American Public Opinion on the Iraq War.

• Author: Schneider, Michael
• Position: Book review

American Public Opinion on the Iraq War by Ole Holsti, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011, ISBN-13: 9780472034802, pp. 238, $40.00 (paper)

Few conflicts have so engaged, or enraged, American public opinion as the war in Iraq, especially in the first four years. Uncertainty in response to an insistent President turned to anguish and outright opposition as casualties and costs mounted between March 2003 and the growing success of General Patreaus' troop surge and the Sunni Awakening in 2007-2008. Noted political scientist and Duke University Professor Ole Holsti analyzes the interaction of leaders and public opinion, and adroitly shows both the manipulation of public attitudes by the Bush Administration after 9-11, and the reaction as Administration claims proved false and expectations for "mission accomplished" fell flat. This is a worthwhile companion piece to the defensive memoirs by Bush Administration leaders, the insider depictions of decision-making by political analysts such as Bob Woodward, and histories of that troubled decade.

American Public Opinion on the Iraq War presents a well-structured narrative of the sequence of decisions regarding Iraq. The author breaks no new ground in use of sources or revelations of the internal decisional process in the Bush Administration. Nor does the reader come away with any special insights into personalities or rivalries--the gossip about conflict behind the scenes we all love to hate. Yet, for a short tour of the political battlefield this book recalls the milestones and major sites, and offers a useful timeline.

Holsti's key judgment was that "... survey data apparently played little role in policy decisions [italics by the author] but they helped shape how issues were framed in what was a relentless effort to gain public support for the administration's policies on Iraq. Although his team examined a variety of polls, President Bush "... had a very low regard for pollsters and was skeptical of evidence from their surveys, believing that his own instincts provided a better guide to the public mood." (p. 132)

The author points out the extraordinary effort by the Bush team to sway the public, in two phases, from 2001-2003, and in 2003-2009. At the outset, this paid off, according to the author. Media and Congressional doubters lost traction and fell into line, particularly in Holsti's view, because the Bush team framed the Iraq issue "... as a central part of the post-9/11 'global war...