An Appraisal of French Antitrust Policy

• Author: B. Clement
• Published date: 01 September 1974
• Date: 01 September 1974
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X7401900306
• Subject Matter: Article

AN APPRAISAL OF FRENCH ANTITRUST POLICY

by

B.

CLEMENT-

During the Tokyo Conference on International Economy

and Competition Policy, last September, Professor Corwin D.

Edwards asked me to give a paper for The Antitrust Bulletin.

He expressed the wish

that

I should frankly give my opinion

about the French

antitrust

legislation' for the enforcement of

which I have been, under the authority of senior officials.

chiefly responsible during fourteen years. He thought

that

I

should be in a position to write about

it

with a certain disen-

gagement, having retired in the midst of

last

year. This I will

try

to do.

After

some brief historical remarks, my paper will be

divided in three unequal parts.

It

will first deal with the gen-

eral requirements of

any

successful action in the field of

restrictive business practices and the way in which these

requirements are now fulfilled in France. Then, with more

details,

it

will contain adescription of the scope of our legis-

lation and

its

main features, together with my personal views

on the subject. The third

part

will consist in an attempt to find

how the natural course of events has been influenced by our

antitrust

legislation

and

its enforcement, in other terms. an

attempt to assess its

real

impact,"

- Mr. Clement has

just

retired from his position as Assistant

Director for Competition of the French Economic Ministry's Di-

rectorate for Competition

and

Prices.

1This expression, used in the present paper for the sake of brev-

ity, must be understood

as:

regulations against restrictive business

practices or regulations on competition.

.I

Fuller

details on the French antitrust legislation, but of a purely

descriptive nature, can be found in the O.E.C.D. guide on restrictive

business practices legislation. A more philosophical

and

critical ap-

587

588

THE

ANTITRUST

BULLETIN

Needless to say, the French antitrust legislation, as it ap-

peared in

1953,

must be looked on as a

part

of what Professor

Edwards called the burst of post-war legislation," a

burst

which took its greater extent in the fifties.

It

cannot be denied

that

this legislation was inspired, to a

certain extent, by the American experience in this field. There

is not any doubt that the American legislation was kept in

mind when the French one was framed. The efficiency of the

American economy,as proved during World

War

II,

was then

admired by all Western countries. French officials and busi-

nessmen went to the States in order to take benefit from the

American economic experience, and the antitrust legislation

was regarded as one of the keys of the American economic

efficiency.

That

some measures of a similar kind were neces-

sary, seems the more evident as the shortage of almost every-

thing during the war and the immediate afterwar, together

with the consequent governmental regulations, left little place

for competition, while bad habits were fostered among business

spheres.· But, thanks among other factors to the Marshall

aid, our economy was getting normal and it became impera-

tive to change both minds and behaviors. Though inspired by

the same considerations, the regulations adopted by different

countries differ widely, according to their historical back-

ground and prevailing political conditions (see Corwin D.

Edwards, op. cit., Chapter

II:

"Influence of the Cultural In-

heritance," and also Chapter

IV:

"The Broad

Patterns

of

Control").

proach is given

in:

Control of Cartels and Monopolies, an Interna-

tional Comparison, by Corwin D. Edwards (New York 1967), the

best comparative book I ever read on the subject.

• Op. cit., Chapter I.

• The more the power intervenes into the economy, the more it is

necessary for it to reduce the number of its interlocutors. Rigidly

organized professions are therefore preferred to more competitive

structures. Though in a lesser form than during the war, this ten-

dency persists in some administrative circles and may be observed in

more than one country.