An Integrative Approach to Modeling Presidential Success in Congress
| Published date | 01 March 1998 |
| Date | 01 March 1998 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/106591299805100107 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
155
An
Integrative
Approach
to
Modeling
Presidential
Success
in
Congress
BRAD
LOCKERBIE,
UNIVERSITY
OF
GEORGIA
STEPHEN
BORRELLI,
AND
SCOTT
HEDGER,
UNIVERSITY
OF
ALABAMA
We
propose
and
test
an
integrative
multivariate
model
predicting
ag-
gregate
annual
presidential
success
on
House
and
Senate
roll
calls
from
1953
to
1994.
We
incorporate
presidency-centered,
Congress-centered,
.
agenda,
and
timing
variables
in
our
analysis.
Our
results
show
that
there
are
important
similarities
and
dissimilarities
across
legislative
chambers.
For
both
chambers,
the
percentage
of
co-partisans
of
the
president
and
when
they
came
into
office
are
important.
A
presidential
honeymoon
with
Congress,
however,
is
evident
in
the
House
of
Representatives,
but
not
in
the
Senate.
Also,
the
House
equation
does
a
substantially
better
job
of
explaining
the
variation
in
presidential
success
than
does
the
Senate
equa-
tion.
We
argue
that
an
integrative
approach
offers
a
more
satisfactory
statistical
and
substantive
explanation
of
presidential
success
than
an
approach
based
on
a
single
perspective.
The
&dquo;presidency-centered&dquo;
view
of
presidential-congressional
relations
em-
phasizes
the
importance
of
presidential
skills,
popularity,
and
personality
in
deter-
mining
presidents’
legislative
success
(Barber
1993;
Hager
and
Sullivan
1994;
Kellerman
1984;
Neustadt
1960;
Sullivan
1991).
Sullivan
(1991),
for
example,
finds
that
presidents
have
the
ability
to
increase
their
initial
levels
of
support
in
Congress.
Moreover,
he
finds
that
presidential
popularity
influences
the
presi-
dents’ ability
to
sway
members
from
their
initial
positions.
A
&dquo;Congress-centered&dquo;
view
competes
with
this
perspective,
which
highlights
the
partisan
and
ideologi-
cal
composition
of
Congress
as
the
primary
determinant
of
legislative
victory
or
NOTE:
The
authors
would
like
to
thank
Charles
S.
Bullock,
III,
Loch
K.
Johnson,
several
anonymous
reviewers,
and
the
editors
for
their
helpful
comments
on
an
earlier
version
of
this
article.
156
defeat
(Bond
and
Fleisher
1990;
Edwards
1989;
Oppenheimer
1993).
The
accep-
tance
of
the
Congress-centered
view
is
based
on
the
dominance
of
party
affiliation
in
individual-level
regression
models
predicting
presidential
support,
and
of
cham-
ber
party
composition
in
aggregate-level
models
of
presidential
agreement
or
suc-
cess
in
getting
legislation
passed;
in
contrast,
presidency
centered
variables
(such
as
the
president’s
Gallup
approval
ratings
or
perceived
levels
of
legislative
skill)
have
weak
and
inconsistent
effects
in
such
models.
Obviously,
neither
perspective
should
be
overemphasized,
and
some
scholars
have
called
for
a
more
balanced,
&dquo;tandem&dquo;
perspective
(Jones
1994;
Peterson
1990).
According
to
this
point
of
view,
it
is
rare
for
either
Congress
or
the
president
to
&dquo;win&dquo;
or
&dquo;lose&dquo;
a
legislative
battle
unambiguously,
and
each
player
has
a
significant
role
in
determining
the
outcome.
These
studies
tend
to
combine
the
quantitative
approach
emphasized
by
the
&dquo;congress-centered&dquo;
literature
with
the
qualitative
approach
stressed
by
the
&dquo;presidency-centered&dquo;
scholars.
In
recent
years,
political
scientists
have
introduced
yet
another
way
to
view
presidential
congressional
relations.
They
suggest
looking
beyond
the
participants
in
the
legislative
process
and
examining
the
nature
of
the
process
itself.
This
perspective-which
we
might
call
the
&dquo;structural&dquo;
perspective-
includes
a
variety
of
factors.
There
are
temporal
factors,
such
as
the
trends
and
cycles
in
presidential
influence
and
the
election
calendar.
Presidents,
for
example,
might
be
advantaged
by
an
influx
of
new
members
who
are
elected
along
with
the
president.
These
new
members
might
be
especially
loyal
to
the
wishes
of
the
president.
After
an
intervening
election
has
passed,
however,
the
impetus
of
new
members
of
the
president’s
party
to
be
especially
support-
ive
might
dissipate.
Institutional
factors,
such
as
the
differences
in
rules
across
legislative
chambers,
might
contribute
to
an
explanation
of
presidential
suc-
cess.
Last,
agenda
factors,
such
as
whether
the
issue
under
consideration
is
foreign
or
domestic
policy
or
if
the
issue
is
one
favored
or
initiated
by
the
president
as
opposed
to
wholly
independent
congressional
proposals
might
play a
role.
While
some
of
these
variables
have
been examined
in
earlier
work
on
the
presidency,
the
research
that
specifically
employs
this
perspective
is
of
reasonably
recent
vintage
(for
example,
Brace
and
Hinckley
1992;
Covington,
Wrighton,
and
Kinney
1995;
Jones
1994;
Light
1989;
Skorownek
1993;
Sullivan
1991).
Structural
variables
are
considered
important
because
they
reflect
general
patterns
and
constraints
that
affect
all
modern
presidents
and
Congresses,
regardless
of
their
particular
political
situations,
goals,
and
re-
sources.
For
example,
all
presidents
have
had
to
cope
with
the
fact
that
Senate
procedures
are
less
predictable,
and
more
tolerant
of
minority
rights,
than
are
House
rules
(Oleszek
1995).
All
presidents
have
had
to
consider
the
prob-
lems
and
opportunities
posed
by
a
fixed
election
schedule,
and
by
the
exter-
nal
demands
that
necessitate
shifts
in
emphasis
from
foreign
to
domestic
policy
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