributed to the in-fighting. Pakistan recognized and provided support to seven groups--one Tajik and six largely Pashtun. Iran focused its attention on Afghanistan's Shi'a...

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