An Economic Assessment of the Administration's Detrebling Proposal

AuthorGregory J. Werden,Marilyn J. Simon
DOI10.1177/0003603X8603100403
Date01 December 1986
Published date01 December 1986
Subject MatterSymposium on the Reagan Administration's Legislative Proposal
The Antitrust Bulletin/Winter 1986
An economic assessment
of
the Administration's
detrebling proposal
BY GREGORY J. WERDEN and MARILYN J. SIMON*
935
Section 4
of
the Clayton Act provides that any person injured "by
reason
of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" may sue and
recover threefold the damages sustained. IUntil 1940 there were
few actions for recovery
of
treble damages. The frequency of
such actions increased, however, through the 1950s and 1960s,
reaching an annual average of over a thousand cases in 1970. The
annual number
of
treble damage actions peaked in the mid-1970s,
but remains in excess
of
athousand.' The growth in importance
of the treble damage remedy naturally led to scholarly critiques
and proposals for reform. These proposals ranged from the
introduction of judicial discretion into the determination
of
the
Economists, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
AUTHORS'
NOTE: The views expressed herein are not purported to reflect
those
of
the U.S. Department
of
Justice.
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF'S NOTE: This symposium on the Reagan Administra-
tion's legislative initiatives was guest edited by Gregory J.
Werden.
15 U.S C. §15 (1982).
2See Gallo, Craycraft &Bush, Guess Who Came to Dinner:
An
Empirical Study
of
Federal Antitrust Enforcement
for
the Period 1963-
1984, 2 REV.
IND.
ORG.
106, 109 (1985); Posner, A Statistical Study
of
Antitrust Enforcement, 13
J.L.
&Ecox. 365, 371 (1970).
Cc
1987 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
936 The antitrust bulletin
damage multiplier for dealing with special cases' to the complete
elimination
of
private enforcement.4Several commentators advo-
cated reducing the damage multiple for certain types
of
offenses.'
In 1983, the Reagan Administration proposed to limit trebling to
cases involving "plainly anticompetitive" conduct," and more
recently, the Administration has proposed to allow trebling only
of
damages caused by overcharges and underpayments.' We
review the economic issues relating to the choice
of
a damage
multiple and to the design
of
an enforcement system and use
economic teachings to evaluate the Administration's latest pro-
posal. We also briefly discuss alternative approaches to the
reform
of
the private treble damage remedy.
2P.
AREEDA
&D.
TURNER,
ANTITRUST
LAW
149-51 (1978).
4Breit &Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Effi-
ciency: The Uneasy Case for
Treble
Damages, 17
J.L.
&
ECON.
329
(1974).
See also W.
BREIT
&K.
ELZINGA,
ANTITRUST
PENALTY
REFORM:
AN
ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
(1986); K.
ELZINGA
&
W.
BREIT,
THE
ANTITRUST
PENALTIES:
A
STUDY
IN
LAW
AND
ECONOMICS
(1976); Breit &Elzinga,
Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning, 28
J.L.
&
ECON.
405
(1985).
5See R.
POSNER,
ANTITRUST
LAW:
AN
ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE
221-31
(1976) (multiple damages only for concealable offenses); Easterbrook,
Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28
J.L.
&
ECON.
445 (1985) (treble
damages only for customers
and
suppliers); Baker, Reagan Administra-
tion Proposal Opens Debate on
Treble
Damages,
NAT'L
L.J.,
May 9,
1983, at 20, col. 2 (treble damages only for "covert agreement[s] among
competitors to fix prices or to allocate customers, territories, or mar-
kets").
6See Reagan Administration Approves Proposal
for
Antitrust,
Intellectual Property Bill,
[Jan.-June]
ANTITRUST
&
TRADE
REG.
REP.
(BNA) No. 1108, at 681,713-14 (Mar. 31, 1983). See also Baker, supra
note 5; Sullivan, Breaking Up the
Treble
Play: Attacks on the Private
Treble
Damage Antitrust Action, 14
SETON
HALL
L.
REV.
17, esp. 67-69
(1983).
7See Text
of
Administration's Proposals in Antitrust Reform,
[Jan.-June]
ANTITRUST
&
TRADE
REG.
REP.
(BNA) No. 1253, at S-4 (Feb.
20, 1986).

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